

# Turkish Literature and Cultural Memory

»Multiculturalism« as a Literary Theme  
after 1980

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## **“Turkification” Policies in the Early Republican Era<sup>1</sup>**

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In this article, we shall analyze some of the Turkification policies which were implemented during the early years of the Republic and which became crystallized only in the formation of the Turkish nation-state. In this context, by “Turkification” policies I mean the way in which Turkish ethnic identity has been strictly imposed as a hegemonic identity in every sphere of social life, from the language spoken in public to the teaching of history in public schools; from education to industry; from commercial practices to public employment policies; from the civil code to the re-settlement of certain citizens in particular areas. The preconditions of the implementation of Turkification policies can be summarized as follows: the emergence of Turkish nationalism as a well-structured political ideology, the recognition of this ideology by the great majority of the political elite in power, and the existence of an international political conjuncture favourable to the implementation of these policies domestically.

In my article “1934 Trakya Yahudi Olaylarını ‘Doğru’ Yorumlamak” (“Correctly” Interpreting the 1934 Jewish Incidents in Thrace), it has been argued that the concept of “us” as in the dichotomy of “us” versus “others,” which com-

1 This article, originally published in Turkish as “Cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarında uygulanan ‘Türkleştirme’ Politikaları” in the journal *Tarih ve Toplum*, (No: 156, 1996, 4-18) as well as in the book by the author, entitled *Varlık Vergisi ve ‘Türkleştirme’ Politikaları* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000, 101-134) has been translated into English for publication in this collection by Adnan Tonguç, Tansel Demirel, and Amy Spangler.

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prises the basic categories of all nationalist movements, was defined by Kemalists as “those who are part of the Turkish ethnic identity” (Aktar 1996). Previously, I described how the Kemalists claimed that all ethnic groups who had been living in Anatolia for centuries “were actually Turks.” I also stressed the fact that with this method of inquiry an attempt was made to include all these different ethnic groups within the Turkish ethnic identity. In my previous article, I explained how the category of “us” was expanded during the single party period. However, the non-Muslim minorities who had been living in Anatolia for centuries under the protective umbrella of the Ottoman regime and keeping their own religious and ethnic identities intact were logically included in the category of “others.” If examined carefully, it will be noticed that these two processes are two different sides of the same coin. Consequently, and according to the Kemalists’ conception of nationalism, in order to extend the scope of the category of “us,” every person living in the country was declared to be a Turk! However, when this could not be implemented for structural reasons in the cases of non-Muslim minorities, the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey were in practice discriminated against and classified as “minorities” or “foreigners.”

Turkification policies implemented by the single party in power during the early years of the Republic (1925–1945) were thought to be “all-encompassing” for the Muslim population in the short term. Nevertheless, as far as the non-Muslim groups were concerned, these policies had “discriminatory/anti-minority” characteristics. If this is the case, then nearly all anti-minority policies implemented in Turkey cannot be described as being “antagonistic towards a particular ethnic or religious group,” such as the Jews, the Greeks, or the Armenians. In other words, during the single party period, all social groups that could not be Turkified for structural reasons were discriminated against without exception.

Consequently, all the efforts to Turkify every sphere of social life during the establishment of the nation-state manifest themselves at once and inevitably as “anti-minority” policies. What comprises “us” versus the “others” in a nation-state, and the criteria on which these notions are based, give us clues about the dominant type of nationalism in a country. These notions also help us identify all the tensions that encompass the fault line between the dominant political class claiming to represent the so-called Turkish majority and the non-Muslim minorities.<sup>3</sup> At this point, we should turn our attention to the intellectual heritage that shaped the praxis of the Turkish political elite in relation to non-Muslim minorities.

3 For the best study concerning the classification of different types of nationalism, see Greenfeld 1992.

## **I. A turning point in the intellectual heritage of the Kemalists: Ziya Gökalp**

The Republic of Turkey, which was born from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, had inherited a population comprised of many different religious and ethnic groups. Even though the overall population had decreased as a result of casualties incurred during the Balkan Wars, World War I, and the Turkish War of Independence, the share of the Muslim/Turkish population had increased in relative terms as a result of the Armenian deportation (1915–1917) and the Turkish-Greek Population Exchange (1922–1924).<sup>4</sup> As Çağlar Keyder expresses it so succinctly: “... Before the war, one out of every five persons [20%] living in present-day Turkey was non-Moslem, after the war, only one out of forty persons [2.5%] was non-Moslem” (Keyder 1989, 67). This radical change in the ethnic and religious composition of the population, combined with the political events of the period, resulted in the transformation of the conception of nationalism, from that developed by Ziya Gökalp before World War I, to that of Kemalist nationalism, which began to take shape in the 1920s. Even though these differences were not very obvious at the philosophical and ideological levels, they became utterly visible in the laws passed during the consolidation of the Republic.

Undertaking to formulate a nation-building project for a population comprised of widely diverse ethnic and religious groups, Ziya Gökalp designated culture (*hars*) as the defining criterion whereby an individual belonged to the national community. According to Gökalp:

A nation is not a community bound by geographical, racial, political, or voluntary ties. A nation is a cultural class made up of individuals who share a common language, that is, who have been brought up in the same way. One prefers to live together with people who have had the same upbringing and who have the same mother tongue, rather than with people of the same blood, because our personality lies not in our bodies, but in our spirits. Even though our physical virtues derive from our race, our moral virtues derive from the society that has nurtured us. (Gökalp 1982, 228)<sup>5</sup>

The concept of “culture,” as so meticulously defined by Gökalp on the basis of sociological principles, placed individuals under the same, broad cultural umbrella, irrespective of their ethnic identities, so long as they shared the same mother tongue and socialization. According to Gökalp, Islam is one of the most

4 On the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, see Aktar 2003. Also, for the Armenian massacres, see Aktar 2007.

5 All quotations from the Turkish have been translated by Adnan Tonguç, Tansel Demirel, and Amy Spangler, unless otherwise noted.

important aspects of the process of “socialization,” which he discusses as part of his conception of culture. In the same article, while underlining the importance of religion within the process of socialization, Gökalp also explains the social mechanisms that help people of the same religion but different ethnic identities accept the same national identity:

We have many co-religionists, who even though they are not racially Turkish, have a Turkish spirit in terms of their upbringing and their culture, and who share our misfortunes as well as our joys... As a result of their upbringing, these people can live in no other nation but Turkish society, and can work for no ideal but the Turkish ideal. (Gökalp 1982, 229)

In this way, Gökalp points out the social function of religion, which must have been the most disturbing aspect of his teaching for Kemalists in later years. The new regime did not look very favorably upon strengthening social solidarity via the ethical norms of Islam.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, we can clearly say that Gökalp’s conception of “nation” is more encompassing than exclusionary. His approach was particularly suitable to the demographic conditions in Anatolia at the time. This large umbrella would make it possible for those who felt themselves to be Albanian, Circassian, Bosnian, Kurdish, or Laz in terms of “ethnic identity” to nevertheless adopt a “Turkish national identity.” As Taha Parla stresses in his groundbreaking study *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876–1924*:

In Gökalp’s view, Turkish nationalism represented a cultural ideal, a philosophy of life which laid the basis of social solidarity. He believed that that applied to every [type of] nationalism. His was non-racist, non-expansionist pluralistic nationalism. Similarly, his unorthodox, Sufi brand of Islam with its emphasis on ethics rather than politics reinforced solidarity. Thus, Turkism became the cultural norm and Islam the moral norm in his societal model. Westernism or modernism, which Gökalp used interchangeably, meant the scientific, technological, industrial achievements of European capitalism, which were to form part of his program of national revival. (Parla 1985, 26)

True enough, in the years following 1908, when Gökalp’s conception of

<sup>6</sup> Uriel Heyd, who was the first to underline Gökalp’s views about Islam, made the following comment: “But for the anti-Islamic attitude of Atatürk, Gökalp might have become the initiator of fully scientific investigation of Islam in Turkey and perhaps even the father of an interesting religious reform movement” (Heyd 1950, 82).

nationalism was formulated, Jewish intellectuals like Moiz Kohen Tekinalp also contributed to the formulation of Turkish nationalism. Years later, Tekinalp would say the following about Gökalp:

Gökalp’s Turkism is not destructive, but rather constructive in the real sense of the word; it is not restrictive, but embracing... It has no aggressive tendencies or feelings towards any social institution that is not contrary to the good and well-being of the Turkish nation. In essence, he did not refrain from expressing his sentiments of love and respect towards non-Muslim Turkish citizens, or, as Ziya Gökalp himself expressed it, for his fellow members of the Turkish state (*Türk ‘devletdaşları’*). (Tekinalp 1944, 219)

This all-encompassing approach of Gökalp’s when it came to inclusion in the national community changed somewhat, however, when the matter of non-Muslim minorities’ dominant position in the economy came to the fore. The final stanza of the poem “*Vatan*” (Homeland) in Gökalp’s book titled *Yeni Hayat* (The New Life), which was published in 1912, is in a way a manifesto of Turkish economic nationalism:

A country where all the capital in the markets,  
Where science and technology guiding its crafts belongs to Turks.  
Where its craftsmen are always in solidarity with each other;  
Where the shipyards, factories, ships, and trains belong to Turks;  
Oh, son of the Turk, that is your country! (Gökalp 1976, 11)

The wishes expressed here are on the one hand the abolition of the capitulations granted to foreign companies in fields like shipping lines, railroads, and port management, and on the other, the strengthening of social solidarity by means of the mutual help of professional organizations set up within a corporatist framework. The poem includes also a very clear message as far as the Turkification of capital is concerned. In his article “*Yeni Hayat ve Yeni Kıymetler*” (New Life, New Values, 1911), which he wrote around the same time, Gökalp describes the position of non-Muslim minorities from the cultural point of view as follows:

When our non-Muslim citizens decided to acquire a new life, they did not need to search for long. The urban lifestyle of European nations suited them like ready-made clothing purchased in a shop. The majority of Greeks, Armenians, and Bulgarians among us immediately adopted all the urban customs and social attitudes of Europeans. As for us Muslims, we could not imitate the ready-made rules and standard lifestyles of civilization, because of the

particular characteristics of our lives. We needed lifestyles and rules tailored according to our own measurements, like a tailored suit, rather than a ready-made one. (Gökalp 1982, 44–45)

With these words, Gökalp seems at once to be making reference to a Latin American-style comprador bourgeoisie, as he also stresses the need to perceive the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims at the level not just of religious but of cultural differences as well.

When analyzing the structure of late Ottoman society in light of the basic concepts of Durkheim's sociology, Gökalp states that the specialization and differentiation processes, which gave rise to a wide variety of professional groups as a consequence of the social division of labor, did not automatically serve to strengthen social solidarity:

For example, in old Turkey, Turks and non-Muslims were living a common economic life. However, the social division of labor between them was not so much a genuine division of labor as it was a relationship of mutual parasitism, because these Turks and non-Turks shared no collective conscience. Turks were the political parasites of non-Muslims, and non-Muslims were the economic parasites of Turks. International economic relations are all of this kind. The second condition for the strengthening of this kind of [organic] solidarity is the creation of professional ethics in all professional classes, following the organization of professional classes into national associations throughout the country. (Gökalp 1976, 87)

You will notice that Gökalp first stresses the difference between Turks and non-Muslims from the cultural point of view, and later states that these groups lived within the same society, as two culturally separate blocs, connected to each other by bonds of a parasitic nature. Gökalp argues that the society lacked a collective conscience, which is one of the most basic concepts of Durkheim's sociology, and adds that this could be established only within a corporatist state shaped according to the principle of "professional representation."

Here, Gökalp puts forward a radical critique of the social structure of the late Ottoman period. Non-Muslims had previously solved matters like taxation, education, and civil law within their own communities thanks to the *Millet* system, and later when this system was abolished, they managed to hang on to some of their privileges, while simultaneously benefiting from the egalitarian atmosphere brought about by the *Tanzimat* reforms. On the one hand, non-Muslims became relatively richer as a result of the development of commercial life once the Ottoman Empire had opened up to the world economy in the nineteenth century. On the other hand, they were placed under the protection of European states once the "minorities question" had come to the fore as an important axis

of relations between the Ottoman State and the Great Powers. The complex web of relations in which Ottoman minorities found themselves in the late Ottoman period was strikingly described by Lewis and Braude as follows:

One could not be a citizen of a sovereign nation, the protégée of a foreign power and the subject of a would be egalitarian empire at one and the same time. Neither physics nor politics allows such things to occur, at least not for long. (Braude and Lewis 1982, 33)

After 1908, the administration of the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki*) was striving to both eliminate the capitulations and introduce egalitarian measures that would make all members of society equal under the law, such as centralizing the educational system, changing the conditions whereby non-Muslims were allowed to pay for exemption from military service, and overhauling other institutions that had been inherited from the Ottoman *ancien régime*. At the end of the Balkan Wars and World War I, the above-mentioned demographic changes occurred, the conflict between different nationalisms ended in disaster for some, and, finally, the Ottoman Empire collapsed.

## **II. The “problem of minorities” in the negotiations for the Lausanne Peace Treaty and the Civil Code**

The “problem of minorities” came to the fore once again in 1923, when the victorious commanders of Ankara were laying the foundation of the new Turkish state in Lausanne. Undoubtedly, the most difficult negotiations were those that concerned the capitulations of a judiciary nature rather than the financial capitulations. İsmet İnönü summarized the situation in his memoirs as follows:

Since the very first day, the Allies had accepted the need to abolish the financial requisites of capitulations, but they did not accept the outright abolition of the capitulations in the judicial field, and at the very least, they insisted on a five-year transition period. (İnönü 1989, 88)

The problem of judicial capitulations and privileges consisted of deciding which courts would have jurisdiction to handle cases or conflicts between members of different communities. In a way, judicial capitulations meant the existence of more than one judicial system within the same country. Keeping in mind that the Civil Code was enacted in 1926, or three years after the Lausanne Treaty, it is clear that the foreigners/minorities who did not want to be tried in courts subject to the Muslim canonical law were asking the new

regime to provide them with guarantees on this matter. It is for this reason that all the institutions that had been inherited from the Ottoman *ancient régime*, like pious foundations, schools, church courts, etc., were scrutinized during diplomatic negotiations in Lausanne.

As negotiations were going on in Lausanne, Hasan Saka, who was a member of the Turkish delegation, came back to Ankara and informed the Turkish Parliament about how things were progressing. During closed sessions held in the Turkish Parliament, which had assembled on January 1, 1923, the following juridical principles were established: All Turkish citizens, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, were to be placed under the same juridical system. And for non-Muslim citizens, all procedures having to do with private law, like marriage, divorce, legal origin of children, alimony, etc., were to be taken away from the churches and placed under the jurisdiction of the Turkish administrative system, thus making them subject to Turkish courts rather than community courts. However, this could be possible only if the newly founded nation-state were to renounce canonical law completely and enact a new Civil Code regulating relations between all Turkish citizens.<sup>7</sup>

Hasan Saka's speech in the Turkish Parliament is of particular significance, because it shows that at Lausanne, the Turkish Delegation promised the Allies that a new Civil Code would be enacted within three years' time. Hasan Saka spoke as follows:

Once the privileges of the religious communities have been abolished, the minorities' legal issues with regard to religious affairs, marriages, parentage, and alimony will remain, and these issues should be resolved by subordinating them to the Civil Code. We now have the obligation of reforming, completing, and enacting the laws related to family affairs within the Civil Code in a way that is in accordance with the requisites of the religions and denominations of all minorities, and since the need has arisen to register all marriages and divorces, including those of minorities, in our official records, through our official courts, we are also obligated to enact our laws accordingly.<sup>8</sup>

By enacting the Civil Code around three years later, the Ankara government eliminated the most significant problem of the community-based social system of the preceding Ottoman *ancien régime*. In this way, it both broke the traditional resistance of non-Muslim communities by making them subject to a sec-

7 For the most recent, most useful study concerning the way Turkish law changed during the process of modernization, see Bozkurt 1996.

8 *TBMM - Gizli Celse Zabıtları* [Turkish Grand National Assembly - Minutes of the closed sessions], Ankara, 1985, 1173.

ular system that was under its complete control, thus turning non-Muslim minorities into Turks from a legal point view, while also adopting the role of protector of non-Muslims, consequently annulling the influence of the Great Powers, which had been meddling in Turkey’s affairs. Thanks to the enactment of the Turkish Civil Code, the newly established nation-state had finally acquired the power to regulate through the juridical system the private lives, too, of all its citizens. From the point of view of the Kemalists, this law was not just a reformist legislation that had “raised juridical relations between individuals to the level of contemporary civilization,” but also the most important step taken by the nation-state on the road leading to its complete monopoly of power over its citizens’ legal affairs.<sup>9</sup> It is for these reasons that the enactment of the Civil Code cannot be considered as just “a step leading to the level of contemporary civilization,” since this law provided the Kemalists also with the magic key that let them not just be in power, but also made them capable of exerting unlimited power over the citizens of the Turkish State.<sup>10</sup>

To get back to Lausanne, Dr. Rıza Nur represented the Ankara government in the sub-commission for minorities at the Lausanne conference. Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of the Interior, who would also happen to be responsible for the Exodus of Jews from Thrace in 1934, was an active member of this commission.<sup>11</sup> In these negotiations, during which all institutions of the Ottoman State were discussed, the question of minorities played a key role.

We can state that the negotiations about minorities during the Lausanne Conference in 1923 broadened the horizons of Turkification both emotionally and intellectually for the founders of the new Turkey, and that they led to what we might term the “groundwork” for what would later become the Settlement Law, and to the Thrace Incidents of 1934. Within this context, I think the following passage from the memoirs of Dr. Rıza Nur is particularly significant:

According to the Europeans, we have three different types of minorities: racial minorities, linguistic minorities, and religious

9 Niyazi Berkes occupies a prominent place among the scholars who have written about Turkish reforms; however, it is interesting to note that even though Berkes took up this matter in detail, he did not approach it from the point of view of the “struggle for power.” See Berkes 1973, 470–471.

10 The matter of state power was expressed in the following terms in the justifications for the enactment of the Civil Code: “To ensure that laws should be applicable to all of society in those states whose subjects are members of various religions, these laws should be severed completely from religion; this is a requirement of national sovereignty as well, because if laws are based on religion, a state that accepts freedom of conscience will have to enact different laws for different groups of subjects, and such a state of affairs is completely discordant with the political, social, and national unity required by contemporary states.” Quoted in Bozkurt 1996, 193.

11 For the activities of this commission, see *Lozan Barış Konferansı - Tutanaklar Belgeler* 1970a, 151–288.

minorities. This is a very serious situation as far as we are concerned; a great danger! It is remarkable how well and how profoundly these men think, when they are contemplating against our interests... From a racial point of view, they will place the Circassians, the Abkhazians, the Bosnians, the Kurds, etc. together with the Greeks and the Armenians. From the linguistic point of view, they will make a minority of those who are Muslim but who speak other languages. From the religious point of view, they will make a minority of the two million Kızılbaş (Alevites), who are pure Turks. In other words, they intend to divide us into bits and pieces. I shuddered when I heard this project.... With all my strength, I sought to eliminate this terminology. I fought very hard to do so. Albeit with great difficulty, I succeeded. *The moral of the story*: The basic, most just, and most vital matter for us, is to ensure that no people of another race, language, or religion should remain in our country. It is for this reason that a long time ago I turned from Turkism to extreme Turkish Nationalism... It is for this reason that first priority should be given to disperse the Circassian, Albanian, etc. villages and to settle them together with Turks. (Nur 1967, 83; emphasis is mine).

Observations and generalizations of the sort seen in the quotation above, which are reminiscent of the “stream of consciousness” literary technique of Western literature, are not frequently encountered in the memoirs of the Kemalist elite. Due to his incurably fanatic character, Dr. Rıza Nur’s memoirs are full of accusations against national heroes that could be defined at the very least as “unstable.” Despite his tendency to exaggerate, we can safely claim that Dr. Rıza Nur’s sentiments about minorities are sincere, especially once you read the memoirs’ sections referring to Lausanne together with the official minutes of the conference.

### **III. Non-Muslim communities renounce the rights they gained at Lausanne**

Turkey’s Civil Code (*Türk Medeni Kanunu*), which is actually a translation of the Swiss Civil Code, was approved by the Turkish Parliament in February 1926 and, following a transition period, came into force in October of the same year, together with the new Turkish Penal Code, which was adopted from Fascist Italy. However, other steps that paved the way towards the implementation of the Civil Code were finalized in the summer months of 1925, when the Civil Code was still being prepared.<sup>12</sup> Just before the Civil Code went into effect, the minority representatives—who thought that, thanks to Article 42 of the Lausanne Treaty, their rights had been guaranteed—were pressured by the

government and, as a result of said pressure, assembled their Community Councils and declared that they renounced all the rights bestowed upon them at Lausanne.<sup>13</sup>

The three commissions that had to be established, in accordance with Article 42 of the Lausanne Treaty, were formed in May 1925. The members of these Greek, Armenian, and Jewish commissions were appointed by the government. Following long discussions and intense pressure from government circles, the commission, which included Jewish members, announced on 10 September 1925 its decision to renounce all the rights given to the Jewish community in accordance with Article 42 of the Lausanne Treaty.<sup>14</sup> This was followed by a similar decision on the part of the Armenian community. The Greek community resisted for a while, but sub-committees that were supposed to “generate recommendations” were continuously being formed. At times, some members of the sub-committees were removed and replaced with more “moderate” members. Finally, the day before the sub-committee was going to vote, the members most adamantly opposed to renouncing the rights granted by Article 42 were arrested by the police. As a result of all this, on November 27, 1925, 55 of the 72 members of the sub-committee voted in favor of signing the document, whereby the Greeks, too, then renounced their minority rights. The main committee approved this decision.<sup>15</sup> Thus was the last vestige of Ottoman *ancient regime* abolished, and so, having been deprived of all the privileges they had derived from being part of minority religious and ethnic communities and which had been guaranteed by international treaties, non-Muslim citizens became Turks from a “legal standpoint.”

12 Dispatch sent from Mr. R. H. Hoare in Istanbul to Sir Austen Chamberlain in London: FO 371: Foreign Office Correspondence / Document dated 9 August 1926, E 4663/35/44.

13 Official English translation of Article 42 of Lausanne Treaty is as follows: “The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities.

These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers.

The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorization will be granted to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are guaranteed to other private institutions of that nature.”

14 For the text of the decision, whereby the Jewish community renounced the rights granted to it by Article 42 of the Treaty of Lausanne, see Galanti 1995, 70–74. See also Alexandris 1983, 135–138.

15 See Alexandris 1983, 138.

#### **IV. The Turkification of capital and of the labor market:**

Another policy that began during the first decade of the Republic and that continued during the following years was the policy of Turkification of capital and of the labor market, which we might term “economic nationalism,” and which was carried out according to the principles laid out by Gökalp in his poem “*Vatan*,” published in 1912. The main targets of this policy were foreign companies operating in Turkey, and the foreign or non-Muslim personnel employed in these companies.

The reports and letters written to their headquarters by representatives of the Great Powers, whose interests in Turkey had been damaged by this policy of Turkification, are full of details concerning the practical implementation of said policy. For example, in his report to the British Foreign Secretary Sir A. Chamberlain, the British Ambassador in Istanbul Sir R. Lindsay first presented a general assessment of the situation, and then stated: “Turkish nationalism does not differ in essentials from other forms of European nationalism.” In this report, the British Ambassador explained the wave of nationalism in Turkey by saying: “It is, however, aggravated by isolation of Turkey in her distant capital at Ankara and by the novelty of the disease which runs a high fever in its early stages.”

In this fascinating report, it is stated that “numerous orders and decisions by the police of municipal authorities, which are never put in writing, are being produced to force foreign firms of all kinds, whether shops, banks etc. to employ at least 75 per cent Moslem Turks on their staff.” In the last part of the report, it is underlined that “when the port services were nationalized, foreigners and non-Moslem Turkish subjects were prevented from carrying on professions such as pilotage, diving and ship-chandling.”

The following is another point that did not escape the attention of the British Ambassador:

The Municipal authorities are trying to reserve all kinds of callings for Turks. For example, on the plea of revising chauffeurs’ licences, they are holding back all licenses belonging to foreign and non-Muslim Turkish chauffeurs. Also foreign masters and engineers employed on vessels flying the Turkish flag have been notified that these callings are reserved for Moslem Turks.<sup>16</sup>

At the end of his report, the ambassador states that, as a result of the intense lack of trust towards non-Turkish groups, the Republican administration wanted to establish a state that was surrounded by some kind of a Chinese Wall and belonged to them alone. The British Ambassador added that this lack of trust

<sup>16</sup> Dispatch sent from Sir R. C. Lindsay in Istanbul to Sir Austen Chamberlain in London: Document dated February 8, 1926, E1072/373/44.

derived from the Great Powers’ policies towards Turkey during the previous century, and stressed the fact that the Republican administration had the intention of insulating themselves completely against eventual pressures from foreigners.<sup>17</sup>

In those same days, J. E. Kingsbury, who was the representative in London of the Istanbul Telephone Company founded with British capital, wrote a letter to the Foreign Office, in which he quoted from a letter written by the general manager of the company in Istanbul in which the latter complained about the policy of Turkification. This is what the general manager in Istanbul wrote:

I’ll have to sack Nicos, my chauffeur who has been with me since 1912. The Prefecture won’t license him to work as a chauffeur. They are driving out all non-Muslims from being waiters, including dozens of Russian refugee girls who, at present, are earning an honest living.<sup>18</sup>

Kingsbury states that there had not been as yet any pressure concerning the few British specialists working in the company, but that they were facing great difficulties finding qualified personnel to employ in place of the non-Muslims who had been dismissed.

Similar complaints came also from the company running the Izmir-Aydın railway. Mr. Shewan, the general manager in Izmir, said that “there is a very strong feeling [in Ankara] that all the railways ought to be in the hands of the state,” a view reinforced by the example of the Turkish-run Anatolian Railways. He added that “the successful management of the Anatolian Railway is popularly quoted in proof of the ability of the Turks to hold their own against foreigners in all railway affairs, not knowing or ignoring the fact that it has been worked at a loss, the state paying the deficit.”<sup>19</sup> One of the subjects discussed during the meeting about the Izmir-Aydın Railway Company on March 18, 1926, is particularly interesting. In the minutes summarizing the complaints made by company managers to the Foreign Office, it was stated that following the nationalization of the Izmir Port Authority, the railway company was denied the right to use the jetty, wharf, and cranes that it owned, because its workers in the port were foreign, and thus considered to be potential spies, and that for this reason alone, the authorities were demanding that they be dismissed.<sup>20</sup>

A questionnaire sent by the Statistics Department of the Turkish Ministry of Commerce to the representatives of all insurance companies around two months

17 Ibid.

18 From J. E. Kingsbury in Istanbul to the Under Secretary of State in London, dated February 18, 1926, E1186/373/44.

19 Letter from General Manager T. M. Shewan in Smyrna to the London Manager and Secretary of the Ottoman Railway from Smyrna to Aydın, dated March 2, 1926, FO 371: E1470/373/44.

20 Ibid.

later contained detailed questions concerning the companies' capital structure, the foreign countries in which their headquarters were located, and the shareholding structures of the companies that they represented or were a subsidiary of. However, the second part of the questionnaire aimed to collect information that would be especially valuable for the purposes of Turkification policies. In this part, the companies were asked to provide not only detailed lists of the salary levels of their employees, but also the distribution of the employees within each group in terms of the categories "Muslim Turk," "non-Muslim Turk," and "Foreigner." In his report to London, the British Ambassador Lindsay said that "the document is interesting as a proof of the distinction drawn by the Turkish Government between Moslem and non-Moslem Turkish subjects: a distinction which the Government has always maintained does not exist."<sup>21</sup>

When the Wealth Tax (*Varlık Vergisi*), which was an "anti-minority" tax, was introduced during World War II, about seventeen years later, similar categories were used to classify taxpayers. In the summer of 1942, Faik Ökte, the head of Financial Revenue Office in Istanbul, received a secret order from Ankara, recommending him to begin preparations for the collection of a once-for-all tax. Mr. Ökte decided to put together names of the businessmen accumulating extraordinary profits due to war conditions by classifying them according to ethnic and religious background.<sup>22</sup>

Another law enacted on April 10, 1926, by the Turkish Parliament made it obligatory for all companies to "use Turkish in all operations, contracts, correspondence, accounts, and book-keeping conducted within Turkey."<sup>23</sup> As for foreign companies, they were obliged to use Turkish in their contacts with Turkish citizens and in their official books. Actually, this law was the re-make of a very similar law passed by the Union and Progress government during World War I (Toprak 1995, 60). However, contrary to the previous law, which could not really be enforced during wartime and the armistice, its Republican version was implemented with utmost strictness. The true aim of both laws was not to ensure that foreigners working in Turkey should learn Turkish, but to pressure foreign countries into employing Muslim Turks.

These attitudes, which were the tangible manifestation of economic nationalism aimed specifically at the markets themselves, might at first glance be regarded as a "left-leaning, anti-imperialist reaction." If, in the early Republican era, steps had been taken to nationalize the companies owned by foreigners,

21 Dispatch sent from Sir R. C. Lindsay in Istanbul to Sir Austen Chamberlain in London: FO 371: Document dated March 3, 1926, E2778/373/44.

22 In his memoirs, Faik Ökte explains the process as follows: "Lists were first divided into M and G. The group M represented Muslim tax payers and G represented non-Muslim minorities. Later the D added to these for Crypto-Jews [migrated from Salonica] and E added for foreigners." (Ökte 1951, 48)

23 Law No. 805 on the "Obligatory Utilization of Turkish Language in all Economic Enterprises," dated April 22, 1926. For the text, see *Düstur* - III. Tertip. Vol. 7, 219.

by altering their ownership structures, then it might have been possible to perceive the entirety of events that we have been summarizing as the implementation of an anti-imperialist economic policy in favor of national independence. However, the Turkification policies that were implemented in the 1920s were directed not only against foreign capital, but against foreign or non-Muslim employees as well. Consequently, the matter went beyond the ownership structure of the companies. What the Republican/Kemalist elite sought was the elimination of “those who are not one of us”—even if the person in question was a simple worker! It is for these reasons that Turkification policies manifested themselves as a set of discriminatory policies.

### **V. Employment in the public sector: the last Ottomans and the single party regime**

Beginning from the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman bureaucracy underwent a great transformation with regard to the ethnic and religious characteristics of its employees. At that time, non-Muslims educated in modern schools established throughout the empire began to find more and more employment opportunities in the Ottoman bureaucracy, both central and provincial. For example, if we look at the numbers provided by Carter Findley on the basis of the employment records for the Ottoman Foreign Ministry for the years 1850–1908, we see that in that period, minorities comprised around one third (29%) of all career officials (Findley 1982, 343). Despite the unfavorable effects of the nationalist and secessionist movements amongst the minorities in the late Ottoman Empire, it is quite clear that equal opportunity in terms of state employment was achieved within the Ottoman Foreign Ministry.

Likewise, even during the 33-year reign (1876–1909) of Sultan Abdülhamid II, who skillfully employed Islamic and Turkish symbols as part of his project to promote “Imperial Ottoman Nationalism,” the Sultan in no way took measures to keep minorities from being employed or subsequently rising within the ranks of the Ottoman bureaucracy (Deringil 1998, 16–43). In his study on the employment of non-Muslims in the Ottoman bureaucracy during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, İlber Ortaylı states that the fact that non-Muslims were being appointed to and employed in the Ottoman bureaucracy “could not really be ascribed to the pressure exerted by foreign Christian states.” Ortaylı also adds:

[T]he state had begun to become more cosmopolitan from the eighteenth century onwards, and young non-Muslim men, especially those educated in the secular schools of the nineteenth century, entered state service and were appointed to various positions just like their Muslim counterparts. Thanks to this new development, an old standard of the traditional bureaucracy was done away with in the period of the *Tanzimat* reforms.” (Ortaylı 1994, 168)

As for the single party period (1923–1946), the employment of non-Muslims in public service was first stopped *de facto*, and then *de jure* by means of the enactment of a specific law. In Article 4 of the Law on State Employees, dated March 18, 1926, (Law No. 788), it was stated: “The following requirements are necessary to become a state employee.” The first requirement in clause “a” was that one “must be a Turk.”<sup>24</sup> This law, which spelled out the requirements for becoming a state employee by making direct reference to Turkish ethnic identity, rather than simply stating that one “must be a citizen of the Republic of Turkey,” remained in force until 1965.<sup>25</sup> The Law on State Employees during the single party period gave only ethnic Turks or Laz, Bosnian, Circassian, Kurdish, etc. citizens who could be Turkified (i.e., ethnically non-Turkish Muslims) the right to work in the public service, thus simultaneously encouraging a significant portion of the population to become Turks, and constituting a typical example of the “discriminatory” policies against non-Muslims. This law thus barred non-Muslim citizens of Turkey—i.e., those who, because of their ethnic identities, could in no way be considered or “become ethnic Turks”—from state employment, regardless of their education or qualifications.<sup>26</sup>

## VI. “Certain professions” are reserved for Turkish citizens

Another law of particular importance for the Turkification process is the “Law Reserving Certain Professions, Trades, and Services to Turkish Citizens.” Enacted by Turkish Parliament on 4 June 1932 (Law No. 2007), this law banned non-Muslims from practicing certain professions outside the public sector. In his speech during the presentation to parliament of this law (the full text of which is provided in the appendix), Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya had the following to say:

24 For the complete text of the Law on State Employees, see *Düstur - III. Tertip*, Vol. 7, 667.

25 Article 48 of the Law on State Employees number 657, which was enacted on July 14, 1965, and is still in force, has finally been amended, so that the requisite for being a state employee has been changed to that of “being a Turkish citizen.” See *Düstur - V. Tertip*. Vol. 4, Book 3, 3053.

26 During a public debate believed to have been held in the 1980s, Dr. Hagop Sivashyan, a journalist of Armenian origin, responded to a university teacher who had told him, “Armenians are not second class citizens, there is no distinction between Turks and Armenians. Armenians are free to work in any kind of business environment, and non-Muslims benefit from all rights enjoyed by Turks,” as follows: “The fact that during Ottoman times Armenians could become pashas or administrators is frequently mentioned. Okay, so the Armenians of Ottoman times were very bright and capable, but what about the Armenians of Republican times? Are they all stupid? Why isn’t the same still happening? ... I am ... a journalist, I have studied medicine, but I have never practiced this profession, I am nevertheless employed... I don’t want anything to do with commerce. I want to be a *Nahiye Müdürü* (appointed governor of a small county). That’s my hobby! And I believe that I would be the best governor in Turkey, no matter how many governors of small counties there are in Turkey. But I am not allowed to become a governor. And if I am not allowed to become a governor, it means there is a problem.” See Kılıç 1992, 65.

This law, or in other words, the law that prohibits foreigners from practicing certain crafts, is a law that all independent nations have been implementing for a long time. In international law, this is called *régime d'étrangers*, that is, the procedures and rules that apply to foreigners. It has long been our wish to pass this law; however, the capitulations, which have always hindered the development and future of our country, made us incapable of realizing this wish, until now. When the capitulations were unilaterally abolished during World War I, some crafts were reserved exclusively for Turks. We gained the greatest of such rights at Lausanne. At Lausanne, we reserved the practice of certain crafts and professions for the citizens. However, there were still a few steps that needed to be taken, and now, we have perfected and completed those last few steps with this law. The following are the principles upon which this law is based:

Professions related to public security, professions related to public service, and some economic and social statuses and conditions... Some professions related to public security had already been reserved for the citizens by means of laws regulating professional classes, like the Law on Practicing Medicine and the Law on Practicing Pharmaceutical Professions, while some were regulated by means of the Law on Maritime Shipping (*Kabotaj*). Now all that remains are professional classes like chauffeurs and janitors. We are filling in this gap now by means of this law, whereby we reserve these professions for the citizens.

Secondly, there are those jobs related to public service, such as that performed by porters. We are reserving those, too, for the citizens. I mean jobs like street vendors (*ayak satıcılığı ve bohçacılık*).

Thirdly are the social and economic positions, and these, too, we have reserved for the citizens. This also is an economic necessity. These are arts, crafts, and professions that require limited capital and limited skill. Being a street vendor is the best example of this. Whenever a citizen is in need, he should be able to take his handkerchief out of his pocket and sell it in the market in order to put food on his table at home. If he has to compete with people from other nations, our citizen would be deprived of this right.”<sup>27</sup>

27 TBMM - Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre 4, Cilt 9. Ankara, TBMM Matbaası [Turkish Grand National Assembly - Record of Minutes. 4th Election Period, Vol. 9. Ankara, TBMM Press], 65.

The Interior Minister's speech clearly demonstrates the *raison d'être* of many laws, insofar as they serve to further the policy of Turkification, enacted during the second half of the 1920s, not all of which we have been able to analyze in this article. In particular, the fact that even chauffeurs and janitors were considered important for public security is very enlightening in that it shows the extremely broad definition of public security adopted by legislators.

It is not difficult to imagine who Minister Şükrü Kaya was referring to in the last paragraph of his speech, when he mentioned the categories of "foreigners" and "people from other nations." Before the signing of the Lausanne Treaty, the "Treaty Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish People" was signed on January 30, 1923, according to which the Greeks of Istanbul were exempted from the population exchange and given the right to live and work in Istanbul without becoming Turkish citizens, on the basis of the status of *établis* [settled].<sup>28</sup> According to the 1927 population census, there were 26,431 Greek citizens in Istanbul. Consequently, the targets of Law No. 2007 were first of all the Greek citizens in Istanbul, but also minorities like the White Russians, who had refugee status.

According to Article 5 of this law, "foreigners must resign from their jobs within six months following the publication of this law in the Official Gazette." Later this transition period was extended to a year and then, with a final amendment on May 31, 1933, to two years, but the decision concerning "which of the jobs indicated in this law would be forbidden at what date" was left to the cabinet. Let us see what happened in the summer of 1934, when the transition period established by this law ended.

## VII. The Istanbul Greeks who lost their jobs migrated to Athens

A few days before the 1934 pogrom concerning the Jews of Thrace, or to be more exact, on June 28, 1934, the US Ambassador Robert P. Skinner invited the Greek Consul in Istanbul to lunch. During lunch, the Greek Consul mentioned the fact that, because of the end of the transition of the above-mentioned law, around 15,000 Istanbul Greeks would lose their jobs. As a result of the decisions made by the cabinet in May 1934, this minority group, comprised primarily of professionals, small merchants, and craftsmen, found itself unemployed and was therefore getting ready to migrate to Greece.<sup>29</sup>

In the summer months of 1934, around 2,000 Istanbul Greeks with Greek passports began to emigrate from Istanbul. According to the 1935 census, the

28 For the complete text of the treaty, see *Lozan Barış Konferansı - Tutanaklar Belgeler* 1970b, 89.

29 Records of the Department of State relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey, 1930–1944. Dispatch sent from Robert P. Skinner in Istanbul to the Secretary of State in Washington, dated June 30, 1934, 867. 504/11.

number of Greek citizens living in Istanbul had decreased to 17,642. This meant that, in comparison to the 1927 census, the number of Istanbul Greeks with Greek passports had decreased by around 9,000 (Alexandris 1983, 185). As for the White Russians, who at the time numbered around 2,000, they were able to hold on to their jobs thanks to the fact that the US Ambassador made a special plea to Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras, and requested also for the intervention of the League of Nations in Geneva.<sup>30</sup>

Faced with this situation, the Greek government was at a loss as to what to do. It was useless to give land to the Istanbul Greeks, who were immigrating to Greece, and to ask them to become farmers, because these people did not have a rural background. As for the bigger cities of Greece, they were already full of urban Greeks who had arrived from Anatolia about ten years earlier, as part of the population exchange. On July 24, 1934, the US Ambassador in Athens notified Washington of the Greek press’s highly critical coverage of the Turkish government’s expulsion of Greek natives of Istanbul, stating: “Greek friendship must mean something, after all, to a nation like Turkey which stands such a fear of the growth of Italian power in the Aegean.”<sup>31</sup> Despite the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece in those days, the Turkish administration did not budge; the Turkification policy was continuing.

### **VIII. “Citizen, speak Turkish!” – The situation in 1937 from the point of view of the minorities**

Lastly, we shall analyze a debate that began with the “Citizen, speak Turkish!” campaigns, which comprise the most important aspect of the Turkification policies.<sup>32</sup> Following the “prohibition of speaking in languages other than Turkish within city limits” implemented by certain municipalities in 1937, the Chief Editor of *Tan* newspaper, Ahmet Emin Yalman, wrote an article on this sub-

30 From Chargé d’Affaires G. Howland Shaw in Istanbul to the Secretary of State in Washington, dated September 18, 1934, 867. 504/19.

31 From Ambassador Lincoln Mac Veagh in Athens to the Secretary of State in Washington, dated July 24, 1934, 867. 504/13.

32 These campaigns began during the single party period, and were repeated on various occasions up through the mid-1960s. As a result of government pressure, minorities strove to adapt and formulated a theoretical framework for the campaigns that they carried out to this end. For example, in his work titled *Türkleştirme* (Turkification), originally published in 1928, Moiz Kohen Tekinalp, a Jewish intellectual who had worked closely with Ziya Gökalp, summarized in “ten commandments” what the Jews had to do to ensure that the Jews of Turkey should be included in the “collective conscience” that was the basis of Turkish national union: “1. Use Turkish names; 2. Speak Turkish; 3. Say at least some of their prayers in the synagogues in Turkish; 4. Turkify their schools; 5. Send their children to national schools; 6. Get involved in the affairs of Turkey; 7. Establish close contacts with Turks; 8. Eradicate community spirit; 9. Do their duty in the field of national economics; 10. Know their rights.” See Landau 1996, 289.

ject, and Marsel Franko, President of the Lay Council of the Chief Rabbinate and of the Jewish Community, responded with an open letter; you can find both articles in the appendices. This debate gives insight into the conditions in which non-Muslims, who were perceived as “others” within the Kemalists’ conception of nationalism, found themselves in 1937, and the sensitivities of their community leaders.

Since the “Citizen, speak Turkish!” campaigns of the single party period could be the subject of a separate article, I do not want to analyze them in detail here. As you can see from Yalman’s article, the people to whom this campaign was addressed were not just the non-Muslim minorities. Yalman advises also the Muslim migrants from Balkan countries settled in Turkey that it would be best to drop their habit of speaking other languages in public “for the sake of the political and social union and harmony” of the country. Yalman also states that not too much pressure should be put on non-Muslim minorities who insist on speaking in their own mother tongues, and that the best approach to such people is simply to tell them, “as you please,” and show them to the door. Although it may appear as if the subject of Yalman’s article is the use of Turkish in public places, what was actually being debated was the problem of the integration of non-Muslim minorities, and in particular the Jews, into Turkish society.

As for Marsel Franko’s open letter, it addresses the problem directly and discusses the ways by which the 80,000 Jews of Turkey might adapt to Turkish culture. After stating that many Jews considered it degrading to even discuss their loyalty to the nation, Franko, head of the Jewish community, stresses the fact that it is the right of these people to expect “to be promoted from part-time citizenship, visitor status, and mere Civil Code Turkishness, to full moral citizenship, as a normal result of the [Republican] regime.” In addition to this, Franko writes that Jewish youth were not being admitted to national youth organizations, and goes on to list the Jewish community’s expectations of the state, and remind the readers that they wished for the “discriminatory” policies to come to an end and expected “clear signs and guidance” from statesmen on the subject of integration.<sup>33</sup> Reading between the lines, we can discern that Franko meant to say that Jews were ready to join the Turkish national community, but at the same time, he had complaints regarding discriminatory policies, which he referred to as relegating minority populations to “part-time citizenship, visitor status, and mere Civil Code Turkishness.”

## **IX. In lieu of a conclusion**

I stated at the beginning of this article that Turkification policies were at the same time a set of discriminatory, “anti-minority” policies. The Kemalist conception of nationalism that defined the criterium of membership in the Turkish national community or in the Turkish nation as “being part of the Turkish ethnic group” was very different both from the “Ottoman Nationalism” of the reign

of Sultan Abdülhamid II, and from the conception of “cultural nationalism” formulated by Ziya Gökalp. These differences become blatantly obvious in expressions of Kemalist nationalism, particularly in official publications and in the Kemalists’ speeches and statements. In his pioneering study on the official ideology of the single party period, Taha Parla reveals the two faces of Kemalist nationalism. The first is a defensive, egalitarian, ethnically pluralistic, and cultural conception of nationalism. The other is a conception of nationalism that is implemented especially against non-Muslim minorities, foregrounding the Turks as an “ethnically dominant-monopolistic-exclusionary” majority. Parla argues that minorities became the target of the second conception of nationalism and “in the Republic of Turkey, they have been perceived as people with ‘conditional citizenship’ and ‘limited rights,’ who have been ‘relegated to the fringes of society’ as people who ‘do not belong to us after all’” (Parla 1992, 209). You will notice that the situation described by Parla as “being relegated to the fringes of society” was described by Marsel Franko as “part-time citizenship, visitor status, and mere Civil Code Turkishness.” Franko’s wish was for this situation to be remedied by means of positive steps to be taken by the central authorities. As far as we know, such steps were never taken. Quite to the contrary, by means of laws like the Wealth Tax Law, which was passed during World War II, the position of non-Muslim minorities as “part-time citizenship, visitor status, and mere Civil Code Turkishness” has been further reinforced.<sup>34</sup>

33 Turkification policies were also valid for youth organizations. Article 1 of the “Law Concerning Turkey’s Youth Organizations Being Exclusive to Turkish Citizens” (Law No. 1246, enacted on May 12, 1928) imposed a limitation by stating that “the right to establish youth organizations as rangers, explorers, boy scouts, or with any other name or title, within the borders of the Republic of Turkey, in schools or outside schools, is exclusive to Turkish citizens.” Law No: 1246, adopted on May 12, 1928 by the Turkish Parliament.

34 An interview in *The London Times* with then-Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu, dated January 16, 1943, at a time when the collection of the Wealth Tax was still ongoing, is particularly enlightening in this respect. As he explains the reasons for the Wealth Tax, Saracoğlu provides clues about his own perception of minorities: “Many things have been said about the Wealth Tax that has been introduced by the Turkish government in order to satisfy urgent financial and economic needs. This law is not just legitimate and appropriate, but it is nearly certain that other countries, too, will introduce a similar tax before the end of the war. Turkish peasants have had to bear the burden all by themselves for centuries. The Turkish nation in its entirety has responded gallantly and willingly to the measures requiring sacrifices that the government has introduced to be able to face the exceptional circumstances caused by the war. Only some people and merchants have shut their ears to the pleas of the government, and have abused the freedom and trust afforded them by the new government when it was formed last year. It was as a result of this that the need to introduce this law appeared. It has to be admitted that certain aspects of this law are onerous. However, those who prove their good faith and they are good citizens will be facilitated, and material mistakes will be corrected. This law will be applied with all its force against those who, *even though they got rich thanks to the hospitality shown them by this country*, have refrained from carrying out their duty towards it in this precarious moment” (Emphasis is mine!). For the Turkish version of this interview, see *Aynı Tarihi*, No. 110, 1943, 38.

In this article, I preferred not to enter into a detailed analysis of Turkish nationalist ideology and its transformation, as I have done elsewhere (Aktar 1996b). Instead, I tried to elaborate actual practices in the early years of the Republic, especially by describing discriminatory policies directed towards non-Muslim minorities.<sup>35</sup> Considered within this framework, what I have done here is analyze the 1934 pogrom against the Jews of Thrace, which was the subject of my previous article, as well as some discriminatory practices and their ideological reflections. However, in this article, as I was examining Turkification policies, I furthermore tried to analyze both some actual circumstances and the process by which those circumstances were transformed into legislation, by focusing on some key laws of the period. In this way, I traced the process whereby what was *de facto* later became *de jure*, and thus gave rise to tangible political institutions. It seemed to me that the most effective way of understanding the creation of a national state, the resulting power structure, and the dominant conception of nationalism, was to follow the shadow of the state over the minorities. In a way, what I did was try to understand some structural characteristics of the main formation by subjecting that shadow to a detailed analysis.

35 At this point, I would like to underline Taha Parla's method of analysis in order to understand corporatism in general. Parla argues the following: "Corporatism as a model and philosophy of society, then, may be expressed in the form of a well-formulated, programmatic political ideology, or it may remain as a loose worldview. At another level, or dimension, corporatism is a system of actual practices and policies that are the result of, or in conformity with, such a worldview or ideology. At a third level or dimension, corporatism, beyond the *de facto* manifestations of the second level, unfolds in *de jure* manner as tangible political institutions and legal structures." (Parla 1985, 46)

**Appendix I:**

**Law No. 2007 on “Restricting Certain Professions and Trades to Turkish Citizens Only”<sup>36</sup>**

Article 1 – Within the borders of the Republic of Turkey, the following crafts and services are to be carried out exclusively by Turkish citizens. Non-Turkish citizens are forbidden from carrying out these crafts and services.

- A) Street vendors; musicians; photographers; barbers; typographers; dealers [middlemen]; clothing, cap, and shoe manufacturers; brokers in stock markets; sellers of state monopoly goods; interpreters and guides for tourists and travelers; construction workers, and iron and wood industry workers, permanent or temporary workers in public transport or utilities like water, electricity, heating, and communication; loading and unloading of land transport vehicles; chauffeurs and their assistants; all kinds of manual workers; concierge, janitors, and porters in all kinds of institutions like merchant houses, apartment buildings, offices, hotels and companies; female or male servants, waiters, and waitresses in hotels, offices, public baths, coffeehouses, night-clubs, dance halls, and bars; bar entertainers and singers.
- B) Veterinary doctors and chemists.

Article 2 – Unless authorized with a special license by the Council of Ministers, the following professions cannot be carried out by foreigners:

- A) Aircraft machinists and pilots.
- B) Institutions owned by the state or by provincial governments, or municipalities and facilities owned by municipalities.

Article 3 – If the need arises, the Council of Ministers may prohibit foreign citizens from performing crafts and services that have not been reserved for Turkish citizens by this law.

Article 4 – The janitors and doorkeepers of the embassies and consulates of foreign countries in the Republic of Turkey, and the workers who are citizens of their own or of another foreign country and who drive the vehicles under their orders.

<sup>36</sup> Law No. 2007, dated June 11, 1932. For the full text of the law, see *Düstur - III. Tertip*, Vol. 13, 519–, March 4, 1937.

Article 5 – Foreigners, who on the date of publication of this law are carrying out crafts and services that have been reserved for Turkish citizens, are obliged to leave their jobs within *one year* after the date of publication of this law.

Article 6 – Foreigners who continue to carry out crafts and services that have been reserved for Turkish citizens after the end of the term indicated in Article 5, will be prevented from carrying out these crafts and services by the orders of the highest local authority, and together with an official record indicating this breach of the law, they will appear before a court of first instance, where they will be condemned to pay a penal fine ranging from ten to five hundred liras.

Article 7 – The citizens of countries that impose administrative or legal limits upon Turkish citizens may be prohibited from carrying out the crafts and services that previously permitted to them in Turkey, by a decision issued by the Council of Ministers.

Article 8 – Foreigners are forbidden from opening shops in the villages.

Article 9 – This law will be valid from the moment of publication.

Article 10 – The Council of Ministers is responsible for the implementation of the requisites of this law.

**Appendix II:****Turkish in Public**<sup>37</sup>

Ahmet Emin Yalman

Municipalities in various parts of the country have prohibited the public usage of languages other than Turkish. There have been rumors in newspapers to the effect that this measure would be taken in Istanbul as well; however, this has not turned out to be the case.

We have to admit that the situation in Istanbul is unlike that of any other place in Turkey. Even though ensuring that no other language but Turkish be spoken in public is not the job of municipalities, in various parts of the country municipalities have taken this matter upon themselves in response to general public sentiment. However, the situation in Istanbul is a matter of state policy, and cannot be achieved by the municipality alone.

Voices across the country object to the fact that citizens who have immigrated from abroad continue to speak languages such as Greek, Bosnian, Albanian, and Circassian, as was their habit in their former countries. For the sake of the political and social union and harmony of the nation, it is absolutely necessary that we should engage in a determined struggle to combat these habits. An ugly mosaic-like situation is encountered in many parts of the country. We find that in the villages of people who have immigrated to Turkey half a century ago, a language other than Turkish continues to function as the mother tongue. Rather than being the result of a lack of national sentiments among the people concerned, this is due to the neglect and lack of interest of the former government and of society. In revolutionary Turkey, which adheres to a coherent national policy in every sphere, it is imperative that this mosaic-like situation be eliminated as soon as possible.

**The unique status of Istanbul**

As for Istanbul, here conditions are not suitable for such a prohibition. One must consider all facets of the issue and seek out solutions for all the different manifestations of the problem at hand.

A certain degree of homogeneity throughout the country has been achieved by means of the population exchange. Only Istanbul was exempt from this

<sup>37</sup> *Tan*, March 4, 1937.

practice. Istanbul is at the same time a major economic center. In such a major business hub, there should be no excess or any factors that might disturb or upset the general atmosphere.

In Istanbul there are citizens whose mother tongue is not Turkish. The younger generations of these citizens are learning Turkish at school. Among the older generations, there are not a few who do not know Turkish, or who know only very little. What will happen if such people speak a language other than Turkish, as they inevitably will? Most certainly, some citizens will caution them not to do so. When people feel justified in taking the enforcement of law and order into their own hands, some are certain to act in excess. In our country, this has never happened, for positive and comprehensive measures have always been taken to solve problems.

### **White and black sheep**

Being a Turkish citizen is the greatest attribute in the world. We do not need people who do not appreciate the privilege of being part of this nation while enjoying the status of Turkish citizenship and who do not strive to make amends for the unforgotten events of the armistice period and regain the genuine trust of the Turkish nation. Why should we encourage the hypocrisy of those who are not compelled by their own desire, love, and interests to follow this path? There are those who make their lack of appreciation for their Turkish citizenship blatantly clear by means of their language and actions, and who have no desire to adapt to the public life of the country; let those people reveal themselves for what they are and expel themselves from the system as alien bodies. We need to find a way to distinguish the black sheep from the white.

If the aim is to homogenize those groups who do not meet national standards, then pressure and excess are the worst, least productive means to this end. The best thing to do is to keep the door open and to declare "as you please..." However, this should be done on condition of not placing those individual citizens who show that they really consider themselves Turkish and part of Turkish life, and who prove that they are trying to be useful to their nation, in the position of black sheep. As individuals, we know such Jewish, Greek, and Armenian citizens, who really consider themselves Turkish, but who, despite this, suffer because their nation does not fully accept them.

### **The condition of the Jews**

The language problem is different for different groups. Jews are in the most precarious state of all. There is no country in the world in which the Jews who have settled there have failed to adopt that country's language as their mother tongue. Strangely enough, Turkey is the sole exception to this rule: Turkey, which for centuries has treated the Jews warmly as friends, and which has

always acted to thwart potential extremist actions against them... In this case, the fact that the Jews should consider Spanish [Ladino] or French their mother tongue, and that they should use these languages in public, is nothing but a blatant declaration of the alienation that they have forced upon themselves. Plenty of Jewish citizens have genuinely comprehended this and struggle to correct this unfortunate state of affairs. Jews who prefer to speak Spanish or French in public, even though they speak perfect Turkish, should not be surprised that this attitude is perceived as contempt towards others and that it should elicit a feeling of bitterness.

### **Armenians and Greeks**

For the Armenians, it is a matter of deciding on an individual basis whether or not they wish to fully adopt Turkish citizenship in accordance with their own wishes and interests. There is absolutely no need to encourage hypocrisy by introducing a prohibition upon the language.

For the Greeks, however, the situation is different. The exemption of the Greeks in Istanbul and of the Turks in Western Thrace from the population exchange was a reciprocal act. The new close friendship between Turkey and Greece has further increased the significance of this exemption. The friendship between the two countries should be treasured, and everybody should avoid extreme acts that might threaten it.

It is not just that the Turks speak Turkish in Western Thrace. On my way back from Athens, I met a railroad inspector on the train. He spoke perfect Turkish. I thought that he must have migrated to Greece as part of the population exchange, and so I asked him where he was from. He said something that sounded like Sivas; thereupon I started talking about Sivas. The poor man laughed and corrected my mistake:

- No, I was born in the old Greece. I have been here for three years. The people speak Turkish. So I thought that it would be a good idea to learn the language of the people. Learning a new language is not a loss but it is a gain. Especially now that we are talking about a Turco-Greek union...

Responding in kind to the friendly and magnanimous attitude displayed by Greece would be a just and natural act.

### **Cosmopolitan Turks**

As we see it, those who deserve the greatest censure as far as the question of language is concerned are those Turks who speak a language other than their own just to show off. Any Turk who, rather than rebuffing the salesperson in a Beyoğlu shop for addressing him in a language other than Turkish, answers in the same language, should be held responsible for committing a crime against Turkishness. The same is true for any Turk who, when a foreigner

addresses him in fluent or broken Turkish, tries to respond in the foreigner's own tongue rather than replying in Turkish. Nowadays, all foreigners who live in our country would like to learn Turkish. They complain that by talking to them in a foreign language Turks deny them this opportunity.

### **Three reasonable measures**

In conclusion, we are of the opinion that it would be appropriate to take the following three steps to solve Istanbul's language problem:

- 1 Increase the number of free Turkish language courses.
- 2 Encourage and congratulate members of non-Turkish communities who have learned and are speaking Turkish; emphasize the fact that those who do not do so will be looked down upon; however, avoid prohibitions that might lead to extreme acts or individual interventions in public places.
- 3 Be generous in helping those immigrant Turks who consider a language other than Turkish to be their mother tongue, and be very strict towards those people with a cosmopolitan spirit who belittle and neglect their own language...

**Appendix III:**

**Open Letter from Marsel [Franko]<sup>38</sup>**

[Following our lead editorial about the language issue the day before yesterday, we have received a very clear, well-written, and important letter signed "Marsel [Franko], President of the Lay Council of the Chief Rabbinate and of the Jewish Community." You shall read in these columns this letter in its entirety, a significant document in and of itself.]

Sir, yesterday, in your article, you subjected the matter of generalizing Turkish culture to such a sophisticated and realistic analysis that there is neither a single word to be added to what you wrote, nor the faintest light to be added to the light you emanated. I thank you in the name of common sense.

However, now that the illness has been so masterfully diagnosed, it falls upon every literate citizen to seek out a cure to the problem you have identified.

The fact that the language issue is one facet of the problem of integration is a reality accepted by all who examine the Jewish matter closely and objectively. What really matters is not just speaking Turkish, but thinking and feeling like a Turk. Though aware of the public reaction that this might elicit, I would like with your permission to pose a few questions and attempt to provide answers regarding this issue of primary importance for our community. In these questions and answers, I address the matter of the time, the means, and the conditions required for the integration into Turkish culture of the 80,000 Jews in Turkey.

**Is integration possible?**

It is. It would be ridiculous to seek obstacles. Some Jews who had migrated to Turkey later settled in England and Holland. These have integrated so well with the local populations that they can no longer be distinguished from the natives.

There are a handful of Jews who have lived amongst the Turks in our eastern provinces for centuries, and whose faces even have become indistinguishable from those of the Turks. These Jews have solved the problem of integration in practice.

38 *Tan*, March 6, 1937.

Actually, Jews are creatures who possess the capacity to adapt to their respective environments.

There are no spiritual or moral obstacles to integration either. Jews have always lived comfortably in this country. Not only have they been permitted to live comfortably, they have never asked for political privileges or sought to set themselves apart. There are no painful or blood-soaked memories of ancient political feuds inherited from history that could inhibit relations between the Jewish community and the main group of this country.

The path to integration is smooth and clear; there are no obstacles in sight.

### **Is integration desirable?**

The leaders of this country have made clear by means of their actions that there is no place for “state anti-Semitism” among the principles of the regime, and that all those who adopt Turkish culture can become members of the Turkish community. These are the words of our statesmen, who have conquered the hearts of world public opinion with their dignity, sincerity, and earnestness, and have rendered baseless even the slightest of doubts. Clearly, integration befits the doctrines and policies of this state.

Need I show that integration also serves the nation’s best interests? Clearly, this lack of harmony undermines national unity and must be eliminated.

It is both logical and natural that 80,000 Turks, who have been living in this country for centuries, should be integrated into the national community.

### **Is integration desirable for the Jews?**

Some people claim that the Jews’ desire for integration is actually driven by ulterior motives. However, those familiar with history will know that the Jew is a creature who lives and is willing to die for what we call faith and ideals.

There are more of us than you can imagine who find it demeaning to have their loyalty to the nation made a matter of debate and who are deeply hurt by claims of disloyalty. These citizens, who silently suffer from a feeling of spiritual and emotional exile, are justified in their wish to be promoted from part-time citizenship, visitor status, and mere Civil Code Turkishness, to full moral citizenship, as a normal result of the regime.

### **Has the time for integration come?**

It has come, and it is about to pass, for various reasons. One of these reasons is absolute: It is the mingling of youth, in schools, in barracks, and in sports. The generation that would take over the administration of the government in the future is being brought up and educated in isolation from the Jewish citi-

zens. In other words, it is probable and natural that tomorrow, this generation will treat the Jewish citizens not as brothers and friends, but as foreigners.

Ensuring substantial and continuous contact amongst the youth is an urgent duty.

This is the second reason: Spirit and nature cannot bear voids. *L'âme a horreur du vide*. [The soul despises voids.] Denied the right to embrace the national ideal, the Jewish Turk is left with no other choice but to seek artificial ideals. There is no need to elaborate upon the disastrous effects of this tendency with respect to national unity.

This is the third reason: Today, the organization or lack of organization of the Jewish community is headed by a few intellectuals who have a program to finalize the integration process, and who are prepared to help facilitate the relevant measures that will inevitably be taken by our leaders.

The aforementioned intellectuals have been preparing the Jewish public for integration in a methodical way for the last three years now. With the authority vested in me as the leader of this movement towards integration, I can assure you that the conditions have matured!

### **What are the requirements for realizing integration?**

First of all, let me make clear that when I say requirements, I mean natural requirements, not the conditions of a negotiation... Having made this clear, let me now list the requirements one by one:

- 1 The first condition is that we not underestimate the challenges of the mission at hand. Most Jewish Turks live in Galata and Beyoğlu. The atmosphere in that area is well known. In those quarters, you can meet true Turks of the kind who think it appropriate to answer in French even when you speak to them in Turkish.

In addition to this, there are Jews of foreign nationality who are connected to Turkish Jews by bonds of friendship and affinity, and trying to get them to accept local culture would be a waste of our efforts.

- 2 The second condition is that this issue be considered a state affair. Everything that has happened in this country from the creation of the new regime onwards—all reforms, both major and minor, from industry to clothing and from the alphabet to railroads—have all been realized thanks to the earnest and systematic intervention of the state.

So long as the state fails to explicitly declare its interest in the issue of integration and to prove that its concern is genuine by means of its acts and practices, failure is inevitable. What is more, at a time when there are so many cowards who consider engaging in politics a sin rather than a duty, it would be utterly unrealistic to expect a weak community to overcome its timidity (that naturally derives from its weakness) and to launch a systematic effort to tackle such a precarious issue.

- 3 The third condition is that the integration of Jewish Turks should not be subordinated to the integration of other minorities. Politics is built on realities, not on dreams... It would be wrong to ignore the particular characteristics of each minority. This point is both an important and a delicate one.

**This is what we are expecting from the state:**

- A) The state should treat those individuals who have integrated as true Turks, so that the doubters will see that the road to salvation, the true path, is the one that leads to Turkishness.
- B) There should be an end to the “save the day” regime (*idare-i Islahat*) that governs the so-called communities (*cemaat*), which are legal freaks based upon obsolete regulations and decaying traditions. A new legal regulation in keeping with the secular principles of our Republic is needed. This regulation should confine community (*cemaat*) activities to the spheres of religion and charity and ensure with objective disinterest that all such activities are regulated, facilitated, and overseen in a proper manner.
- C) The problem of [minority] schools should be solved in a reasonable and radical way. With regard to this matter, the state can trust in the good faith of those governing the community, of this I am certain.
- D) The state should keep the doors of its youth organizations open to Jewish children.

This is an outline of our main views, which should be taken up as a whole. However, we, who are determined to turn these ideas into reality, are equally devoted to national discipline.

We know that our leaders, who have successfully transformed Europe’s sick man into Europe’s only healthy man, have drawn up a comprehensive program whereby each task is to be performed when the time has come.

We think it meaningless to undertake any action whatsoever until we have received clear signs and guidance from them. We believe that in making the public opinion aware of this issue by presenting it in a clear, honest, and sincere way, and by bringing this issue to the attention of our superiors, we have performed an essential duty to our nation and completed the requirements of our moral responsibility. Now it is up to the state.

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