

BOOK REVIEWS

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DIONISIUS A. AGIUS, *In the Wake of the Dhow: The Arabian Gulf and Oman* (Reading, U.K.: Ithaca Press, 2002). Pp. 275. £35.00 cloth.

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Dionisius Agius, a reader in Arabic and the Medieval Mediterranean at the University of Leeds, has directed his expertise in linguistics and the writings of medieval geographers writing in Arabic to a study of seafaring in the Arabian/Persian Gulf and Oman. Drawing on a wide range of literary sources and more than ten years of fieldwork in the region, Agius has sought in this book “to establish an historical and linguistic link between the present traditional seagoing vessels and coastal boats of the Gulf and Oman, and those of the medieval Islamic period” (p. xv).

The first two chapters provide background information. Agius begins with a discussion of his methodology and fieldwork, including an extensive review of the literature on the maritime history of the Gulf as well as a description of the difficulties of collecting oral-history materials. Of particular significance is that Agius establishes the historical ties between Persian/Shi‘ite “ethnic” groups and shipbuilding in the region. Chapter 2 is a fairly standard historical survey of the Gulf region from the 17th century through the 20th century based largely on Western sources. The focus here is on maritime activities such as international commerce, piracy, the slave trade, and the more localized fishing, pearling, and shipbuilding. In describing this maritime history, Agius identifies early usages of ship types, including the generic term “dhow.”

In the next four chapters, Agius turns to technical terminology, beginning with functional and generic terms for ships and boats and then discussing large oceangoing dhows; fishing and pearling dhows; and ships’ boats, canoes, and rafts. This division generally follows local usage, although, as Agius explains, dhow is a term used “by English speakers to represent any Perso-Arab or Indian or east African vessel” (p. 33) while a variety of terms exist in the local lexica. In addition to function, vessels are identified by hull styles (double-ended or square-ended) rather than by sail configuration, as in the West. In describing each of the ships that he identifies, Agius follows this paradigm and then, in keeping with his goal, analyzes the linguistic origins of the name. So, for example, the *baghla* is a square-ended, oceangoing sailing ship with its name deriving from an Indian dhow called the *pahala*. I have, of course, greatly simplified Agius’s explanation, reducing to one sentence some five pages (pp. 49–53) of text that add other details to distinguish a *baghla* from a *bum* and dozens of other vessels.

Chapter 7 is dedicated to dhow construction. Agius begins with a general description of historical methods—that is, either constructing the shell and then “ribbing” the inside or building the frame and then planking over it and whether ships are sewn or nailed, and tools. He then goes through the process of building a dhow (actually a *bum*), including preservation techniques and the launch ceremony. This is a very technical chapter that includes many Arabic terms, but Agius has included photos and diagrams that greatly assist the reader.

The final chapter provides an overview of the book, including a discussion of the evolution of technology and design transfers (mostly from Europe). Agius also addresses the matter of the link between medieval shipping and the modern varieties, admitting that there are only four terms that have carried through. Finally, Agius discusses the problems of establishing a taxonomy for Gulf and Omani ships, not the least of which is the fact that there is no consistency in the use of terminology: a *baghla* in Kuwait is called a *ghanja* in Oman, and a small *baghla* might be used for fishing and pearling and therefore confused with a large *sambuq*.

The book includes an appendix, with nine drawings of a *bum* with all technical parts identified. It is a very useful supplement to Chapter 7. There is also a glossary, which greatly helped when trying to keep all of the technical terms for ships and ship parts sorted out, and a bibliography.

This is an excellent addition to the literature on the maritime history of the western Indian Ocean region. It is a very technical book most suited to serious scholars of maritime history and to Gulf specialists interested in cultural history. Although Agius, by his own admission, did not succeed in establishing much of a link between medieval Arab shipbuilding and modern activities, his linguistic and ethnographic work does firmly establish the long-time inter-relationship among the peoples of Arabia, Iran, and India. Furthermore, the extensive catalogue of ship types and description of the shipbuilding process will preserve information threatened with extinction as the majestic dhows of yore are replaced by motor-driven fiberglass ships.

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R. J. BARENDSE, *The Arabian Seas: The Indian Ocean World of the Seventeenth Century*, Asia and the Pacific (London: M. E. Sharpe, 2002). Pp. 604. \$34.95.

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This is a frustrating book. It is frustrating because the author, R. J. Barendse, has clearly undertaken an enormous amount of archival research, including extensive work in the Dutch archives, which, for linguistic reasons, have not been sufficiently exploited. His sources provide a wealth of colorful vignettes from the world of trade in the 17th century. The trip from Mosul to Basra, for example, “led through barren deserts, where the single sound was the distant wail of hyenas. No other human beings were seen for days; sometimes on the far horizon appeared campfires” (p. 44). Or the trials and tribulations of a Turkish merchant named Nasr Ali Cagasi who went to Samarkand to buy rhubarb for a Dutch merchant. When he went bankrupt, the Dutch East India Company threw him in jail to force him to pay his debts. Finally, they released him since no one came forward to provide bail; he had to labor as a domestic servant instead (p. 157). Yet the wealth of detail in the book is not presented within a coherent framework. Indeed, organization of the material is so lacking that it is exhausting to read.

In both the Preface and the Introduction Barendse says that he wants to write world history, which he sees as opposed to both national history and area studies. Clearly, an entity such as the Arabian seas would sit awkwardly in any book organized along national lines, but even area specialists, he argues, have missed the critical links that tie together the ports of the Arabian sea. Scholars of India, Iran, and Africa have seen only that part of the sea that falls within the purview of their particular coastline. In the Introduction, he makes the important—and certainly correct—point that Africanists in particular have tended to treat the continent in isolation. Since students of the Swahili coast are Africanists, they tend to stress the links of the coast to the African hinterland. According to Barendse, the ports of East Africa were a world apart from

the interior and are more properly understood as the western end of a tightly knit commercial world. This world he calls the Arabian seas, an area which encompasses the Arabian Sea and the interior of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea and extends to the waters off the East African coast. "If still large, this is an area with old and deep commercial linkages, one bound by common characteristics and by common networks, which merits consideration as a whole" (p. 3).

This is the world that Barendse sets out to describe, and one of the endorsements on the back of the book is right to point out the Braudelian undertone of his project. All this is well and good, but the Arabian seas as a coherent object of study sink into the depths shortly after the Introduction and rarely appear again. The East African coast is a good example of this. After the first chapter, "Ports and Hinterland," references to Africa are few and far between. The book is heavily oriented toward India, followed by Iran and the Middle East. Therefore, one of the primary goals of the book, as defined by the author—to draw the connections between East African ports and other ports of the Arabian seas—is not realized.

This lengthy book is laid out in eleven chapters, including an Introduction and a Conclusion. In between, the chapters are thematic. Although the author says in the Introduction that he will focus on the period 1640 to 1700, chronology is not an organizing principle for the book. Chapters 2–6 discuss different aspects of this commercial world, from ports (chap. 2) and European colonies (chap. 3) to the world of merchants (chap. 5) and the merchandise that is traded (chap. 6, more than 100 pages long). The trading companies of the major European powers—the Portuguese, the Dutch and the English—are each assigned a chapter, and the book ends with a consideration of private trade. In every chapter, the reader must struggle to make the connection not only between chapters, but even between other sections in the chapter. The first chapter, for example, begins with an interesting typology of ports along the East African coast. Then, in the following two sections, he delves in great detail into how the Portuguese tried to settle the African interior. The shift to the African interior is never explained, nor does he explain the exclusive focus on the Portuguese, given that, in the Introduction, he said that the book would concentrate on the period of Dutch dominance in the second half of the 17th century. This kind of disconnect, unfortunately, runs throughout the entire book.

Despite his professed desire to write about the Arabian seas as a whole, there is really very little on this topic. There is a good deal on individual cities, on peddlers versus capitalists, and on different articles of trade. Golden opportunities to demonstrate the contours of the world of the Arabian seas are left unexplored. For instance, in a section devoted to the merchants and markets of Gujarat, he points out that interest rates at Surat were lower than elsewhere. The explanation is that "Surat was the focal point of information on the commercial conditions throughout the Arabian seas" (p. 177). The reader would like to be shown how this worked, what the linkages were, but nothing of the sort follows. Instead, Barendse moves swiftly on to a consideration of the old arguments about the peddling trade.

Very curiously for a book that presents itself as world history, it is quite Eurocentric. Close to a third of the book is devoted to a discussion of European trade and traders. More alarming is the fact that in a discussion of the legal situation for commerce in India, Barendse lets European views about "corruption" and "despotism" stand as faithful depictions of how things actually were.

Finally, the book is very poorly edited. Some sentences are simply bizarre—"There is a whole lore, sweet as cherry pie, about the Indian nautch girls that those virile warriors preferred in their crib" (p. 97)—while many more are badly written and even ungrammatical. A sentence that appears on page 21, "Along the coast are, often closed off by sandbanks, many inlets, some of which are easily accessible from the sea, and tiny coral islands," is rather typical. Short as it is, the brief biographical sketch of the author that appears at the end of the book manages to misspell his name in the second paragraph. The word "intersect" is used as a noun on the back cover.

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ASLI ÇIRAKMAN, *From the "Terror of the World" to the "Sick Man of Europe": European Images of Ottoman Empire and Society from the Sixteenth Century to the Nineteenth* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2002). Pp. 246. \$15.95.

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In *From the "Terror of the World" to the "Sick Man of Europe": European Images of Ottoman Empire and Society from the Sixteenth Century to the Nineteenth* Aslı Çırakman argues that European attitudes towards the Ottoman Empire were extremely variable in the 16th and 17th centuries, hardening into a simpler picture as Europeans became more self-confident and more self-critical: "one can observe that in the eighteenth-century images of Ottomans there is more agreement than controversy as to the nature of this peculiar form of government and people" (p. 108). The author seeks to challenge Edward Said's arguments in *Orientalism*, stating flatly that Said oversimplified early modern attitudes to smooth the way for a teleological argument that European attitudes started out reflexively hostile and only became more so with the rise of imperialist and colonialist agendas in the region. Specifically, she argues that earlier travelers and essayists displayed a more wide-ranging curiosity and therefore produced more diverse perspectives on the Ottoman Empire than did their counterparts in the 18th century.

This argument hinges in part on proving that 18th-century writers were more eager to fit data into preconceived notions, primarily of despotism, than were their predecessors, and that despotism came to be defined "as an Oriental form of regime" used to critique European regimes vis-à-vis Asian regimes (pp. 108–109). Many of our Europeanist colleagues are eager for a book that puts these materials in context of their European origins and reception, as well as their accuracies and inaccuracies in the portrayal of Ottoman history. Çırakman analyzes a wide variety of early modern sources in the original English or in English translation to make her case, with some reference to Postel and a few others in the original French. The secondary literature is drawn from English, French, and modern Turkish, and the work bears the welcome promise of bringing our colleagues' Turkish-language discussions of Orientalism, many of which have not been published in English, into wider discussion. This promise is not fulfilled, however, as there are only a few passing references to works in Turkish (pp. 93–94).

Unfortunately, sloppy editing does a great disservice to Çırakman's work, with an accumulation of simple errors from front matter through misdirected indexing that, taken together, give a distressing impression of a book that could have been far better. The bulk of the book is in two unwieldy chapters, one on the 15th and 16th centuries, and another on the 18th, each disorganized in format and narration. The editor allowed basic grammatical and spelling errors to remain on every page, which detracts from the fluency of arguments and narrative and suggests a basic discourtesy, at best, to a junior scholar publishing a first monograph in a second language. Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, for example, is repeatedly referred to as "Lady Mary Wortley Montague." There is a basic error on page 139, equating "escheat" in European feudalism with confiscation of *timar* holdings at the death of the *timariot*. This error might have originated with the author as an error of fact or as an error in poorly edited prose, but by page 139 it is impossible to tell which. There are errors in the scholarly apparatus, as well, including some startling omissions in the secondary literature. It is not even clear in which library or libraries the primary sources were located; nor can one ascertain from the bibliography which editions were used of works published across three centuries, whether in the original or in facsimile. In addition, the prose is repetitious when the argument could be

moving forward, a common failing of second-language writing that can easily be remedied by a vigilant editor.

There are, however, strong moments in the book. When Çırakman presents Anquetil-Duperron's original perspectives and his arguments against Montesquieu, for example, we are on the brink of understanding how an Orientalist (as Çırakman describes him) and contrarian challenged the rise of cliché and condemnation in popular essays. Anquetil-Duperron (1731–1805) is paraphrased and discussed rather than simply excerpted and summarized, as are other authors, and here one can see where Çırakman's promised disagreement with what she describes as Said's "monolithic" view of European writings on the Orient might play out. Perhaps we will learn how Anquetil-Duperron trained to study India, and why he became interested in the Qur'an, or even be given a list of his publications. But no. Instead, we are simply told that "Anquetil-Duperron's ideas did not receive much attention during the eighteenth century" (p. 130). It is hard to evaluate the merits of this claim without the basic elements of *Rezeptionsgeschichte*: when and where was the work under discussion published and by whom, how many editions or printings were made, and how many copies survive? Why was Ludovico Cartano's *Good News to Christendome* translated into English in 1620, for example, and by whom? What motivated Fynes Moryson to translate his own work from Latin into English in 1617 (not mentioned by Çırakman), and were any of the other works similarly taken from original Latin versions into vernacular languages? Even better-known authors such as Voltaire, Rycout, and Knolles are presented without such context, their writings excerpted more often than not without dates of publication in the body of the book, with no data on how many printings their works went through. Instead, one is asked to rely on the author's statements of influence, easily accepted in the case of Knolles as Bodin's translator, but not proved elsewhere. This is a curious deficiency in a book about the development of ideas.

Çırakman likewise dismisses German authors in a lump with Hapsburg writers, while later mentioning Luther in passing and leaving the Reformation almost entirely out of the picture. Attempts to address the German-literature gap in Said's analysis have resulted in solid secondary-source analyses of the origins of German intellectual attitudes toward the East, such as Suzanne Marchand's studies of German archaeology and the construction of knowledge in Germany from the 1700s forward, so it is curious that Çırakman repeats Said's lacuna in this regard even as she seeks to challenge his discussions of early modern Orientalism. There are also several important gaps both in attribution and in analysis. For example, there is considerable overlap with Bouwsma's masterly 1957 analysis of Guillaume Postel in demonstrating Postel's voracious curiosity but also the uses to which he put his analyses of the Ottomans in internal European discourses about politics and abuses of power. One searches in vain, however, for engagement with a full range of more recent works, such as S. J. Bamforth's "Les Écrits de Guillaume Postel et Leurs Éditeurs" (*French Studies* 48 [1 January 1994]), or Goffman's *Britons in the Ottoman Empire, 1642–1660* (1998), or even Macfie's reader on Orientalism (2000), which would have had the added merit of including articles in English, singularly lacking in the bibliography, which includes only a few articles from two English-language scholarly journals, *Past and Present* and *Journal of the History of Ideas*.

There is promise here of an incisive study of Enlightenment attitudes toward failing empires, but instead the reader is presented with shallow generalizations about the British and the French, such as, "[t]he English were interested in despotism because, for them, it was an alien regime while the French were concerned with despotism since, they thought, they had a different version of it" (p. 191). Which English and which French at which points in the 18th century? The period from 1700 to 1800 saw monarchy, revolution, and the birth of empire in France, as well as the many missteps of revolutionary regimes, which

could safely be described at points as despotism by committee. Yet the events of the French Revolution and of Napoleon's rise are not analyzed. England was also wracked with debates about changing patterns of wealth and power in the 15th and 16th centuries, as well as the small matter of rebellious colonies in the 18th. Slavery is another promising topic, with distinctions drawn among civil, political, and military slavery by Europeans discussing the Ottomans, but Çırakman fails to acknowledge the debate over domestic slavery in Europe and its colonies. With Montesquieu's revival of ancient notions of humors and climates to justify the subjugation and explain the supposed submissiveness of human beings raised in hot climates, it is difficult not to consider the roles of domestic African slaves on the European continent, and chattel slaves in the colonies, in the rise of Europe's new attitudes of superiority and new ambitions in the Near East.

In sum, this book is sorely disappointing to those who seek a trenchant analysis of early modern attitudes toward the Ottoman Empire, even as it contains gestures toward important themes and excerpts from critically important works.

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JOHN J. DONOHUE, *The Buwayhid Dynasty in Iraq 334H./945 to 403H./1012: Shaping Institutions for the Future*, Islamic History and Civilization. Studies and Texts 44 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2003). Pp. 399. \$131.00 cloth.

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In A. D. 945, eleven days after receiving his title from the ruling Abbasid Caliph al-Mustakfi, the Buwayhid amir Mu'izz al-Dawla deposed him. Like the green dome of the palace of Abu Ja'far Mansur that had crumbled during the spring rains of 939, the Abbasid caliphate was collapsing inward. Not until the turn of the next century, with the loosening of the hold of the Buwayhid amirs on Baghdad, did a caliph make guarded efforts to assert his divinely sanctioned authority outside his sacred precinct. By that time, beyond the walls of the caliphal palace, monumental changes in the structure of power had long since occurred.

It is difficult to remember that the political realities of the Buwayhid dynasty, which seemed hewn from marble at the end of the 10th century, were but the ambitions of a family of war-weary soldiers from the Caspian region seventy years prior. John J. Donohue, in his fine study *The Buwayhid Dynasty in Iraq 334H./945 to 403H./1012*, ably depicts the circumstances under which the main political and social institutions of Buwayhid rule took shape in Baghdad and what form they provided for the succeeding decades and centuries. As in the making of many of history's most durable constructs, accident and accommodation proved a surer bond than human will.

The majority of Donohue's book is devoted to the institutions of the emirate and the vizierate (190 pages), with five smaller chapters devoted to the army, provincial government, land administration, the caliphate, and religio-political institutions (i.e., judges, syndics, and witnesses). A final chapter addresses social organization in the period. Each of the chapters can be read independently as a separate study of the development of a particular institution. Together, they provide the reader with a sense of the great transformations that occurred in the politics and society of the Abbasid state during the first seventy years of Buwayhid rule.

Similar to Heribert Busse's important survey of the entire Buwayhid period in Iraq, *Chalif und Grosskönig: Die Buyiden im Iraq (945–1055)* (Beirut: Franz Steiner, 1969), Donohue's study is fundamentally concerned with the political and economic consequences of the

Buwayhid amirs' assumption of military and economic control in Baghdad. The shorter time frame of Donohue's work allows him to directly assess the effects of this major change during the first three generations of Buwayhid rule and the causes of the dynasty's decline in the 5th century.

In contrast to the oft-told story of the Buwayhid amirs' willful manipulation of the Abbasid caliphate, the author demonstrates that "tradition, public sentiment, and the requirements of legitimation prevented the office of the caliph from being overshadowed completely by the amir who had usurped the military and financial administration of the capital" (p. 125). To be sure, the Buwayhid amirs of Baghdad applied their influence over the Abbasid caliphs in their dynastic struggles with the other Buwayhid amirs of Rayy and Shiraz, as well as in diplomatic relations with foreign rulers. Yet it was the amirs' adherence to Abbasid tradition that limited their range of power by providing a check on many of their actions. While the Buwayhid amirs drained the caliphate of its military and economic power, the vessels of Abbasid protocol remained intact.

As the subsequent chapters of Donohue's book well illustrate, the language and traditions of the Abbasid state often proved difficult to reconcile with the new shape of Buwayhid rule. The once powerful office of the Abbasid vizier in Baghdad became subject to the command of the amir. The centralized administration of the Abbasid caliphate was dismantled, and many regions were placed into the hands of military lords as fiefs (*iqṭā'āt*). Leaders of the army had a more prominent role in the conduct of state affairs. Although the language of power remained the same, there were many signs that a new age had come.

The Buwayhid Dynasty in Iraq 334H./945 to 403H./1012 is a carefully researched and clearly written study. The author skillfully moves among the evidence provided by chronicles, official correspondence, biographical literature, and numismatics. Given the late and polemical nature of some of the sources, Donohue does a good job sorting through the authors' various biases. While the book focuses mainly on the administrative structures of the period, scholars interested in the literary and intellectual life of the Buwayhid period can find much in Donohue's study worthy of their attention. Like all serious pieces of scholarship, Donohue's book reminds us of the many traditional areas of research still unfinished or unconsidered. It merits serious scholarly attention.

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MAJID FAKHRY, *Al-Farabi, Founder of Islamic Neoplatonism: His Life, Works and Influence*, Great Islamic Thinkers (Oxford: Oneworld, 2002). Pp. 176. \$23.95.

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This is a fine, if somewhat simple, undergraduate introduction to the thought of Alfarabi—if you happen to be a student transported back to the late 1960s. There are a few entries in the bibliography dated after that, but these citations are mostly reprints of Alfarabi's published texts. Certainly, Fakhry's observations on Alfarabi's thought do not appear to have developed much beyond the scholarship of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the reader justifiably might think that this is a publication of a rather old manuscript, dusted off and given a pleasant cover. Fakhry's efforts here remind one of the recent publication of Muhsin Mahdi's *Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy* (Chicago, 2001) in that both are rather quaint products of an earlier time in the study of philosophy and science in Islam. It is difficult to say what has prompted this resurrection of mostly outdated scholarship. It may

be a response on the part of publishers eager to get anything in print since the recent renewal of interest in things Islamic, though for all the wrong reasons.

Despite its rather grand-sounding title, Fakhry's book consists of little more than his summaries of some of Alfarabi's major works, divided into ten chapters covering the major divisions of his thought (logic, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and politics). This summary approach could be useful in presenting Alfarabi to new readers, but Fakhry does on occasion provide some basic interpretation. It is in such castaway interpretive statements that Fakhry exposes his lack of knowledge on the impressive strides in scholarship on Alfarabi in the past two decades. Fakhry displays no familiarity with more recent studies on Alfarabi's biography, his version of the "Alexandria to Baghdad" narrative, his contributions in logic, his epistemology and psychology, or his metaphysics. It is doubtful that, with Fakhry, we need to revisit the question of Alfarabi's alleged "Shi'ism," and it is certain that there is a great deal more to Alfarabi's "Neoplatonism" than his emanationist cosmology, which is the only aspect of his "Neoplatonism" Fakhry announces in the title of the work. If Fakhry's book were to find its way onto an undergraduate syllabus, it would have to be for a course on the history of Western scholarship in the field in the latter half of the 20th century.

Another book on Farabi was published in 2002: Ilai Alon's *Al-Farabi's Philosophical Lexicon*, in two volumes (Wiltshire: E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Trust). It costs about \$200 more than Fakhry's contribution, but it actually lives up to its title, contains the "detailed bibliography of primary and secondary sources" heralded on the back of Fakhry's book, and is a publication every scholar working on Arabic philosophy should have at hand. As for a reasonably priced basic introduction to Alfarabi's thought, we will have to wait.

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MOLLY GREENE, *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000). Pp. 241. \$45.00 cloth; \$19.95 paper.

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Historians of the Ottoman Empire have until recently characterized the 17th and 18th centuries as a period of decline, wedged in between the glorious age of Süleiman and that of the Ottoman recovery in the Tanzimat era. As such, the Ottoman conquest of the island of Crete that began in 1644 and ended with the fall of Candia (Iráklion) in 1669 has often been reduced to a footnote, at best, or confined to discussions of Ottoman military tactics and siege warfare. Greek nationalist historiography sees the conquest of the island as a tragic historic rupture, with the island's people slipping from the mini-renaissance they had enjoyed during the last decades of Venetian control to the despotism of the *Tourkokratía*. Despite the very important re-imagining of the Ottoman past that has occurred over the past decade as scholars have examined a wider range of archival sources throughout the Mediterranean basin, this thesis has gone largely unchallenged. Molly Greene's monograph on Crete before and after the conquest shatters that simplistic characterization with a well-written, and much needed, bit of historical revisionism.

In a challenge to the Greek nationalist interpretations, Greene chooses to emphasize the continuities between the Venetian and the Ottoman regimes during the first century of Ottoman rule. The very late date of the Ottoman acquisition of the island helped to prevent a radical

transformation of the rhythms of its agricultural and commercial sectors in the transfer from Venetian to Ottoman hegemony. The Ottoman authorities surveyed the island soon after its conquest to divide the island's agricultural lands into *timars*, whereby its villages would be parceled out to resident cavalymen who would collect the revenues in lieu of salary and serve the state at its beck and call. This replicated the process by which conquered territories elsewhere in the Balkans, Anatolia, and Syria were incorporated into empire. But Greene argues convincingly that this course of action was never implemented. Further supporting the argument for continuity, there was no attempt by the Ottoman state to settle on Crete Turkish-speaking, Muslim settlers from the mainland, as had been the case in Cyprus, another island conquered from the Venetians the century before. There was thus no trauma of colonization or dispossession. Rather, Cretan men converted to Islam in great numbers largely, it seems, to gain the right to plunder that being in the military conferred. As in the case of Bosnia and Albania, "Turks" on the island were largely indigenous, and the Ottoman military presence consisted largely of formerly Christian soldiers, an irony frequently noted by European visitors.

Greene also deftly challenges the thesis of Crete's steep economic decline after the Ottoman conquest. Although the formerly renowned wine trade of the island suffered in the transition to rule by Islamic law, she argues, other commodities, especially olive oil, emerged as viable exports. Greene cautions that the Western sources that speak of decline in trade should be balanced against evidence that trade began to flow northward toward Istanbul, eastward to Izmir, and south to Egypt, all ports controlled by the Ottomans. Local Greek Christian merchants and shipowners predominated in this trade and profited. This is an important finding, as it pushes the origins of an entrepreneurial Ottoman Greek merchant class back to the final decades of the 17th century and suggests that it emerged on Crete as well as in the smaller Greek isles of the Aegean Sea.

Greene's monograph on Crete is an example of the best of what is currently being produced in Ottoman history. Using Venetian, Greek, and Ottoman archival sources, the author of this work seems to have left no potential source untouched. Greene's understanding of a wide variety of sources in a number of languages, her ability to conceive the continuity in the patterns of Mediterranean commercial life, as well as the more apparent discontinuities, and her clear, jargon-free prose provide us with a multi-layered portrait of the island's incorporation into the empire in an "age of decline." This work is unquestionably a major addition to Ottoman history. It forces us to rethink what the historical impact of the Ottoman conquest was on the people of Crete and the island's economy. Greek nationalist historians have depicted the Ottoman occupation as one of doom and gloom. Greene has shown that the picture was not nearly so bleak and that Cretans became adept at establishing a multitude of strategies, including their conversion to Islam, to profit from the change in regimes from Venetian to Ottoman.

Although Greene's book does much to integrate Crete's history into that of the larger Mediterranean region—of both the Latin West and the Ottoman world—it unfortunately has little to say about the Ottoman Empire's other Mediterranean island, Cyprus. A more explicit comparison of their two very different experiences as part of the Ottoman Empire would have been useful. Nevertheless, this book, with its Braudelian vision of a Mediterranean world marked more by continuities than ruptures, is highly satisfying. It provides an important breakthrough in integrating Ottoman history into broader themes of Mediterranean history. With the appearance of a paperback edition (2002), it seems destined to become a standard text for the teaching of Ottoman and Mediterranean history to undergraduate students.

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ABDELFATTAH KILITO, *The Author and His Doubles: Essays on Classical Arabic Culture*, trans. Michael Cooperson, Middle East Literature in Translation Series (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2001). Pp. 153. \$34.95 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

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Classical Arab authors' use of anthologies for self-expression and their tendency to recycle familiar material from earlier authors make their works a gold mine for studying the relationships that link a person to a text. It is this tangle that Abdelfattah Kilito unravels and illuminates, deftly and unobtrusively, in *The Author and His Doubles*, a set of essays on plagiarism and forgery in classical Arabic literature. The fourth chapter, "The Paths of the Prophetic Hadith," for example, points out both that few other texts have inspired as much discussion of the relationship of a man to a text as hadith collections and that scholars' emphasis on its *isnād* did not mean that they neglected "the contents of the Hadith" (p. 42).

In *The Author and His Doubles*, Kilito follows a different strategy from his later work *L'Oeil et l'aiguille*, which is an invitation to a timeless land where we debate the implications in daily life of episodes from the *Thousand and One Nights*, or his earlier work *Les Séances*, a more conventional scholarly commentary. All the same, *Les Séances* (Paris: Sindbad, 1983) prefigured the present book by stating a main theme, which, loosely translated, is that in classical Arabic literature, "[t]he canonization of genres and of previous themes makes such serious claims upon the future that a firm circle is inscribed, outside of which only non-texts are produced. (p. 73)."

Arabic literature has some idiosyncratic genres that deserve attention, and Kilito demonstrates the relevance of genre considerations to understanding classical Arabic literature. When reading a modern text, for example, one is directed by stylistic devices toward an author, whereas in classical Arabic literature it is far easier to trace a text's genre than its author (p. 2). The exception proving the rule may be, as Kilito observes, that "[t]here does exist an unmistakably Jahizian style" (p. 73). In classical Arabic literature, using a name prevalent in earlier poems ties one's work to those poems, which constitute a de facto genre (p. 55). Even the earliest known Arab poets were consciously working within a tradition and so within a set of genres. Thus 'Antara's voice "liberates itself by the very gesture of signaling its dependence" (p. 12).

These essays might easily be reformatted as dialogues, since there is enough internal debate to satisfy Plato. Also in the Platonic tradition, Kilito provides, in his final essay (the "Conclusion"), a myth—that of a lost man who barks to wake sleeping dogs in hopes that their response (more barking) will guide him home. Instead of providing a history of the barking-man motif in medieval Arabic literature, Kilito provides a parable that explores uses of language as well as the nature of otherness.

This welcoming book invites us in for a chat but also challenges us to read or reread classical Arabic literature and then to think some more. The right answers are not listed for the indolent in an appendix. All the same, this is an appropriate book to place in a student's hands to introduce diverse forms of Arab literary creativity, because it bridges the classical-modern divide. The author, for example, uses an anecdote from classical Arabic literature—Khalaf's comparison of literary scholarship to professional money changing—to make the point that no matter how much one protests he knows what he likes, items rejected by literary critics and moneychangers, respectively, will eventually be "taken out of circulation" (p. 48). The nine essays and the concluding myth seem a more humane way of introducing students to the pleasures and concerns of pre-modern Arabic literature than an exclusively historical approach.

They also serve to introduce students to a challenging contemporary Arab scholar of great erudition and subtlety.

A churlish critic might object that although Chapter 6, “The Poetics of the Anecdote,” provides some tips about better anecdotes (e.g., to make the level of language appropriate to the character), it does not deliver on its title’s promise or analyze the digressive approach to literature of which the inclusion of anecdotes in literary essays is symptomatic. Michael Cooperson’s translation from the French (and from the Arabic of the literary quotes) is so clear and elegant that it seems similarly churlish to suggest that the English title of the first chapter, “Verses and Reverses,” sacrifices clarity for elegance. All the same, the French title is “*Métempsycose du poème*,” or “Reincarnation of the Poem,” and the gist of the essay is that in writing a poem one must tie one’s words to the traditions of Arabic poetry to such an extent that one’s original poem is inevitably a reincarnation of previous poems.

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RAFAEL TALMON, *Eighth-Century Iraqi Grammar: A Critical Exploration of Pre-Halilian Arabic Linguistics*, Harvard Semitic Studies, 53 (Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2003). Pp. 361. \$44.95 cloth.

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This learned work is the accumulated harvest of more than twenty years of profound research, as shown by the inclusion in the book’s bibliography of numerous publications on the subject by the author, Rafael Talmon. The subject at hand is the reconstruction of the Arabic grammatical tradition in its earliest phase up to the time of the most famous grammarian of Arabic, Sibawayh (d. ca. A.D. 796), author of *al-Kitab*, “the Book,” and his teacher al-Khalil ibn Ahmad (d. between 777 and 791), author of the lexicographical *Kitab al-ʿAyn*. The discussion was triggered by Michael G. Carter in a few thought-provoking publications dating from the 1970s in which he identified Sibawayh and his immediate teachers (besides al-Khalil, Yunus ibn Habib [d. 798]) as the first real systematic grammarians of Arabic. In Carter’s view, Sibawayh had a group of enthusiastic but still amateurish grammarians in mind when reference was made, twenty-two times, to *naḥwiyyūn* in his *Kitab*. Talmon could not and would not accept the idea of a sudden creation of Arabic grammar in free space and became engrossed in approaching this subject matter from various angles, analyzing both grammatical and historiographical aspects of the early history of the Arabic grammatical tradition. In his previous monograph, the voluminous *Arabic Grammar in its Formative Age* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), originally intended to be a mere chapter of the book under review here, Talmon deals exclusively with al-Khalil’s role in the genesis and early development of the Arabic linguistic tradition. This was basically done to determine which parts of *Kitab al-ʿAyn* can be positively attributed to al-Khalil in order to compare al-Khalil’s views with Sibawayh’s and with those of other early grammarians from both the Basran and the Kufan schools to support the “Old Iraqi School” hypothesis, which is central in the present work.

The “Old Iraqi School” hypothesis contends that the *naḥwiyyūn* referred to in Sibawayh’s *Kitab* was a homogenous group of grammarians working more or less along the same lines but in various centers of learning, mostly in the province of Iraq (Lower Mesopotamia)—that is, in Basra, Kufa, and Baghdad, but probably in Medina, as well; that al-Khalil and Sibawayh opposed the teachings of this Iraqi School and introduced significant innovations to Arabic

linguistic theory; and that the Kufan grammarian al-Farra' (d. 822) and his followers remained faithful to the teachings of the Iraqi School and were therefore considered to be the Basrans' opponents. To buttress the Old Iraqi School hypothesis, the author mainly limits the present study to sources from the 8th and early 9th centuries, including, besides Sibawayh's *Kitab* and al-Khalil's *Ayn*, "several lexicographical works, a handful of Qur'an commentaries, and some other early compositions including invaluable information of the *akhbar* type" (p. x; one finds, among other works, al-Farra's *Ma'ani al-Qur'an*; Abu 'Ubayda's [d. 824; Basran] *Majaz al-Qur'an*; al-Akhfash's [d. 815; Basran] *Ma'ani al-Qur'an*, complemented by the early historical biographical works by the Basran al-Jumahi [d. 846] and the Kufan Abu Hamid al-Tirmidhi [d. ca. 864]). From these works Talmon gathered excerpts on grammatical positions of pre-Khalilian scholars, both named and unnamed or unidentified, for an analysis at various levels. It is in these analyses that we see the author at his best. (For the layman, this is the right moment to warn that the monograph is very technical and assumes a firm basis of knowledge in the field of Arabic grammar.)

After an introduction outlining the genesis and general aim of the study, the book continues in two parts. The first deals with the formative period—that is, of the Old Iraqi School—and the second part focuses on the innovative character of al-Khalil's and Sibawayh's teachings. Chapter 1 of the book's first part, entitled "Grammarians and Their Teachings," introduces the sources used for the study and the identification of grammarians—individuals such as Yunus ibn Habib, 'Abdallah ibn Abi Ishaq (d. 735), 'Isa ibn 'Umar (d. 766), and Abu 'Amr ibn al-'Ala' (d. ca. 773), as well as groupings such as *ahl al-madīna*, *al-kūfiyyūn* and *al-naḥwiyyūn* who could have belonged to the Old Iraqi School. The second chapter presents a survey of grammatical data attributed by the sources to early (groupings of) grammarians. The data amount to 244 items that are meticulously analyzed to identify possible pre-Khalilian elements of grammatical theory. Subsequently, in Chapter 3, the material is rearranged and discussed according to sixty-one points of similarity between the teachings of the various (groupings of) grammarians involved, thus paving the way to canvass Old Iraqi School teachings.

Part 2, titled "Khalil's forerunners and the Khalilian reformation," comprises two chapters and aims to distinguish clearly between pre-Khalilian grammatical elements of the Old Iraqi School and innovations introduced by al-Khalil and Sibawayh. This is done on the basis of an assumption that the earliest source still extant, Sibawayh's *Kitab*, "primarily represents the Khalilian revolution, not the older layer of Arabic grammar" (p. 163). By focusing first on a selection of material presented thus far, which embraces elements different from Sibawayh's theories but similar to al-Farra's (chap. 1), the Old Iraqi School teaching is reconstructed as far as the source material allows. Then, in the next chapter, a full account of the innovations introduced by al-Khalil and Sibawayh in the field of grammar is given "based largely on comparison between the Old School's teaching which is reconstructed in chapter one and Sibawayh's and Khalil's thinking according to the *Kitab*" (p. 281).

The book ends with a list of abbreviations used, a bibliography of primary and secondary sources, and several useful indexes, including a general index and indexes of Arabic terms, grammatical themes, and Qur'anic citations. A synopsis of the database of grammatical items (pt. 1, chap. 2) and points (pt. 1, chap. 3) and a list of references to aforementioned items and points throughout the book are also provided.

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MAAN ABU NOWAR, *The Struggle for Independence 1939–1947: A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan* (Reading, U.K.: Ithaca Press, 2001). Pp. 373. £35.00.

MAAN ABU NOWAR, *The Jordanian–Israeli War 1948–1951: A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan* (Reading, U.K.: Ithaca Press, 2002). Pp. 526. £35.00.

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Maan Abu Nowar, a member of a well-known family from Salt, joined the Arab Legion in 1943. In 1948, as a young lieutenant, he participated in the Palestine war. In 1957, as a colonel and commander of a brigade group, he was tried for involvement in a conspiracy against King Hussein (instigated by his cousin, Ali, the chief of the General Staff) but was acquitted. He retired from the army in 1972 as a major-general and commenced a second career as a diplomat and politician. Simultaneously, he pursued a third career—that of a prolific historian. In 1988, he gained a D.Phil. at Oxford for the study that constituted the basis of his book *History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: The Creation and Development of Transjordan 1920–1929* (1989). His two recent books are a chronological and conceptual continuation of his first work.

The first volume covers the years 1939–47, a period that the author calls “a golden age for the Hashemite Kingdom” (p. 271). In those years the Jordanians faced not only the challenges of World War II, from which they emerged with a strong sense of national unity; they also passed the test of a civil society, governed by the rule of law.

The author records the main developments year by year in the regional theater (the course of the war, inter-Arab relations, the Greater Syria scheme) and in Jordan (the Arab Legion, domestic politics, relations with Britain, educational and social progress). Against the backdrop of anti-British sentiment, Abu Nowar reiterates that Emir Abdullah was the only Arab leader to support the British during World War II, even at the nadir of their plight.

The author tends to move unsystematically from one topic to another. In the chapter on 1942, for example, he jumps from blackout regulations in Amman to the Biltmore conference and Zionist endeavors to establish a Jewish brigade within the British army to judicial reform and educational achievements (pp. 86–88). This makes each chapter a collection of episodes rather than part of an integrated historical narrative and analysis. Nevertheless, one may find the given data (including the information stored in the book’s seventeen appendixes) an invaluable source of knowledge on the state-building process in Jordan. The book sheds light on the making of the administrative and bureaucratic institutions, the development of the armed forces and a parliamentary framework, the emergence of an opposition, and the formation of political public opinion. It also illuminates the crystallization of Arab and local national identities and the creation of an infrastructure from which an indigenous class of intellectuals and professionals later emerged.

This volume also meticulously unfolds Abdullah’s efforts to persuade the British to grant his country independence. Nevertheless, the author fails to provide a conclusive explanation of why the British eventually did so in 1946.

The second volume covers a shorter yet more eventful and complex period: the 1948 Arab–Israeli war and its aftermath. Its first half discusses in great detail the military moves and engagements by the Jews with the Arab Legion and the other Arab forces. In this respect, the book is a mine of minute information on the location, size, composition, equipment, and deployment of the belligerent forces during every stage of the war, including the number of casualties. These descriptions are the book’s most important contribution. In some cases, the author even records the role of units as small as platoons in the military encounters.

Abu Nowar's treatment of the political aspects of the war is less comprehensive and more selective. He is rather vague on the activity of the Arab League prior to the Arab invasion of Palestine, and he fails to mention, for example, the league's resolution of April 1948 (in response to Jordan's announcement of its intention to invade Palestine) that any Arab intervention would be considered a purely temporary expedient. He hardly refers to the Palestinians as a political factor after May 1948 or to the Arab Legion's efforts to contain their activity.

In his discussion of the post-war years, Abu Nowar focuses on the practical and formal annexation of the West Bank and analyzes its impact on the domestic arena, the situation along the armistice line with Israel, and the growth of the Arab Legion. The professionalism and high standards of the latter contributed to the stability of the kingdom through trying times and at certain critical crossroads, such as the assassination of King Abdullah.

Abu Nowar severely criticizes most of the parties involved in Palestine: the Arab leaders were "nothing more than Effendis of the Ottoman style and mind" (p. xi), their armies were badly led and performed poorly in the battlefield. The Arab League is accused of total disharmony, and its creation, the Arab Liberation Army, proved a complete failure. The author also criticizes the Palestinian Arabs and their leadership for being ungrateful to King Abdullah, who saved them from the Jews. The latter are portrayed as criminals and terrorists who committed heinous and inhumane crimes (pp. 23–26).

Abu Nowar is ambivalent toward the British. He accuses them of pursuing a systematic pro-Zionist policy and blames them for their occasional reluctance to reciprocate Abdullah's loyalty. Yet he appreciates their contribution to the advancement and improvement of the Arab Legion. He attributes many of the British omissions or moves that were regarded as anti-Arab to American or Jewish Zionist pressure (see, e.g., p. 190).

The author does not spare even leading Jordanian politicians from his criticism (pp. 369–70). He is particularly critical of the Palestine-born prime ministers Tawfiq Abu al-Huda and Samir al-Rifai, whom he calls "imported effendis" who limited the freedom of the Jordanian citizens. The former is even accused of being a British agent (*Struggle for Independence*, pp. 66, 71, 155).

The only uncontested hero of Abu Nowar's books (save for the Jordanian army) is King Abdullah. He is portrayed as a true Arab patriot devoid of any personal interests or ulterior motives. It is probably the author's desire to keep Abdullah's nationalistic image untarnished that causes him to utterly ignore the king's ties with the Jewish Agency. He fails to mention Abdullah's meetings with Elias Sasson in 1946 and with Golda Meyerson (later Meir) in 1947 and in 1948, as well as other numerous meetings and correspondence. Nor is there any intimation of the meeting between senior (British) Arab Legion officers with a Hagana official in early May 1948 or of the alleged collusion or the unwritten agreement on the partition of Palestine between Abdullah and the Jews.

The post-war negotiations between Jordan and Israel, including the official talks under United Nations auspices in Rhodes, are referred to only partially and selectively (*Jordanian-Israeli War*, pp. 293, 299, 305, 313). Abu Nowar admits that after the conclusion of the armistice agreement Abdullah wanted to negotiate and achieve a peaceful settlement (p. 364). There is no reference, however, to the actual conduct of these negotiations (which in early 1950 yielded the draft of a peace agreement and later the draft of a five-year non-belligerency pact), save for quotations from reports of British officials (pp. 337–39). The text of the second agreement is given in Appendix H of *Jordanian-Israeli War*, but nothing is said about the course of the negotiations, who initiated them and why, what were the proposals of each party, and why this endeavor eventually failed. As far as relations with Israelis are concerned, it seems that Abu Nowar the historian succumbs to Abu Nowar the politician.

The technique of quoting British correspondence when treating sensitive issues is used extensively by the author. Abdullah's readiness for a cease fire (in May and June 1948),

the legion's retreat from Lydda and Ramle, Jordan's opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian Arab administration in Palestine, and Abdullah's intention to annex its occupied sections are but a few examples. In his frequent use of long quotations from reports by Bevin, Kirkbride, Glubb, and so on, with hardly any comment or explanation Abu Nowar evades another historian's intellectual duty: to confront and analyze King Abdullah's views, intentions, and conduct.

Another flaw in the study is the numerous mistakes and inaccuracies (mainly but not exclusively in the first book). Al-Hajj Amin al-Husseini arrived in Baghdad in October 1939, not in January 1940 (*Struggle for Independence*, p. 35). Jamal al-Husseini and Amin al-Tamimi were captured and deported by the British in late 1941, not in 1940. George Antonius died in 1942, not in 1940 (p. 39). King Faruq did not replace Ali Maher as prime minister with Nahas Pasha but with Hassan Sabri. Nahas became prime minister only in early 1942, replacing Hussein Sirri (p. 41). The Alexandria conference convened in September 1944, not in 1945 (p. 154). Nuri Said was assassinated in 1958, not in 1968 (p. 140). Abd al-Karim Qasim was a lieutenant colonel in 1948, not a lieutenant (*Jordanian-Israeli War*, p. 170). The Palestinian national Congress in Nablus was held on 28 December, not 28 October, 1948 after the Congress of Jericho (p. 267). These are only a few instances in which the books could have benefited from more stringent copyediting and proofreading.

The main source that the author uses is the files of the British Public Records Office. To a lesser degree he relies on Jordan's Official Gazette, newspapers, interviews, and unpublished material. The list of his secondary sources is rather elementary and lacks (particularly in the first book) some important items in both Arabic and English.

In summation, despite the valuable information that may interest both a general readership and students of history, the credibility of these books is impaired by what they ignore. In his acknowledgments in the first book, the author thanks the late King Hussein and the freedom "which enabled me to write as objectively and truthfully as I could about a very critical and sensitive period of Jordan's history." In the second volume, Abu Nowar again thanks the deceased king, "who urged me to publish the whole truth based on both historical facts and adherence to the dignity of history." One may speculate that Abu Nowar's interpretation (or misinterpretation) of the king's desires might be the explanation for his occasional selectivity.

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AYHAN AKTAR, *Varlık Vergisi: Ve Türkleştirme Politikaları* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000). Pp. 244.

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This volume hit the bookstore shelves when the film *Salkım Hanım's Necklace* sparked a great deal of controversy in the Turkish press and drew criticism from ultra-nationalist circles. The film was about the tragedy of the Capital Levy, the most drastic Turkification policy implemented during World War II. It was thanks to the film that younger generations of Turks learned about these events. The debate was further inflamed when the film was shown on state television.

The Capital Levy was enacted in the Turkish Parliament in November 1942. Its declared purpose was to tax huge profits made through war-time profiteering, as well as to combat inflation. However, the Capital Levy also turned out to be an excellent measure for expropriating the non-Muslim minorities and weakening their hold on the economic life of the country.

Aktar's work brings together a series of essays previously published in Turkish journals. It offers the most detailed and by far the best documented history available on the Turkification policies of Republican Turkey and the discriminatory policies directed against minorities in all spheres of life.

Turkification did not occur in a void. The main motive was the wish to create a new economic class assisted by the state. In this context, an important stage in the establishment of the national economy was the exchange of minority populations between Turkey and Greece. The first chapter of the book is devoted to the causes and consequences of this policy, which, in Aktar's view, prepared the ground for the emergence of a xenophobic milieu in which the Ankara government adopted an inward-looking autarchic economic model in the 1930s.

The second chapter, titled "The Jewish Events in [Eastern] Thrace and Turkish Nationalism—1934," demonstrates conclusively the role of the Republican People's Party in the relocation of the Jewish population from eastern Thrace to Istanbul. Jews were seen as an "undesirable element" by the government (p. 83). The extent of the government's involvement and the backing it provided has not been adequately addressed in prior studies. Aktar's interpretation leaves no room for doubt that the government played an important role behind the scenes. However, he also argues that Kemalists were not fascists, since they lacked the means of a legal-rational state to mobilize the masses.

In its attempts to Turkify the minorities, the Ankara government resorted to many tactics. A number of Turkification policies implemented in the early years of the republic are considered in the third chapter. Aktar convincingly demonstrates the evolution of *de facto* policies to *de jure* procedures. As with all nationalisms, the Turkish case tended to view minorities through the lens of us-and-them categories, and non-Muslim groups were regarded as half-citizens.

The fourth chapter treats in detail the implementation of the Capital Levy. Contesting the common view that the Turkish state was under the spell of Nazism in line with the spirit of the times, Aktar argues that it would be wrong to attribute the implementation of the Capital Levy solely to the winds of Nazism. He cites Faik Ökte, then the director of finance in Istanbul, as evidence of the true underlying motives and touches on debates in secret cabinet meetings. As might be expected, the implementation of such a discriminatory policy also drew rebukes from the outside world. It is to his credit that Aktar extensively uses U.S. and British archives, which enable him to assess the attitude of the international community vis-à-vis Turkey.

The book concludes with a chapter on the transfer of immovables during implementation of the Capital Levy. The author's research is based on primary documents from six land registries in Istanbul. Aktar reveals that tax assessments were made in an arbitrary fashion. Taxpayers were designated Muslim, non-Muslim, and converts (Turkish citizens whose ancestry could be traced to Salonica). Contrary to what is commonly assumed, not only were rich minority merchants forced to pay the Capital Levy, so were taxi drivers, secretaries, wage earners, peddlers, self-employed small producers, and so on. The tax had to be paid within a month of the date of posting. For that reason, many were compelled to sell their property at ridiculously low prices. Those who could not pay were forced to go to work in a labor camp in eastern Anatolia. It is noteworthy that among the 1,229 persons deported to Aşkale labor camp there was not a single Turkish Muslim defaulter.

Aktar's book is a mine of information filled with fascinating anecdotes. Numerous interviews, published memoirs, and press accounts supplement his archival research. As with any work, this book suffers from a few shortcomings. Aktar terminates his study prior to the multi-party period. One recounts similar events in the past fifty years, such as those of September 1955, when Turkish nationalists targeted the Greek community in Istanbul and exposed them to violence. It is an open secret that the Democratic Party threw its weight behind this provocation. Had Aktar expanded his book to encompass this tragic event, his

account might have been even more illuminating. It is a pity that this important book does not have an index of proper names and key words.

Nevertheless, given the unavailability of state archives to scholars, Aktar's study is an achievement of the first order. This book is an important challenge to official Turkish historiography and an honest attempt to confront the darker sides of the single-party period. A welcome step in this regard might be its translation into English, for it deserves the attention of a broader audience. It is hoped that such scholarly contributions will continue to add to the development of modern Turkish historiography.

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MAZIAR BEHROOZ, *Rebels with a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999–2000). Pp. 239. \$24.50 paper.

REVIEWED BY KAZEM ALAMDARI, Department of Sociology, California State University, Los Angeles; e-mail: kalamda@calstatela.edu

Maziar Behrooz has stated that the goal of his study is twofold: first, to document the history of communism in Iran during the thirty years between the 1953 coup and 1983, "when the last legal communist organizations were banned"; and second, "to provide an analysis of how and why the movement disintegrated in the 1980s." (p. xv)

To meet these goals, Behrooz has organized this book in four chapters, with an Introduction and an Appendix that provides a chronology of the events between 1941 and 1983. The first three chapters mainly cover the first stated objective, which is a detailed study of the thirty-year history of the communist organizations in Iran. In Chapter 4, Behrooz competently implicates specific factors in the failure of the left in Iran. The book was written at the time of the total demise of the left, not only in Iran, but also on a global scale. This obvious disposition is therefore reflected in the author's critical point of view toward the left.

Behrooz clarifies that the thirty-year period included the history of three generations of the left in Iran. During the first period, the Tudeh Party developed from a collection of intellectuals to a mass party and a serious force with an impressive following among the workers. The party played a leading role in all three major workers' unions, which at one time included 75 percent of the labor force in Iran. The Tudeh Party also succeeded in placing three ministers in the cabinet. To this strength the party military networks within the armed forces should also be added. Regarding this fact of the vast influence of the Tudeh Party, particularly among the working class, it seems that Behrooz contradicts himself when he writes, "Perhaps the factor most instrumental in the Marxist defeat was the failure of the movement to create a strong base among the working class of Iran, which communists saw as vital to their plans" (p. 147). This conclusion stems from the fact that Behrooz posits a common basis for the failure of the left in all periods, while the reasons were actually dissimilar in the various stages.

Behrooz correctly indicates that the Tudeh Party's policy reliance on the Soviets kept it passive at the time of the coup in 1953. I would add that, considering the influence of the party and the popular support of the National Front among various social strata, the coup forces could easily have been defeated.

Behrooz emphasizes that the reliance of the Tudeh Party on the Soviets was so intense that the Comintern actually outlined the policies that the party was supposed to follow. This strategy, which considered the interests of Iran as a shadow of the interests of the Soviet Union, should be considered the most important factor in the Tudeh Party's failure in Iran.

For a few years after the coup, sporadic resistance by party members continued but did not last long, and in 1958 it vanished when Khosrow Roozbeh was executed.

The second generation of the left included organizations such as the Fadaïyan Guerrillas and the Marxist–Leninist mujahedin, Tudeh splinter groups such as the Revolutionary Organization of the Tudeh Party (ROTPI) (originally organized as the Tudeh Youth Organization), and a few regional organizations among the Qashqa’i tribe and in Kurdistan. Although all of these groups were angry at the Tudeh Party’s politics, they were still influenced by the party’s Stalinist legacy and mentality. This period coincided with the Sino-Soviet split and the emergence of Maoism, which caused an international split in many communist parties, including the Tudeh Party. Bijan Jazani, one of the leading theorists and founders of the Fadaïyan guerrillas, suggested that “the Iranian movement not take sides” (p. 60). However, to avoid the unresponsiveness that characterized the Tudeh Party, this group adapted the strategy of armed struggle, which caused them to remain confined within their own underground cells, isolated from the masses and fragmented from society. Surely, this was not the same factor that caused the Tudeh’s failure.

With regard to the third period, Behrooz discusses the role of the leftist organizations before, during, and after the revolution and their final defeat. During the revolution in 1978–79, all of the leftist organizations resurfaced. However, Behrooz points to several factors responsible for the failure of the left after the revolution. These included the “relentless repression of the state” and the leftist’s falling in the trap of the “anti-imperialist paradigm” that the Soviet Union had advocated for a long time. After the Tudeh Party caused a split in the Fadaïyan, the largest leftist organization, the pro-Soviet groups who were left, such as Tudeh and the Fadaïyan Majority, allied themselves with the ultra-reactionary ruling clerics and their associates. They took harsh and hostile positions against nationalist and liberal-oriented groups such as *Nehzat Azadi*, as well as against all other communist groups. Thus, Behrooz states, “After June 1981, the [Tudeh] party and the [Fadaïyan] Majority joined in the repression of those opposed to the IRI [Islamic Republic of Iran], a strategy which without doubt had many repercussions, the most important of which was to tarnish the hard-earned image of Marxism among the population” (p. 146). I would prefer to say something like, “Cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran” rather than they “joined in the repression” of those opposed to the IRI, for despite their cooperation both the Tudeh Party and the Fadaïyan Majority were infiltrated by the IRI. Siding with the IRI was part of the strategy of dividing the world between the Soviet and U.S. blocs, but the Tudeh wrongly saw the IRI as an anti-imperialist force. Instead, the anti-American position of the IRI was rooted in the anti-Western hysteria of Islamist fanaticism that felt stung by historical defeat.

Behrooz also refers to the “poverty of philosophy” among Marxists in Iran as a reason for their failure. This could be challenged by a reference to the victorious Islamist groups in Iran that were not philosophically inclined. They succeeded, rather, by a blind ideology. “Poverty of philosophy” is a relative concept and cannot really serve as a measurement for the defeat of political parties. Furthermore, this lack of philosophical thinking was not limited to the Iranian Marxists; it was in fact a universal characteristic that stemmed from the dogmatic, Stalinist mentality that equated the West with imperialism and considered liberalism the enemy of socialism.

I found *Rebels with a Cause* a rich, useful book with a great deal of remarkable and unbiased analyses. I strongly recommend this book to all who have an interest in the history of the left in Iran and to those researching the failure of communist movements around the world.

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LAWRENCE DAVIDSON, *America's Palestine: Popular and Official Perceptions from Balfour to Israeli Statehood* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida). Pp. 264.

REVIEWED BY ANTONIO DONNO, University of Lecce, Lecce, Italy; e-mail: andonno@ilenic.unile.it

The last chapter in Lawrence Davidson's book is titled "Colonizing the American Mind," with a purpose to reverse the interpretation of Peter Grose's famous book *Israel in the American Mind* (1983). Actually, the whole of Davidson's book aims to revise the traditional historiographical approach, which has highlighted the strong bond between American values and those of the Jewish state. Davidson has been criticizing this approach since the beginning, focusing his argument on the concept of imperialism, which has produced, according to him, a serious alteration in the West's attitude toward the East. However, as will be shown, the concept of imperialism—based on the traditional separation between a civilized, advanced, and efficient West and an East in need of protection and leadership, which Davidson uses as a basic negative criterion for all his interpretation—is weak, outdated, and, above all, too ideological.

First of all, the idea of West and East is too indefinite to formulate a correct critical approach; moreover, it is anachronistic to include Palestine (and all of the Arab Middle East) in the general concept of the East. In this way, Davidson's theses paradoxically end up in the patterns of the Oriental school—which is not, I suppose, Davidson's purpose. So the whole of Davidson's book is marred by this opening ideological mark, gradually leading him to make a lot of errors of judgment.

Davidson makes a false start when he says that, according to American popular perception, as the land that gave birth to Judaism, and then to Christianity, Palestine is alien to the primitive and pagan East. The truth is very different. American public opinion knows very well that what is now called Palestine was Eretz Israel, the land of the Jews, long before the appearance of the Arabs, and that Judaism is the source of Western civilization. Therefore, the return of the Jews to Palestine is regarded as a natural and legitimate recapturing of national sovereignty that for many centuries was denied.

Consequently, Davidson considers Zionism the product of Western racism toward the Arab world and condemns the non-implementation of the concept of peoples' self-determination, first at the time of the Balfour Declaration, and then in Wilson's policy (hastily regarded as the Zionists' *longa manus*, according to the anti-Zionist cliché), by the racist West. Davidson's interpretation is ideological, lacking true historical verification. It is true that, at the end of World War I, the Arab Middle East was partitioned between France and Britain, but this has nothing to do with racism. As Efraim and Inari Karsh brilliantly show in *Empires of the Sand* (still waiting for any historiographically based reply), the Middle East at the end of World War I, was not a victim of Western racism. Rather, it fell victim to its own internecine splits when the Ottoman central power collapsed and many local *rais* expressed their hunger for power (which, according to traditional colonial arguments, the two European powers took advantage of). To interpret the intricate Middle Eastern questions of those times through the criterion of the naughty West's racism is nothing but an ideological operation.

Davidson analyzes the newspapers of that time, concluding that the West's negative attitude toward the Arabs must be included in "the bipolar worldview that structured American and European relations with the non-Western world. It had helped rationalize imperialism before the world and, despite Wilson's talk of self-determination, continued to do so, in the form of mandates, after the war" (p. 22). In short, Western racism was also the mainstay of mandates—a simplistic (ideological) interpretation of a much more complex historical process, at least.

Davidson thinks that the American press of 1917 portrayed Palestine as a biblical land occupied by an alien civilization. That is true, but there is nothing amazing or shameful in it. Is it not understandable that American public opinion at that time would feel a more than legitimate bond with the land that held the seeds of Western civilization? Are we racist in doing this?

Moreover, Davidson stigmatizes the fact that American public opinion did not realize the socialist essence of Zionism in Palestine and continued to nourish the stereotype of the Jew. But for many Americans, Zionism as a national liberation movement ahead of its time was comparable to the North American colonies' war for independence. The elements of socialism within Ben-Gurion's Zionism were traced to this target, not to the foundation of a socialist state, which the Americans correctly regarded as incompatible with Judaism. In short, Davidson thinks the American perception of Zionism as an "altruistic imperialism" and "a civilizing agent in the redemption of Palestine" (p. 64) was biased, because Zionism in fact was only partly traditional and full of racism and Western imperialism.

Regarding this perception as biased points to a methodological question in which Davidson does seem interested. A study of public opinion and its perception of facts can only observe this perception and explain it; it cannot moralistically condemn it just because the author does not like it. Unfortunately, the book continues along the same ideological lines. Davidson repeats ad nauseam that this kind of perception, which can be found in a large part of the American press, was caused by a "bipolar worldview and its pro-imperialist corollaries" and by the spread "of the popular romance of the vast colonizing venture that was Zionism" (p. 87). This is a rather petty explanation of the great political movement that was Zionism and of the complex historical process that led to the foundation of Israel.

Finally, Davidson's big effort to examine the attitude of the American press toward the "Zionist question" does not pay dividends in the long term for a simple reason: Davidson has not studied his research material with a balanced approach and the necessary objectivity. His pet subject—Western imperialism with a racist background—plagues him in all of his book, whose results can be nothing but disappointing.

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ABDELAZZIZ EZZELARAB, *European Control and Egypt's Traditional Elites—A Case Study in Elite Economic Nationalism* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002). Pp. 254. \$109.95 cloth.

REVIEWED BY RELI SHECHTER, Department of Middle East Studies, Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva, Israel; e-mail: rellish@bgumail.bgu.ac.il

Bankers-turned-historians are not a common sight in our field, and EzzelArab brings his expertise to where it is needed most. His book rightly argues for the significance of financial constraints and economic competition in the development of early nationalism as a reaction to foreign interference in Egyptian affairs before the 'Urabi revolt. The author predates the notion of economic nationalism, defined as the struggle over the domination of state finances and the economy, to this period rather than to its common association with the establishment of Bank Misr in the early 1920s. Although the term "traditional elites" is somewhat misleading (see later), the book demonstrates that economic nationalism was developed as a response of local power groups to external threats to their interests.

Chapter 1 puts Egypt in the context of the global economy between 1850 and 1880, and the author lays out the history of finance businesses in this period. Chapter 2 investigates the "traditional elites," who, EzzelArab suggests, came from two main social groups: first,

ahl al-dhawāt, an Ottoman Egyptian elite who dominated the state bureaucracy and the army; and second, *al-a'yān*, or local notables distinguished by wealth and access to the central government. The two groups were different in the 1870s, but “the distinction between them was becoming blurred and there was a general convergence in their basic interests by that time” (p. 24). In fact, the term “traditional” is correct only if it implies that both groups existed in one form or another prior to the period under discussion. As the chapter itself shows, the 19th century brought much transformation to the Egyptian state and economy and, with it, to political and economic elites. During the last part of that century, both groups experienced much competition from local minorities, from Europeans in Egypt, and from growing foreign economic and political control. Hence, their interests converged, and a new venue for struggle was created in the form of embryonic nationalism.

Chapter 3 goes to the heart of the matter in discussing the immediate circumstances that gave rise to the creation of an elitist political movement in Egypt, whose power base was the National Assembly. Unlike Alexander Scholch, EzzelArab argues that, rather than being under the control of Khedive Ismail, the National Party first cooperated with Ismail against European domination and later even stepped in against him to pursue its own interests. The chapter focuses on a close analysis of *al-lā'ihā al-waṭaniyya* (National Program), a document adopted by the National Assembly in anticipation of increased European meddling in Egyptian economic and political affairs. The main disagreement between a European perspective due to be expressed in the European-led Commission of Inquiry's final report and the pre-emptive program was the question of Egypt's financial solvency. The commission considered Egypt insolvent from the time it first defaulted on its financial obligations in April 1876. The program, by contrast, judged Egypt's financial situation less catastrophic. This in turn had a significant impact on the future. The commission envisioned a radical change in Egyptian finances, including growing European political control over the process, whereas the program suggested a gradual recovery enhanced by an increase in political involvement of the local elites through an adaptation of a European-style parliamentary model. This meant an increase in their power in relation to European delegates and the khedive. The author is at his best in exploring the financial alternative put forward by the program. He also shows that while the program seemingly trumpeted the interests of the entire nation, it preserved the economic privileges of those in power, laying the burden of paying the state's debt on the less fortunate—primarily, the peasantry.

Between April and June 1879, during the short national interregnum that followed, the local elites now in power tightened their squeeze on the countryside. This allowed for some improvement in financial matters but failed to secure an external loan (from the Rothschild bank) that was crucial to the success of recovery. The government also faced growing European opposition, which was the context for two calls to establish a national bank in Egypt, as discussed in Chapter 4. The idea behind the two calls was similar: although conceived as a local response to European economic incursion, and envisioned as garnering wide public participation, the “national” bank was to be a private rather than a government enterprise. EzzelArab dissects the two proposals, examining their feasibility and the underlying interests they served. Amin al-Shumayyil, a lawyer of Syrian origin, called for the establishment of a national bank as an instrument to convert external to internal debt, a plan biased toward urban commercial interests. The plan proposed by 'Umar Pasha Lutfi and Muhammad Pasha Sultan was more feasible. It focused on an agricultural bank that would solve the village debt crisis and, by implication, transfers of land to foreigners. The latter reflected an elite emphasis on land as a source of wealth but also a better understanding of the role of the bank as a new financial institution that would foster economic growth. EzzelArab rightly suggests that both plans were “national” only in the sense that they aimed at “extracting control from European hands” (p. 120). As the Epilogue suggests, a wider perception of economic nationalism as a struggle to benefit the homeland as a whole and the establishment of financial vehicles

to enhance this goal would have to wait until the early 20th century. Even then, as Robert Vitalis has shown, national interests were often congruent with those of Bank Misr and other business groups that competed for state rentierism.

Chapter 5 expands on the in-depth analysis of the National Program and the two calls to establish a national bank. The author investigates the dialectics according to which the state's financial constraints and economic competition stood at the core of the crisis but also triggered resistance and formulated the principal goals of the nascent nationalist movement. The events leading to Egypt's colonization dictated the nature of the response to foreign interference. EzzelArab rightly cites Jacques Berque, who commented that the Egyptian national grievance should be considered as "preeminently an economic and financial one. It began with the Debt and it was to end with the nationalization of the Canal" (p. 124). This is a significant reminder for current research on nationalism in Egypt, and the Middle East more broadly, that tends to focus on the cultural at the expense of the economic and political aspects of this phenomenon. The book is a specific reading into an early episode in Egyptian nationalism, and as such it suits the specialist rather than a wider audience. At the same time, perhaps without intending to, the author also invites further integrated research into the various aspects of nationalism.

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RAPHAEL ISRAELI, *Green Crescent over Nazareth: The Displacement of Christians by Muslims in the Holy Land*, Israeli History, Politics and Society (London: Frank Cass, 2002). Pp. 194. \$59.50 cloth; \$24.00 paper.

REVIEWED BY SARA ROY, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.; e-mail: sroy@fas.harvard.edu

In *Green Crescent over Nazareth*, Professor Israeli provides a very provocative and meticulous account of Nazareth in modern times—as part of the British Mandatory Palestine and as part of the State of Israel since 1948—and the changing demography of the city, which he characterizes as the hostile and deliberate displacement of Christians by Muslims. The story of Nazareth, and the political and cultural struggle between the Christian and Muslim communities that clearly characterize it, is explained in great detail and is the focus of the book.

Prior to the creation of the State of Israel, Christians formed the majority in Nazareth, and the city—where the Virgin Mary is believed to have conceived Christ—was always considered sacred to Christendom. With the 1948 war and the influx of Muslim refugees into Nazareth, the demographic balance began to shift. The subsequent and growing emigration of Christian residents further tilted the balance in favor of the Muslim community.

A key factor in the ascendance of the Muslim population in Nazareth is tied to the nature of Arab politics in Israel. As Israeli explains, Nazareth has always been the center of Arab nationalist politics in Israel, particularly with regard to the emergence and growth of the Communist Party. At its height, the Community Party was led by Christian Arabs and represented the mainstream of Palestinian nationalism among the Arab population of Israel. With the rise of the Islamic movement in Israel during the 1980s (and the election of six Muslim mayors in 1988), and the fall of the Soviet Union and communism in 1991, Nazareth's centrality in Arab politics began to diminish. While Nazareth remains the center of the Communist Party in Israel, the decline of the party after 1991 created a vacuum that the Islamists began to fill. Furthermore, according to Israeli, other factors played a role in the weakening influence of the Christian community, including the tenure of the immensely popular poet, Tufiq Zyad, a Muslim who served as mayor of Nazareth for twenty years. With his death in 1994 and the assumption of

his deputy, the Christian Ramiz Jeraysi, of the mayoralty, the stage was set for the Muslim majority (now 70 percent of the population) to finally take control of local political affairs.

Three years after Zyad's death, the underlying conflict openly erupted over control of the plaza in front of the Basilica of the Annunciation and came to be known as the Shihab a-Din Affair. The plaza was scheduled for renovation for the millennium celebrations in 2000, which were expected to bring vast numbers of tourists to the city. However, on Christmas Eve 1997, a group of Muslims "invaded" (p. viii) the plaza, claiming that it was waqf land on which they wanted to build a mosque. The ensuing and ongoing crisis embroiled not only the Christian and Muslim populations of Nazareth (and by extension, the Arab community in Israel), but also the municipality, the mayor, the Vatican, and the Israeli government.

Israeli's command of the history of the city and its political evolution since 1948 is comprehensive and often informative. However, his thesis—that the Christian minority is being forcibly and continually displaced by the Muslim majority in Israel—is marred by a political and cultural bias that is pronounced. It permeates the book throughout and consequently raises serious questions about the author's presentation and interpretation of events. For example, the Muslim population in Nazareth and in Israel are consistently characterized—with certain exceptions—as hostile, attacking, fundamentalist, destructive, dangerous, menacing, and backward. In a statement typical of this characterization, Israeli writes: "[The Christian mayor, Jeraysi,] was oppressed by the thought that his city, which has known universal glory as a Christian city . . . would probably wane as the Muslim fundamentalists took it over, Islamized it and turned it into a backwater center for the Islamic Movement in Israel" (p. 108).

Similarly, in referring to the tension between Christian and Muslim Arabs, Israeli writes: "as the literature on political violence has shown, rhetorical delegitimization of the rival or the enemy is the first step towards making him a free prey for all. If the Jew cannot be defeated at this point, then it becomes imperative to separate oneself off from him. Or, in a process known by psychologists as 'displaced aggression' the weak Christians in Israel are attacked while stronger Jews are avoided, although the Jews are the indirect target" (p. 68).

Although he distinguishes between Islamists and the Muslim Arab majority, the author treats them interchangeably. In a concluding section of the book titled, "Lessons and Conclusions," Israeli writes about the divisive issues separating Jews and Arabs: "[i]n questions of national security or development, the Arabs would not lift a finger: they could not care less if their country were defeated at war. . . . So it goes for land confiscation for the purpose of building roads and airports, which when touching upon areas populated by Arabs—though not necessarily owned by Arab—is always sure to create havoc as if a foreign power had invaded the land in question" (pp. 166–67).

Christians, conversely, are seen as "weak," "scared," "marginalized," passive, peace-loving, and development-oriented. Despite attacks by the "Muslim Movement" (p. 60) against them, they react "like a dhimmi people, who sing the praise of the ruler as they are being beaten by him" (p. 60). He continues: "[t]hey are already looking with horror at their cities being Islamized, their holy shrines diminished or challenged, and their traditional protectors in the West and the Vatican standing by while their millennial culture is being decimated . . . and their history rewritten" (p. 175). Furthermore, the very last line of the book concludes, "After the recent loss of Bethlehem to Palestinian Islamists, the Christian world is not about to swallow complacently the fall of another Christian city to Islam" (p. 180).

The State of Israel is consistently presented as a benign third party—"democratic," "humane," "understanding," with "limitless freedom of expression" (p. 68). According to the author, the Israeli authorities, for political reasons of their own, committed some mistakes in making concessions to the Muslim majority, which inadvertently fueled the crisis. Indeed, he warns, "As long as the Israeli authorities collaborate with them [the Islamists], they [the Islamists] have no reason to reverse course. But when in the future they sense that the day of

Jihad has come, they will not hesitate to do violently to the Jews what they are now doing to the Christians” (p. 176).

Sadly, despite the considerable amount of research that went into this book, one cannot help but feel that it is being used—at its core—as a (not so) veiled attack on all Muslim Arabs in Israel, the distinctions made among them notwithstanding. It is sad because without the polemics and hyperbole, and without the lack of nuance, depth, and completeness that run through this work, the author could have made a compelling case for the complexities of intra-communal politics and the conflicts, difficulties, and possible solutions that naturally accompany them.

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ROBERT L. JARMAN, *Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, Amir of Kuwait, 1965–77: A Political Biography* (London: London Centre of Arab Studies, 2002). Pp. 368. \$45.00.

REVIEWED BY MIRIAM JOYCE, Department of History and Political Science, Purdue University Calumet, Hammond, Ind.; e-mail: mjoyce@calumet.purdue.edu

This biography of Kuwait's twelfth al-Sabah ruler is also a history of the country from the early years of the 20th century until the death of Emir Sabah al-Salim in 1977. Jarman's book, enhanced by the inclusion of both al-Sabah family and official photographs, is based on extensive research in British and American documents and includes material acquired through conversations with al-Sabah family members. In his acknowledgments, Jarman expresses gratitude to Emir Sabah's daughter, Shaikhah Hussah Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah. In the book's Foreword, the Kuwaiti diplomat Abdullah Bishara writes: “[w]e have tried in this book to present Shaikh Sabah's political legacy in every domain he involved himself in” (p. xix). Hence, at the very outset the reader is on notice that Jarman's work is likely to be a hymn of praise to Emir Sabah (p. 224). Indeed, it is, but at the same time Jarman provides the reader with an interesting picture of the history of Kuwait and its development from a poor desert shaykhdom, to an oil-rich independent state.

The year of Shaykh Sabah's birth is uncertain, although it is assumed to be 1913. The young Shaykh Sabah received a traditional Qur'anic education and began his career in government in 1939, when he was appointed commandant of the recently established Town Police. Focusing, of course, on Shaykh Sabah, Jarman discusses how members of the ruling family vied for position and how the future emir moved up the al-Sabah family ladder. After independence, Shaykh Sabah became Kuwait's first minister of foreign affairs and had urgently to deal with Iraq. According to Jarman, despite the opposition of British Ambassador John Richmond, Shaykh Sabah pursued secret contacts with the Iraqis.

Jarman covers the reign of Emir Sabah in the last third of his book, which he begins by reiterating his often repeated theme: “Sabah al-Salim throughout his political life wished to exert a unifying influence and to position himself above the immediate political fray” (p. 224). On assuming the role of emir in 1965, Sabah al-Salim was faced with the necessity of maintaining Kuwait's ties with London, strengthening relations with Washington, and maintaining the rhetoric of Arab unity, which made support for the Palestinian cause essential. According to Jarman, “It would be impossible to over-estimate the importance of the Palestinian movement in Kuwait at that time” (p. 250).

Soon after his accession, Emir Sabah, who wished to promote a Kuwaiti-led Gulf federation, took a quick tour of eight neighboring shaykhdoms. Jarman claims that Kuwait considered the emir's tour a success (p. 239). However, he omits any reference to the readily available British archival material that documents negative reaction to the emir's visit.

Jarman also discusses Emir Sabah's December 1968 visit to President Johnson. The emir expressed concern about Palestine but emphasized that the Gulf was his primary interest. Following his visit to the United States, the emir refused to accept an invitation for a state visit to Britain. Jarman analyzes the emir's unwillingness to accept the invitation by supporting the British assumption that the emir was very concerned about Arab opinion, and a state visit to London so soon after his visit to Washington would provide ammunition to Arab nationalists.

Ironically, in 1975, after the civil war in Lebanon prevented the emir from taking his annual summer holiday at his palace in the hills above Beirut, he purchased an estate in England close to the estates of other Gulf leaders. For many years the emir had suffered from poor health. "It was here, in Beaconsfield, that Sabah al-Salim was to spend much of his last two years, able to relax as 'Mr Sabah,' to enjoy the life of an English gentleman, while keeping in close touch with Kuwaiti government ministers and with the major issues of Kuwait" (p. 294).

Discussing Emir Sabah's accomplishments, Jarman emphasizes that one of the development funds the ruler established was called the Reserve Fund for Future Generations. From 1976 until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 10 percent of Kuwait's oil income was placed in that fund. According to Jarman, the fund provided the money to pay for the country's liberation: "[t]he establishment of the Fund is a lasting testimony to Shaikh Sabah al-Salim's wisdom and concern for present and future generations of his beloved Kuwaiti people" (p. 298).

As a result of the numerous documents Jarman used, scholars may enjoy reading the book to find details they earlier missed. However, patience is essential. Some information is repeated several times, and the notes at the end of the chapters do not include the archives from which each document was obtained.

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MICHAEL FRANCIS LAFFAN, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds*, SOAS/Routledge Curzon Studies on the Middle East (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003). Pp. 310. \$75.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY ROBERT W. HEFNER, Department of Anthropology, Boston University; e-mail: r hefner@bu.edu

Although Indonesia is the most populous Muslim-majority society in the world, Western historiography has downplayed the role of Islamic actors and ideals in the development of the country's nationalism. Echoing earlier Dutch accounts, most historians present Indonesian nationalism as a product of the joint efforts of expatriate students in Holland and Dutch-educated elites in the East Indies. Both groups, the conventional narrative goes, promoted secular notions of ethnicity, language, and territory, at first creating regional ethno-nationalisms (Javanese, Sundanese, Minangkabau, etc.) rather than an encompassing Indonesian form. Under the twin influence of Dutch schooling and colonial subjugation, the elite proponents of these ethno-nationalisms eventually fused their varied ambitions into a single nationalist project. Islam, however, never became more than a background accessory to the larger whole.

A revision of a doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of Sydney in 2000, Michael Francis Laffan's new book takes aim squarely at this established narrative. The author seeks to "evaluate the place of Islam in early Indonesian nationalism" (p. 2) and, in so doing, move Islam from nationalism's margins to its center. Laffan's thesis is that although some variants of Indonesian nationalism did indeed evolve from regional secular nationalisms, in the course of their fusion some of the most important foregrounded Islam as the "underlying mechanisms of commonality" (p. 166) and the requisite basis for a future state.

As he explains in the book's Introduction, Laffan is not interested in providing a new theory of nationalism, Islamic or otherwise. *Islamic Nationhood* makes few references to recent discussions of religion and secular nationalism, with the notable exception of Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1991 [1983]). A towering presence in Indonesian studies, Anderson's account of Indonesian nationalism incorporates conventional biases by ignoring the role of Muslims while over-emphasizing that of Dutch-educated "creole intellectuals." Anthropologists of Indonesian Islam have long taken exception to Anderson's model, pointing out that Muslim preachers and pilgrims were central to the nationalist movement. Laffan makes passing reference to these studies (p. 9) but does not otherwise engage their critiques or adopt their bottom-up approach to Islamic nationalism.

Rather than offering a new theory or a local history of nationalism, then, Laffan seeks to "test Andersonian theory" (p. 9) by adopting Anderson's analytic framework but replacing Islamic pilgrimage and print capitalism for Anderson's secularist entities. Laffan's argument is that "Indonesian nationhood had deeper roots in an Islamic ecumenism within archipelagic Southeast Asia made more tangible through contact with both other Muslims beyond that world and non-Muslims within it" (p. 3). The primary characters in Laffan's story, then, are the Muslim scholars and students "who moved back and forth across the Indian Ocean to institute Islamic reform" (p. 3). In so doing, he demonstrates, they prepared the way for an Islamic imagining of the Indonesian ecumene.

Whereas his theoretical perspective is not new, the historical materials Laffan amasses to explore the world of late colonial Muslims are original, detailed, and masterfully analyzed. Focusing his account on Jawa (Muslims from archipelagic Southeast Asia) from the mid-19th century to the 1920s, Laffan shows that the earliest ideals of Jawa ecumenism were formed not in secularist nationalist circuits, but through pilgrimage and study in the Hijaz. In the course of their travels, the Jawa forged new identities, drawing on the ambiguous experience of encountering a global community of believers while also being made aware of their subordinate status relative to their Arab fellows. As conflict in the Hijaz escalated at the end of the 19th century, a growing number of Jawa left Arabia for Cairo. There, Laffan shows, the Jawa were exposed to ideas of Islamic reform and nationhood entirely unlike anything they had heard in Mecca and Medina. They later carried these ideas of Islamic nationhood back to the Indies. In the second decade of the 20th century, an alliance of Sumatran "new group" reformists (*kaum muda*) and Javanese revivalists drew on these same Cairene models to forge a mass movement, one that replaced earlier ethno-nationalisms with an Islamic and Pan-Indonesian construct.

Though still a powerful force in Indonesia, "old group" (*kaum tua*) traditionalists, such as those who came together to create the Nahdlatul Ulema in 1926, figure little in Laffan's account. When discussed at all, the traditionalists are portrayed as adopting "the weapons of modernity," such as "schools, newspapers, and associations" (p. 235), in response to the needling attacks of reformists, not also as a result of developments in their own communities. Laffan also mentions Indonesia's once rich traditions of mysticism and Islamic secularism only in passing. This is perhaps understandable in light of the author's professed interest in juxtaposing reformist pilgrimage with Anderson's secularist model. However, having demonstrated so convincingly the roots of Indonesian nationalism in Islamic reform, the author's brief mention at the end of the book of "the ultimate failure" (p. 238) of reformists to outflank their secularist rivals and establish an Islamic state seems anomalous. Readers who are not already familiar with Indonesian history get few clues as to how Islamic nationalists endowed with such rich social resources failed to prevail.

No author can do everything, and in focusing on the role of reformists in the forging of Indonesian nationhood Laffan provides an impressive corrective to mainstream histories. Densely detailed yet engagingly written, this study's superb insights into the experiences of

Jawa pilgrims in an age of European colonialism establish the book as required reading for all students of Southeast Asian Islam. It will also appeal to students of Muslim politics interested in the unfinished dialogue of Islam and nationalism.

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BENNY MORRIS, *The Road to Jerusalem: Glubb Pasha, Palestine and the Jews* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002). Pp. 307. \$35.00.

REVIEWED BY KIMBERLY KATZ, Department of History, Towson University, Towson, Md.; e-mail: kkatz@towson.edu

The Road to Jerusalem: Glubb Pasha, Palestine and the Jews is Benny Morris's latest scholarly endeavor to shed light on the events surrounding the 1948 Palestine war. Although, as he notes in his Introduction, it was in Jordan where Glubb, a British general-on-loan to (Trans)Jordan from 1930 to 1956 and leader of the Jordanian Arab Legion, made his main contribution to history, Morris focuses on how Glubb Pasha's actions affected Zionists during the Mandate period and, subsequently, in the State of Israel. The main point of departure for Morris is the notion that Glubb may have been anti-Semitic, thus adversely affecting the Zionists' efforts to establish their state. Yet in reading this book, the reader should pay careful attention to the author's approach, his choice of sources, and his political priorities, all of which inform the book and call into question the allegation of anti-Semitism.

Glubb's alleged anti-Semitism serves the larger issue with which Morris is ultimately concerned: Israeli historiography on the 1948 war period. In the Introduction, Morris states that this study is intended to mediate the controversy between "Old Historians," who determined the official Zionist narrative of the 1948 war and the founding of the state, and "New Historians," who challenge the Zionist foundational myths. As a pioneer of the latter group with his *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem* (1988), Morris cleared the path for Israeli scholars to engage in a new kind of critical, scholarly, national self-reflection that in effect supported long-standing Palestinian claims regarding Zionist responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem. That said, one infers a change in Morris's scholarly direction based on an article he contributed to the *Guardian* newspaper on 21 February 2002 discussing the al-Aqsa Intifada in Israel/Palestine. The past and the present are so interwoven here that, along with a change in his thinking with regard to prospects for peace between Israelis and Palestinians, Morris seems to have reversed his scholarly trajectory by supporting the traditional Israeli/Zionist view of the conflict. Reading *The Road to Jerusalem*, it is evident that his revised position on today's conflict informed his scholarly interest in Glubb's alleged anti-Semitism.

Although he sets out to prove a link between Glubb's perceived anti-Semitism and events in Zionist/Israeli history, Morris actually reaches no firm conclusion about whether the British general was anti-Semitic. He sees in Glubb's writings about Jews both hostility and empathy. Linking history to today's political events, Morris often finds Glubb's comments prophetic for their support of the current official Israeli position. For example, he quotes a report in which Glubb states that "the [1936–39] Palestinian rebellion . . . [has] shown that regular armies are ill adapted to cope with gang warfare, which carries on its activities by the intimidation of private citizens" (pp. 50–51). As the Israeli army has not been able to put an end to Palestinian suicide bombings during the years of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Morris ties Glubb's historical comments to the present situation, which helped formulate the position he explicated in *The Guardian*. Though the author wavers throughout the book on the question of anti-Semitism, he ultimately stakes a clear position about Glubb's view toward Zionism in his conclusion. For Morris it is

axiomatic that Glubb, “a convinced champion of the Arab cause” (p. 233) challenges Zionism and its goals because of his “anti-Zionism.” To be anti-Zionist, for Morris, is to oppose Zionist conventional wisdom for which the project of bringing Jews and settling them in Palestine was intended to bring peace and resolution to the Jewish problem in Europe.

These issues in effect speak less to the subject of Glubb’s suspected anti-Semitism than to the question of whether observers of, and participants in, this century-old conflict can criticize Zionism and Israel in the same ways in which they would criticize other national movements and occupying powers, if at all. Morris’s focus on Glubb’s perceived anti-Semitism seems part of a larger, one-sided discussion among many Jews and supporters of Israel today in which criticism of Zionism or the State of Israel—and, in particular, its policies toward the Palestinians—is tantamount to anti-Semitism and thus is omitted from the discourse. If supporters of Israel proclaim, support, and defend Israel as a “Jewish” state, while disparaging anyone who criticizes the policies of the “Jewish” state in its national form, under what circumstances might it be possible to criticize the State of Israel for its political policies, past and current, without being accused of anti-Semitism?

Morris offers the book as two different kinds of studies in one: it is at once a new interpretation of previously examined sources and an analysis of newly declassified material. He employs previously classified Israeli and British archival material to answer old historiographical questions: the controversial repositioning of troops that led the Arab Legion to lose Lydda and Ramle, the strategy toward the battle for Jerusalem, and the question of whether Jordan’s King Abdullah or the Zionists wanted “all of Palestine,” among others. That said, the book rehashes old arguments, variously dismissing or affirming existing scholarship, without explanation, rather than breaking new ground. In the few cases where British official records disagree with accounts in existing scholarship, Morris often relegates the point to an endnote, diminishing its strength rather than offering the reader a sharp new conclusion. The reader also learns from the endnotes that Morris feels more comfortable citing Israeli sources to prove points than British or Jordanian—indeed, Arab—sources. Though difficult to attain, both primary and secondary Arab sources, especially Jordanian, are widely overlooked.

It must also be said that the publisher has not served Morris well. The book is unfortunately marred by technical and editing problems—repetition, grammatical slips, stylistically cumbersome passages, and weak internal organization of some chapters. The crude, unintelligible map of the Battle for Jerusalem drawn by hand (p. 164) contrasts sharply with the other two more refined and legible maps of the U.N. Partition Plan and the Arab states invading Palestine (pp. 90, 146). The book would have benefited from thorough editing and more careful analysis of the sources, such as that Morris undertook in his earlier work on Palestinian refugees.

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ELIZABETH BOOSAHDA, *Arab-American Faces and Voices: The Origins of an Immigrant Community* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003). Pp. 303. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY SUSANNE DAHLGREN, Department of Cultural Anthropology, University of Helsinki; e-mail: susanne.dahlgren@helsinki.fi

Studies on people on the move have recently gained new impetus, whether looked at from a migration, diaspora, or transnational angle. While dislocations, imagined sites, and belongings constituted virtually have sometimes made places disappear entirely, the idea that people on the move neither “belong” to where they came from nor should be viewed from a narrow nationalistic angle have become evident. Focus has been directed on everyday life and family

formation in multi-localities, with people on the move, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. In the Middle Eastern context, people in a transnational state have become an important field where notions of family, gender, and citizenship are contested and theoretically re-evaluated.

Elizabeth Boosahda's *Arab-American Faces and Voices* is a chronicle of an immigrant community settled in Worcester, Massachusetts. A third-generation Arab American, Boosahda has done extensive work in interviewing old-generation members of the community and tracing families who, from 1880–1915, migrated to the United States from the Ottoman provinces of Syria and Palestine. Still, for a book published by a university publishing house, this is not a conventional academic work. The author's peculiar choice of transliterating Arabic names and words according to two 19th-century language manuals adds to the impression that this book moves in its own scholarly space. For instance, the name of the village from which most of the people came remains obscure to the reader, as it is transliterated in multiple, inconsistent ways, obviously reflecting the corruption of Arabic names in America.

The location of Boosahda's study is the Northeastern town Worcester. She provides little information about the places in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine from which these people came, where they left family behind, and to which many of them eventually returned. Rather, the book is a recollection of how Worcester used to be, before the evident logic of capitalist town building—everything is built to be demolished—swept away the familiar houses, shops, community buildings, churches, and restaurants. While the focus is on community and religious life, neighborhoods, work, and business, the author gives less information about the Arab Americans' everyday practices, homes, and family life. The book should, however, be classified among studies of American history in that it provides interesting data for anyone studying Middle Eastern people on the move. This is true in particular about what Boosahda has to say about women as the first to migrate in the family, as introducing peddling as a profession to other family members, and as running businesses while husbands are away. However, because the book lacks a gender perspective, this information somehow sinks under all of the other material.

It is said that in America, families disappear after three generations. Boosahda thus captures a partly forgotten old generation. She addresses her book to the present generation of Arab Americans who no longer speak Arabic or trace their identities to a village in a distant Middle Eastern country. For these readers she provides a sketchy account of the history of Arabs and an annotated list of books, associations, and religious communities to search for more information. This data may also be useful also to general American readers who are ignorant of the history of Arabs in building the United States.

For Boosahda, the "American way" of immigration—that is, mere assimilation—is an evident process that should be accepted. Although it seems important for her to repeatedly convince the reader of how patriotic Arab Americans are, she also wants to deliver the message that young people should not forget the best qualities of their "origins": generosity, hospitality, and devotion to family and community. Metaphoric for her to practicing these virtues is food: it is in preparing, serving, and enjoying food that we get most of the information about these past generations of people who brought to North America these fine traits.

Quite a number of studies of Arab American communities and peoples in the United States are available by scholars such as Barbara Aswad and Yvonne Haddad (whose works are not mentioned in the bibliography even though they are cited in the text). Yet Boosahda, whose book concentrates solely on the Christian community of Worcester, repeatedly claims that her study is representative of the entire United States. This is hard to substantiate. Her book gives very little information about Muslims, for one thing. What we learn about Muslim families consists of the author's normative explanation, not something people who have been interviewed would say. And even though Arab Christian and Muslim religious communities evidently share customs and everyday practices, their community life certainly is different.

Second, there is very little comparison with other studies of Arab American communities and of how particular local circumstances affected ways of life, possibilities in making a living, and seizing the American dream. Boosahda is too busy giving respect to particular prominent members of the community to explain the various ways in which people became Americanized. For instance, it would have been interesting had she examined how people's names changed, because each name change carries a history of its own.

Despite some critical points, *Arab-American Faces and Voices* is a needed contribution for anyone interested in Arab American history, Middle Eastern people's migration, or the flourishing of a rich ethnic community. With rich illustration it is valuable reading for students of American history, too.

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SHAHLA HAERI, *No Shame for the Sun: Lives of Professional Pakistani Women*, Gender, Culture and Politics in the Middle East Series (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2002). Pp. 463. \$49.50 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY EVELYN ALSULTANY, Program in Modern Thought and Literature, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.; e-mail: alsultany@stanford.edu

Shahla Haeri would like to know why Muslim women who are accessible and visible in their own societies remain invisible in the West. Why have they failed to capture the interest of anthropologists, the media, and the public, in contrast to veiled Muslim women? Dismayed that despite the growing academic literature on Muslim women much of it still focuses on the veil and peasant women, Haeri seeks to document the lives of professional Pakistani women. While anthropologists have become more self-reflexive and critical of their relationship to their subjects over the past few decades, Haeri challenges them to rethink their focus on the subaltern. Deliberately focusing on educated and professional women of similar status to herself, she proposes a new ethnographic model, "shared ethnography," which she demonstrates through her interviews with six Pakistani women, a methodology emerging from dialogues and collaboration with her subjects. Seeking to make professional Pakistani women visible, the title of the book, *No Shame for the Sun*, refers to women out in the public sphere, unabashed and in the sun, despite the multiple structures that render them invisible—be they veils, gender-role expectations, or academic discourses.

Haeri uses the Introduction to set forth her objectives and Chapter 1 to situate herself as an Iranian Muslim feminist scholar and ethnographer in relation to her subjects and to contextualize Pakistani history, politics, and culture. What is particularly interesting about Chapter 1 is that we learn about Pakistani women through the lens of an Iranian woman. The reader gets more than expected: a comparative look at gender in two Muslim countries, Pakistan and Iran. Haeri spends some time explaining the role of honor (*izzat*) in Pakistan and how it operates as a fundamentally gendered cultural principle. The concept of honor is key to understanding the conflicts and challenges Pakistani professional women face as each inadvertently violates traditional notions of honor.

Chapters 2–7 are each devoted to one of her six interviewees. Haeri begins each chapter with a brief introduction stating how she met the woman and the circumstances in which the interviews took place. The bulk of the chapter presents the narrative of the woman unfiltered and without interruption. Haeri saves her commentary for a few pages at the end, in which she briefly addresses some of the themes from the narratives and contextualizes them within anthropological and feminist frameworks.

Each chapter has a title that identifies the main conflict in the interviewee's life: Identity, Violence, Legitimacy, Marriage, Kinship, and Religion. Chapter 2 is about Quratul Ain Bakhteari's life, wrought with conflict regarding her identity as defined by her parents, in-laws, and culture as a woman, wife, and mother and her own desire to have an independent life and make a difference in refugee communities in Pakistan. Although she is repeatedly kicked out of the house by her husband, she manages to earn a master's degree and a Ph.D., and to pioneer community-based sanitation systems in refugee camps and home-schooling systems in villages for young girls. Rahila Tiwana's life (chap. 3) is marked by violence. As a political activist and student leader with a branch of Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party, she was arrested and tortured in police custody. She denies that the torture she endured involved rape to preserve not only her family's honor but also that of Bhutto and the Pakistan People's Party.

Ayesha Siddiqi (chap. 4) moves between two posts: one as a young feudal lord with many servants in her village, where she is often sought after for advice, and the other as a civil servant in the city where she is often not taken seriously as a woman in a position of power. Kishwar Naheed (chap. 5) is a prolific, contemporary, well-known, and controversial poet. She is controversial for challenging the male literary tradition and appropriating the *ghazal*, a lyrical poetic style used by men to express love. Choosing whom she will marry against her parents' wishes, and expressing women's desire in her poetry, she is ostracized for violating her family's honor. Sajida Mokarram Shah (chap. 6) also faces dishonor and ostracism for rejecting the cultural practice of widow inheritance that requires her to live with her husband's brother after her husband's death. The final narrative comes from Nilofar Ahmad (chap. 7), a Sufi feminist whose interpretations of Islam challenge traditional ideas and hierarchy.

Haeri does not present a simplistic argument against the dominant perception of oppressed women in Pakistan by representing their lives as full of success and free from constraint. Instead, the narratives demonstrate the complex ways in which women negotiate agency amid multiple constraints to become influential scholars, activists, and poets. Their narratives disrupt the dominant understanding of how patriarchy operates through dominant men who oppress women and bar them from the public sphere. For example, each interviewee discusses her upbringing and relationship to her parents. Some had domineering mothers who insisted on upholding the patriarchal tradition and passive loving fathers who encouraged them to pursue education, thus complicating the notion that men alone uphold patriarchy. The narratives are inspiring and give true insight into women's agency as they each craft their own accomplishments in the public and domestic spheres despite extreme conflicts and objections from their community and families.

The narratives are interesting not only because of what they say about women's lives growing up in Pakistan after partition, but also because we get to read them in their entirety, without interruption. This is a refreshing change from writing that presents selected quotes from interviews to illustrate particular themes or support an argument (including my own). Haeri's comments draw important points from the narratives, which readers can compare with their own conclusions. This structure makes the book a wonderful text to use in the classroom, as the unfiltered narratives will certainly provoke much discussion and debate.

If you are teaching courses on Muslim women and seeking to move away from the stereotype of the veiled oppressed Muslim woman, this book is perfect. It illustrates that women can have an array of experiences living in the same society; highlights the interaction between culture and religion, moving away from the notion of a monolithic Islam that is oppressive to all women; and demonstrates that Muslim women can be and are active participants in the public sphere. I look forward to adding this text to my syllabus on Muslim women, and I recommend it to those who teach South Asian studies, women's studies, anthropology, and Middle East and Islamic studies.

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STEPHAN PROCHÁZKA, *Die arabischen Dialekte der Çukurova (Südtürkei)*, *Semitica Viva* 27 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2002). Pp. 350. €49.00 paper.

REVIEWED BY PETER BEHNSTEDT, Chipiona, Spain; e-mail: behnstedt@arrakis.es

This thorough study deals with the dialects of the Arabic-speaking minority of Cilicia (Çukurova in southern Turkey), who live in some thirty localities. Before Procházka's fieldwork, Cilicia had been a dialectological terra incognita. The only information available consisted of some remarks on the dialect of Adana by O. Jastrow (*ZAL* 11, pp. 72–79). Procházka estimates the total number of Arabic speakers at about 70,000 (p. 12). They belong to different confessions—some 1,000 are Christians, 4,000–5,000 are Sunnis, both living in Mersin. The Christians claim origin from the Turkish province of Hatay, Syria, and Lebanon; the Sunnis claim origin from the Syrian coast. The most important group are the Alevites, a smaller group of them originating from Hatay. A list and maps of the Arabic-speaking localities are given (p. 4–9).

Astonishingly, the author was able to carry out his fieldwork on the spot, without any hindrance by the authorities. He was also able to visit all the Arabic-speaking towns and villages of the area. Similar research on Arabic-language islands in Turkey had to be done outside the country.

The organization of the book is very clear and follows the model of traditional Arabic dialectological studies. It includes a bibliography but no indexes. The approach is descriptive and diachronic. Part 2, "Grammatische Darstellung," uses as a reference dialect the dialect of the town of Adana. At the end of each chapter, differences between Adana and the other localities are enumerated. The dialects described show many similarities with the Arabic dialects of Hatay and with dialects of the Syrian coast and Lebanon—for example, the treatment of /a/ in pre-stress position in a closed syllable (p. 35), with one remarkable exception: *a > i* also in the forms of the passive participle (*milfuufi*; 'Kraut'), not attested elsewhere in Levantine Arabic. The chapter "Morphology" is followed by a short chapter on syntax. One interesting phenomenon is to be found in the noun-adjective phrase: the noun is in the construct state in more than 90 percent of the cases in his text corpus. This is also known in other Levantine dialects, but only when the adjective has a distinctive function. Remarkable, too, is the absence of a genitive exponent, normally found in all other Arabic dialects.

One shortcoming in most descriptions of Arabic dialects is the lack of a chapter on the lexicon, but Procházka is a commendable exception. He presents some (Arabic) lexical items that are not found in other Levantine dialects (p. 163). A glossary follows, mostly with etymologies, but also containing a number of semantic curiosities, such as *rama* ('to let, leave; normally, to throw').

Chapter 5, "Der Einfluss des Türkischen," is an important one. Because of the contact with Turkish, the dialects have integrated Turkish phonemes such as /ç/, /g/, /el/, and /ü/ and a good deal of vocabulary. One problem the author confronted (p. 184) was to decide whether a word was a loan in Arabic or the speaker was simply code switching (they are all bilingual). He therefore has added some remarks on "code switching." In Chapter 5, the author also deals with semantic influences, the phonology and morphology of loans, and the integration of verbs. Finally, he gives a semantical classification of the loans (cooking, house building, administration, etc.). Section 5.3 presents calques with Arabic plus Turkish elements and those exclusively with Arabic words, while section 5.4 focuses on Turkish syntactic influences. I wonder whether the construction *küür kayyis* ('very good'; cf. 5.4.2, *Wortstellung*) really reflects a Turkish model, since *küür kayyis* or *küür kwayyis* is the normal

construction in all Levantine dialects, and a similar construction may be used in Moroccan Arabic.

According to Procházka, the strong Turkish influence in the vocabulary should not be overestimated. Radical structural changes are not evident either in phonology or in morphology, as also observed in other peripheral Arabic dialects.

Part 3 is a sketch of the dialects of the Sunnis of Mersin who claim origin from Syria. There are indeed many correspondences to be found with dialects of the Syrian coast. The most remarkable phenomenon in this dialect is the perfect ending *-it* for the first person singular versus *-t* for the second person singular. Normally they have the same ending.

Part 4 is a selection of dialect texts (Arabic in transcription with German translation) dealing with the favorite themes of the Alevites: saints, their miracles, and rebirth. Other texts take as their subject customs, cooking recipes, tales about former times, and everyday life and stories.

Procházka's study fills a gap. Even if many of the phenomena described are also found in other Levantine dialects, he nevertheless furnishes a great deal of new material. His book completes our knowledge about the geographical distribution of Levantine Arabic. Alas, it is also an epitaph: the author states (p. 12–13) that the Arabic dialects of Cilicia will certainly have died out within the next forty to fifty years. This fine study is of interest not only to dialectologists of Arabic but also to ethnologists and to linguists dealing with bilingualism, language contact, and language death.

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LAWRENCE ROSEN, *The Culture of Islam: Changing Aspects of Contemporary Muslim Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). Pp. 247. \$24.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY AOMAR BOUM, Department of Anthropology, University of Arizona, Tucson; e-mail: bouma@email.arizona.edu

The Culture of Islam: Changing Aspects of Contemporary Muslim Life explores the shifting social, political, and cultural concepts of a contemporary North African Muslim community, extrapolating it to the rest of the Arab/Islamic world. Rosen uses for the most part his ethnographic experience, which goes back more than three decades in the Middle Atlas town of Sefrou as well as in other Moroccan environments. Stuck in his old paradigm of the “negotiating situated individual,” he reshelves his data, remaps it to include contemporary themes, and restructures “his” Moroccan society, with Sefrou *still* as its microcosm.

In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, Rosen's book adds to the intensive literature that tries to make sense not only of the character of Muslim societies but also of the nature of relationships that involve Muslims. Although the book was not written with the terrorists' attacks in mind, Rosen attempts to provide some answers to Western readers about the Muslim world, using “his Morocco” as an example of the general Arab Islamic context. In fact, in a 24 February 2003 interview with *Princeton Weekly Bulletin*, Rosen confirmed that since 11 September, the United States has not been playing the negotiating game of Arabs/Muslims. While in Sefrou people negotiate their relationship in the market, politics, culture, family, and law, the United States does not engage itself in this bargaining of or for ideas. Instead, it looks to the Arabs as a de-localized and de-centered superpower that can “do anything to anybody.” For Rosen, the “constant focus, then, is on the situations, the contexts in which persons interact with others and on the particular ways they have played out their possibilities to create their own social situatedness. . . . In a sense, then, what is at work is a ‘great game,’ a constant series of moves aimed at securing oneself in an uncertain world.” (xii).

After three decades, Rosen is still faithful to his doctrine of “connections and negotiations,” where individuals, depending on their skills, engage in striking deals, bargaining, and networking. Once again, the group is put aside in the margin of Rosen’s “world order.” In this world, Moroccans as individuals still “bargain” and “negotiate” their relationships. Unlike what Gellner, Hart, and others have maintained, the group—that is, the lineage, the tribe, the neighborhood, and, if we may say, the state—are there only in case the individual needs help. The dyadic characteristic of social relations, the basis of *Bargaining for Reality*, is still central not only to Sefrouis but also to all Moroccans and the Arab world. The negotiation is everywhere: it is in the market, religion, law, economics, politics, family—above all, in “culture.” Simply put, in Rosen’s epistemological construction of “Arab/Muslim societies,” the foundation of these societies is the individual caught in a web of intermittently shifting relationships.

Throughout the three sections and the ten chapters of the book, Rosen crosscuts themes such as memory, sainthood, faith, doubt, corruption, tribalism, Salman Rushdie’s challenge to Islam, and the developing forms of Islam in European communities. Part 1, “Ambivalence Culture,” revisits the concept of ambivalence previously discussed in *Bargaining for Reality* and other works on the Jews of Morocco. For Rosen, whether it is in gender, political authority, or saintly legitimacy, there is an ambivalent feeling toward power seen in many cultural forms in the Arab/Islamic world, and through which Westerners can make sense of many contradictory reactions toward power as experienced in the daily lives of Muslims.

Part 2, “Memory Worlds, Plausible Worlds,” provides some ethnographic stories about peoples’ memories of past events. The three chapters of this part—“Contesting Memory,” “Memory in Morocco,” and “Have the Arabs Changed Their Minds?”—raise some of the central themes of this book. The part begins with a chapter on memory in which Rosen looks at whether memory in Morocco is continuously reconstructed. Rosen uses an example of a Moroccan city whose inhabitants came to realize that their traditionally visited Muslim saint might be Jewish. In this context, Rosen discusses how memory alters over the decades. Furthermore, faithful to his theory of the *situated* person who adapts himself to different webs of relationships, Rosen poses a central question in his book about “whether cultural ideas have so changed in the past generations that the very terms by which the same people capture past events now are different from the way they did so when [he] first encountered them several decades ago” (p. xiv). One of the most important theoretical features of this work is this comparative anthropological diagnosis of a Moroccan society over the years. Yet despite the large number of examples and details, Rosen’s analysis sometimes fails to be comprehensive and convincing. His obsession with individual capacity continues to affect the analytical prisms through which he reconstructs Arab/Islamic society.

Consistent with his theory, Rosen also concludes that his observation of Moroccan society points to “an open ended-approach” to social, political, and cultural concepts. This makes it very difficult for any individual to promote his or her policies or the agenda of his or her group. Of course, this is consistent with Rosen’s “system,” where the individual, as the molecular unit from which society is built, is in a continuous process of negotiating his space and social networks. For these reasons, Rosen makes it clear that, as cultural anthropologists, we should be conservative in our analyses because the “world is more disorderly than our theories about it.” In other words, Rosen’s “cultural anthropological conservatism” is about interpretive theory. What we can do in this disorderly Arab/Islamic world is use the symbols and signs it provides and reconstruct our own anthropological view without looking at the historical, ideological, and economic factors that influence Muslims’ decisions.

Part 3, “Shifting Concepts, Discerning Change,” adds something new to Rosen’s description of the changing Arab/Islamic cultural and religious landscapes. Although some sections of this part reminds us of Rosen’s *The Anthropology of Justice: Law as Culture in Islamic Society*,

also based on Sefrou, this chapter takes us outside Morocco's border to discuss the challenges that Muslim minorities in Europe as well as in the United States, and Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*, pose to Muslims/Arabs.

It remains to be said that Rosen is an excellent writer. The book's synthetic power resides in its ability to bring together three decades of ethnographic experience. Its clear and detailed style makes it an enjoyable read. Rosen gets credit for raising some of the questions at the heart of Muslim societies. Today, the Arab/Muslim world is undergoing a social, political, and economic paralysis. Rosen has raised some of the central issues in this dilemma where Muslims are struggling to find the convenient road to a better modernity. For this reason, I strongly recommend this book to audiences within and outside academe.

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M. NAZIF SHAHRANI, *The Kirghiz and Wakhi of Afghanistan: Adaptation to Closed Frontiers and War* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002). Pp. 302. \$22.50 paper.

REVIEWED BY ARASH KHAZENI, Department of History, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.; e-mail: arash.khazeni@yale.edu

Since the late 19th century, modern nation-states have sought to fix pastoral nomadic societies through various policies of settlement and sedentarization. One of the most basic has been the transformation of open and permeable frontiers into closed borderlands. While many writers have assumed that the inevitable fate of nomads is to become settled and converted into agriculturalists, a few rare voices have called attention to the resilience of pastoral ways. In this respect, the work of M. Nazif Shahrani has been pioneering. In his classic *The Kirghiz and Wakhi of Afghanistan: Adaptation to Closed Frontiers and War* (originally published in 1979), Shahrani suggests that in the Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan there has been no clear progression from nomadic to settled or urban life and that "both nomadization of agriculturalists and sedentarization of nomads has always occurred" in marginal environments (p. 221). While the closing of frontiers in late-19th- and early-20th-century Central Asia imposed dire limits on the Kirghiz, bringing them territorial loss and severing their socio-economic ties with Chinese and Russian Turkistan, they were nevertheless able to remain herders by moving to the high altitudes of the Afghan Pamir, "the roof of the world" (*bam-i dunya*).

Shahrani depicts the Pamir Mountains of Afghanistan as a land of retreat and refuge, a sanctuary for those compelled to take flight. The Pamir Mountains were "a no man's land" for authorities and a sanctuary for those fleeing from them. During the 19th century, groups of the Kirghiz, who had migrated from Mongolia to Xinjiang Province 1,000 years before, began to practice "vertical nomadism" in the Afghan Pamir, climbing to the upper pastures in warmer seasons to graze their herds (p. 48). Russian inroads into Kirghiz territory, beginning with the pacification of Ferghana in 1898, led other Kirghiz families to take refuge in the Afghan Pamir. Following the unsuccessful liberation movements of the Turks of Central Asia against the Russians that began in 1916—known as the *basmachi*, or "bandits," rebellion among the Bolsheviks—numerous Kirghiz families fled to Kashgaria and Kulja in Xinjiang (p. 39). More Kirghiz tribes moved to the Afghan Pamir following the communist revolution in China in 1949 (p. 49). This is all reminiscent of Ibn Khaldun's "Mountains are safe from their destructiveness. . . flat territory falls victim to their prey" (*The Muqaddimah*). For the Kirghiz, pastoral mobility is a political as well as an ecological decision (p. 220).

While detailing the adaptability of a pastoral subsistence economy, Shahrani also stresses that the world of the Kirghiz was radically changed with the formation of nation-states: "there

are no real places of refuge left” (p. 222). Following the closing of the Russian and Chinese frontiers, 2,000 members of the Kirghiz confined themselves year-round to the Afghan Pamir. Without access to pastures in the lowland steppes, they were forced to discontinue their traditionally extensive pasture ranges and vertical migrations in favor of intensive grazing patterns. Although the Kirghiz still maintained herds in the Pamir, they had to adjust the composition of their herds, increasing the number of sheep and yak they possessed while lowering the number of horses and camels. This was accompanied by changes in Kirghiz society. With the closing of frontiers, individual families made claims to the ownership of pastures and campgrounds, and attempts were made to improve pastures through irrigation works (p. 224). The structure of Kirghiz political organization was altered as tribal khans became officially sanctioned under the title of *qaryadar*, or village headman, by the Afghan state. According to Shahrani: “the traditional, somewhat egalitarian, and rather loosely structured Kirghiz” became socially stratified (pp. 226–28).

The updated edition of *The Kirghiz and the Wakhi of Afghanistan*, published in 2002 with a new Preface and Epilogue, addresses questions regarding the current crisis in Afghanistan and traces the movements of Kirghiz tribes from the Afghan Pamir to the province of Van in Anatolia since the book’s original publication. Shahrani suggests that the “root causes” of the problems facing modern Afghanistan are political, not religious, a result of the alienation brought on by the imposition of the centralized nation-state on Afghan societies (p. xxvi). While the new Preface looks into the current state-building effort in Afghanistan, in the Epilogue Shahrani chronicles the relocation of the Kirghiz to eastern Anatolia following the communist coup in Kabul in 1978.

One would have also liked to see Shahrani bring some of the ethnography up to date. The bibliography does not contain a single work published after the 1970s. In light of recent scholarship on ethnicity in South and Southeast Asia, as well as in China, Shahrani might have thought again about the social and political making of Kirghiz identity over time. Although Shahrani mentions that the Kirghiz “were not originally Turks and were Turkicized very early,” the question of Kirghiz ethnicity is missing from his account (p. 47). We are left with a picture of Kirghiz identity as primordial, natural, and “ineffable.” And while we are shown the sedentary origins of pastoral nomadism and the fluidity of Kirghiz ecology, we do not get a sense in the end of the shifts in the mentalities and the values of the Kirghiz. We do not know, for instance, how Kirghiz identity changed after the people were cut off from the steppes. Neither are we told what the substantial loss of horses, which the Kirghiz could not breed in the high altitudes, meant to them (pp. 105–107). Despite such questions, *The Kirghiz and the Wakhi of Afghanistan* stands as a valuable ethnography and a significant contribution to the study of Central Asian frontiers in modern times.

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AMIRA EL-AZHARY SONBOL, *Women of Jordan: Islam, Labor, and the Law*, Gender, Culture, and Politics in the Middle East Series (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2003). Pp. 311. \$45.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

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In an Arab country that boasts the highest female literacy rate in the region (79.4% in 1998) and arguably the best educational system, how is it that Jordanian women’s participation in the economy falls so terribly short of the hopeful expectations generated by these facts? In her

study of women in Jordan, Amira El-Azhary Sonbol provides answers to this question. First, while the Jordanian constitution proclaims equal rights for women, specific legal codes limit these rights. Second, school curricula and classroom practices are gendered, encouraging early marriage for girls, not the pursuit of a career. Third, social attitudes continue to be patriarchal. While all the chapters of the book are written with the aim of addressing Sonbol's central concern, they are also intended to stand individually. The format serves a practical purpose: to facilitate discussion and promote legal change in Jordan and elsewhere.

The second and third chapters offer historical studies of Jordan's legal system and pre-modern court cases involving women's work. Sonbol explains that it is modern personal-status laws that constitute the greatest hindrance to women's ability to work and own businesses. Specific codes embedded within these laws constrain women's constitutional right to work. Efforts to amend or reform these laws have met with considerable resistance, as the prevailing moral discourse legitimates these laws as having originated in shari'a. Sonbol carefully deconstructs Jordan's legal system, demonstrating that most laws pertaining to women actually consist not of shari'a but of a patchwork of tribal, customary, and Western law, as well as medieval *fiqh*. Using early Islamic sources and pre-modern shari'a court records, she offers a history of Muslim women's work in the Middle Eastern region. Sonbol shows that along with the stories of the early Muslim community that speak to the involvement of women in politics, business, and community service, Ottoman court records clearly demonstrate women's full participation in local economies. Women owned land, administered *awqāf* (religious endowments), served as midwives, extended credit, and worked in fields such as weaving, soap making, and agriculture. Sonbol wonders that "today women are fighting an uphill battle to achieve what their sisters already had a hundred years ago" (p. 80). While modern Islamic discourse blames Western influence for Jordanian women's recent demands for equal participation in society, Sonbol argues that it is the modern transformation to the nation-state, with industrialization, capitalism, and Western banking and finance systems, that marginalized Muslim women.

The remaining chapters focus on the situation in Jordan today regarding women's ability to work. They address current laws and court cases, efforts of women's professional associations to encourage women to own businesses, and strategies for legal reform. In Chapter 4, Sonbol argues that, despite the state's efforts to improve women's working conditions, laws regulating taxation, retirement and pension, and social security actually serve as factors that encourage women to retire early. Chapters 5–7 show how laws and court practices involving marriage, divorce, guardianship, and honor crimes discourage women from working. Sonbol demonstrates not only that the law favors husbands and male family relatives but also that, when the law supports women, individual judges often distort it to protect men's interests. Chapter 5 discusses the concept of *urf*, or traditional law, and explains how it shapes the construction of gender in Jordan. Through school, television, and other media, women are taught to be obedient and dependent. While the state has in fact worked to grant women more rights, women hesitate to exercise them for fear of social censure. More than that, the specter of the growing rate of honor crimes threatens women to stay well within the bounds of social expectation.

Women of Jordan rests at the intersection of studies of women, law, Islam, and the Middle East. Sonbol's exploration of the origins of Jordan's legal system demonstrates the complexity of the genesis and constitution of personal-status law. She also reveals the striking irony of contemporary Islamic discourses that defend patriarchal laws as deriving from shari'a and accuse reformers of adopting Western attitudes when, in fact, the very same laws they defend often have European origins. Because of the tenacious hold these discourses have on Jordanian society, Sonbol explains that women's associations desiring change have garnered examples of women in Islamic tradition fully participating in the economy to show how Jordan's current laws are neither Islamic nor just. By demonstrating that Jordan's laws have been created by

the state rather than by God, Sonbol hopes to show that they can just as easily be changed by the state.

In the Conclusion, Sonbol makes an important theoretical point: that Jordan's political and commercial elites rely on tribal leaders to fill positions in the country's security forces. This point is essential for understanding the state's deference to tribal leaders and, hence, its reluctance to overturn patriarchal laws supported by the tribes. Sonbol argues that the confluence of these interests forms the "hegemony" that prevents the advancement of women. She uses the term "hegemony" liberally throughout the book, assuming the underlying theoretical structure that is explained fully only at the end. Had this been addressed earlier in the text, the overall analysis would have been sharper.

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LYNN WELCHMAN, *Beyond the Code: Muslim Family Law and the Shar'ī Judiciary in the Palestinian West Bank* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000). Pp. 444. \$160.00 cloth.

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Lynn Welchman's *Beyond the Code* is a very important book and a serious addition to the legal literature on family law in the contemporary Islamic world. Its most immediate task is to introduce to the reader the historical, institutional, and textual elements of the regulation of the family in the West Bank and Gaza of Palestine. It begins by surveying the history of codification of family law in this region, as well as the evolution of shari'a courts in conjunction with secular courts, and proceeds to give a detailed account of how the marriage contract, marital life, and divorce are litigated in contemporary Palestine. It ends with a review of the debate on reforming family law in Palestine that was triggered by the signing of the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority as an expression, for the first time in history, of a Palestinian (pseudo-) sovereignty. True to its description on the back cover, the book "presents a systematic analysis of the application of Islamic family law [in Palestine] in nearly 10,000 marriage contracts, 1,000 deeds of Talaq or Khul' and 2,000 judicial rulings over a time span that includes Jordanian rule and Israeli military occupation, updating this with material from the beginning of the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority."

On the most basic level, the book is a study of the legal norms of a part of the world that is fiercely discussed on a political level but remains unknown on the legal level. In fact, what is unique about Palestine is that it was forced to take a different historical path from the rest of the region surrounding it and that it shared with that region the status of being, first, an Ottoman domain, and second, a colony of Britain (and France). While the rest of the region marched on to become independent and to develop post-colonial legal texts and institutions, Palestine merely exchanged foreign rulers: from the Ottoman to the British to the Jordanian and the Egyptian to the Israeli—to today. Its prevailing laws constitute a combined "gift" of those rulers. In the domain of the family, contemporary Palestinian shari'a courts follow the Jordanian Law of Personal Status (JLPS) of 1976, its predecessor (which the courts also applied) being the Jordanian Law of Family Rights (1951), itself based on the Ottoman Law of Family Rights of 1917.

Welchman's methodology is highly unusual. She writes in the mode of the modern legal treatise, combining in her presentation the analytics and style of the legal-treatise-writing

traditions of the civil law *and* the common law. On the one hand, this offers a commentary on the code (civil law) through the intermediation of contemporary Jordanian specialists on Islamic law on the family; on the other, it allows the reader to grasp the relationship between the rules of the code and the way the contemporary (Jordanian and Palestinian) courts have interpreted those rules (the common law). The commentary by the Jordanian specialists includes a discussion of the historical roots of these rules in the different pre-modern schools of Islamic jurisprudence.

If one were to read an argument behind the exposition, it would be the author's sympathy with the plight of Palestinian feminists pushing a reform agenda in the direction of liberal feminist regulation of the family in Palestine. Welchman says: "Some of the reactions from individuals and groups identified broadly as 'Islamist' translated into personal attacks on women involved with the project [of reform]—on their morals, their loyalty to the Palestinian national cause and to their religious beliefs. The exercise was portrayed by some as a 'conspiracy' of hostile forces linking the UN, the EU and Israel, portrayed as actively denying Palestinian rights and seeking to weaken Palestinian resolve and unity through supporting and funding attacks on Palestinian Arab and Muslim values, family structures, and national unity; women leading the debates were portrayed as Westernized and removed from 'authentic' Palestinian society and values" (p. 368).

But the importance of Welchman's book lies elsewhere. By relying mainly on commentaries written by contemporary Jordanian jurists, Welchman registers for her readers in English that there is *modern* Islamic jurisprudence that is distinct from the classical one. This jurisprudence has distinct legal sensibility—that of "supra-madhab" (i.e., they do not have a particular loyalty to a particular school of jurisprudence). It is also a jurisprudence that lives comfortably in the confines of a secularized codified legal system. Welchman's book is one of the rare instances that I have seen in English in which the jurisprudence that has evolved in response to the codification of family law is given its due and is presented as a jurisprudence that belongs to its age, the contemporary one. She presents it neither as a pale shadow of a supposedly more authentic classical jurisprudence nor as aspiring to Islamicize the remainder of the secularized legal system of which it is part. Nor does she, in the manner of some contemporary historians, dismiss modern Islamic jurisprudence as a distortion of a supposedly discretionary pre-modern qadi justice. All of those approaches—treating classical jurisprudence as the real expression of Islamic law, speaking of Islamic modernizing jurists as the real expression of the contemporary Islamic world, and dismissing Islamic jurisprudence altogether in favor of a supposed pre-modern qadi justice as real Islamic law—typify discussions of Islamic law in the West. What has been absent up to now—at least, in English—is a description of how Islamic jurisprudence works in contemporary courts, in contemporary commentaries, and in classrooms of modern schools of law in the Islamic world. In other words, what is left untheorized in the standard writings is the contemporary Islamic legal consciousness as it lives *in the shadow of the code*. All produce for Western readers a distorted idea of Islamic law in the contemporary age and a distorted understanding of Islamic identity for modern Muslims. A quick survey of Islamic law syllabi in the American academy reveals the absence of Welchman's jurists. They are systematically ignored as if they are beholders of a secret that, if revealed, will disrupt everything everybody has been saying about Islamic law in the West. And the big secret—the one that Welchman's book seems to go a long way to reveal—is that Islamic law has become secularized beyond classical recognition, and successfully so.

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SAMI A. ALDEED ABU-SAHLIEH, *Muslims in the West: Redefining the Separation of Church and State*, trans. S. L. Gosline (Warren Center, Penn.: Shangri-La Publications, 2002).

REVIEWED BY THIJL SUNIER, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Amsterdam; e-mail: j.t.sunier@uva.nl

The 11 September 2001 attacks and subsequent events brought not only almost daily coverage of Islam in newspapers and magazines throughout the world but also a continuous flow of scholarly books and articles about Islam in the world. One of the main issues, not surprisingly, is the position of Muslims in the United States and Europe. *Muslims in the West*, by Aldeed Abu-Sahlieh, fits within this category. Aldeed Abu-Sahlieh, a scholar of Islamic law based at the University of Lausanne in Switzerland, analyzes the position of Muslims in Swiss society (numbering a little more than 150,000 in a total Swiss population of almost 7 million).

The book starts with an analysis of Islamic theological sources concerning the position of Muslims living outside the so-called *dār al-Islām* (land of Islam), the area where Islam is the dominant religion—or, rather, where rulers rule according to Islamic principles. The author argues that according to classical Islamic sources, living outside the *dār al-Islām* poses a problem for a Muslim because it implies living in *dār al-Kufr* (land of the infidels). Muslims have to cope with a variety of problems and dilemmas implicit in living in a non-Islamic society. There are roughly two strategies to cope with such problems. One is to strive to turn the host country into part of *dār al-Islām*; the other is avoiding *dār al-Kufr* as much as possible. Since this is often impossible in practice, Muslims have to create an “autonomous Islamic space.” This is in itself not a new theme: dozens of publications, mainly by Islamic scholars, address this issue. These publications often contain a message to host societies: give Muslims a certain degree of religious autonomy so they can live according to their faith as much as possible. The message of Aldeed Abu-Sahlieh is also addressed to host societies, but it is of a very different nature: “This is a new problematic challenge to the separation of Church and State. The current and increasing presence of Muslims in non-Muslim countries does not satisfy Muslims themselves, who live constantly in a conflict between their religious norms and national norms. Nor does it please host countries that do not know how to integrate them, without endangering secularism and faith diversity. The separation of Church and State as a principle is opposed to the ultimate aim of the Muslim. . . . [O]ne cannot be very optimistic when considering Christian and Muslim communities in the Balkans who, after having cohabited for centuries, remain separate” (p. 64). The author then continues to warn politicians that when the number of Muslims reaches a “critical mass,” they may demand ever more religious autonomy. When they understand “the Islamic system and worldview” (p. 66), the author argues, it will become clear that integration of Muslims is not viable. But he maintains that the situation might even become worse. The very separation of church and state will be put in jeopardy if Islam acquires too much operational space. It is this warning that sets the tone for the rest of the book, and it is restated again and again. By taking this position, the author joins the recently growing number of voices in Western European countries that consider the presence of Muslims a serious integration problem. It is not only attitudes and opinions of individual Muslims, but also agendas and programs of Islamic associations, that are assessed along these lines. The second part of the book concerns the situation of Muslims in Switzerland. It contains a listing of normative Islamic principles on freedom of religion, schooling, family law, food prescriptions, and burial regulations that are juxtaposed with Swiss legislation, secular principles, and Christian traditions.

Although the author is apparently well informed with respect to Islamic law, and although the first part is instructive, the book on the whole is rather disappointing for several reasons. My main critique concerns the author's heavy emphasis on normative Islamic principles. This in itself is not a problem so long as one is very clear about the implications and the questions asked. If one intends to analyze written Islamic sources on issues such as formal Islamic family law, Aldeed Abu-Sahlieh's method is adequate, but when one wants to learn more about actual marriage practices of Muslims in concrete circumstances, a description of norms is insufficient, static, and essentializing. This is even more the case with such crucial matters as the separation of church and state. The author fails to make the essential distinction between Islam and Muslims and to contextualize written theological principles. An assessment of the status of normative systems must always be accompanied by at least rudimentary social mapping and an analysis of prevailing power relations. Talal Asad has made the crucial distinction between liturgical utterance and religious discourse. Theological principles must always be embedded in actual societal or political context. To understand the place of religion in the lives of migrants from Muslim backgrounds, it is absolutely necessary to collect empirical data, to speak with people, and to analyze their position in the host society. With his rather legalist description of Islamic tradition, Aldeed Abu-Sahlieh seems to completely ignore the sociological and political aspects of the presence of Muslims in Europe.

That brings us to my second point. Aldeed Abu-Sahlieh promises to give an account of the position of Muslims in Switzerland. Instead of meticulously analyzing the various contentious fields concerning the integration of Muslims in Swiss society, he again, without a bit of empirical evidence, presents an overview of Islamic theology and apparently assumes that this will cause problems. Aldeed Abu-Sahlieh fails to give a clue about how these clashes are resolved. Besides that, his account of the Swiss situation is so superficial that the country could easily be replaced by any other country. There is, however, a growing body of publications about Islam in Western Europe based on cross-national research that convincingly shows that the legal, political, and social arrangements in European countries differ considerably from one country to the other. Western European countries may all have freedom of religion in their constitutions, but it makes quite a bit of difference when Muslims live in a country that does not officially recognize religious denominations (i.e., France and the Netherlands), or in one that links religious groups to the state through a system of public institutions (i.e., Germany). These contextual aspects constitute the structure of political opportunity and thus not only influence the agendas of Islamic public actors but also largely shape the discourses about Islam. It is a pity that the author has hardly taken notice of this literature.

The most fundamental critique, however, concerns the debatable implications of Aldeed Abu-Sahlieh's analysis—notably, his suggestion that the presence of Muslims jeopardizes the separation between church and state, which he apparently assumes to be complete and thorough in Western Europe. This in itself is a rather uncertain statement, but it becomes even more doubtful when the author refers to the situation in the former, war-ridden Yugoslavia as a possible future for Western Europe. Supporters of the “clash of civilization” thesis will probably agree with Aldeed Abu-Sahlieh that Islam is the antithesis of all that has been accomplished in Europe in the past 300 years. I do not want to ignore that there are “hot spots” concerning the integration of Muslims in European societies, but it is at best a sweeping statement to argue that Europe—in this case, Switzerland—will become a religious battlefield in the near-future. That is an unscientific rousing of public sentiments that can in no way be substantiated.

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MARC GOPIN, *Holy War, Holy Peace: How Religion Can Bring Peace to the Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). Pp. 269. \$29.95 cloth.

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Many explanations have been proffered for why the Oslo peace process has unraveled into the latest violent phase of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. In this book, Marc Gopin suggests an explanation not often found in standard political analyses: the failure to cultivate peace among the Israeli and Palestinian masses. Gopin himself has long been involved in such grass-roots efforts, and accordingly *Holy War, Holy Peace* is part personal reflections of a peace activist and part manual on conflict resolution. Both parts illuminate and inform each other, making this work a more readable and more poignant study than most books on this subject.

Religion has always been an important part of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Its significance may not have been paramount in the origins of the conflict. Zionism and Arab/Palestinian nationalism were largely secular movements when they began, and one can scarcely identify strictly religious motives for all of the Arab–Israeli wars fought since 1948. But religion has undeniably assumed greater prominence since the 1967 war, as Israel occupied and annexed East Jerusalem, as the settlement of the West Bank and Gaza mainly by religious Jews gained momentum, and as Palestinian Islamic organizations such as Hamas emerged as rivals to the Palestine Liberation Organization. The dispute between Israelis and Palestinians over the same piece of land has in the past thirty years increasingly become a dispute over the same piece of *holy* land.

But it is not just land that is being contested in this particular conflict, according to Gopin. What makes this dispute so intractable is that the same land is being claimed by members of the same “family,” all of whom view themselves as the rightful heirs of Abraham. This is Gopin’s point of departure—the claim that competing “myths” of entitlement, “chosenness,” and religious authenticity or superiority make this conflict particularly intense and intractable. But this same family metaphor can also—if cultivated properly—bring the parties to reconciliation: “[i]f these theologies can change over time for the worse . . . then it stands to reason that standard conflict theory is wrong about the intractability of conflict over religious beliefs and practices, or religious identity issues tied up with land. Whatever is not static, whatever changes for the worse, can also change for the better” (p. 80).

Gopin devotes roughly half of this book to charting specific ways that competing theologies can be reworked hermeneutically to emphasize peace, human dignity, and shared community over land, revenge, and communalism. His suggestions will be familiar to those conversant with conflict-resolution theory, but Gopin’s contribution is to emphasize how religion can both help and hinder in peace-building efforts. He outlines scriptural resources available in Judaism, Islam, and Christianity for forgiveness and reconciliation. He discusses the importance of gestures and spoken and unspoken means of communication. He criticizes the almost exclusive focus of diplomacy on bringing the leaders of warring parties together rather than on devoting some effort to broadening the base for peace among the people.

This discussion leads finally to some concrete proposals on how religion can be reworked to serve peace in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. First, Gopin suggests that “education and training must begin to occur in a coordinated, bilateral way, between significant portions of both populations, and not just children” (p. 200). The goal of such programs will be to inculcate among a broad base of people on both sides the values they share rather than the positions they dispute. The importance of this goal can hardly be over-emphasized. The Palestinian

Authority, not to mention other Arab governments, has been repeatedly and rightly criticized for not doing more to curb the dissemination of virulent anti-Semitism, from primary-school textbooks all the way to adult media. But more subtle forms of the converse prejudices and misunderstandings are readily found in the way Israelis and many American Jews think of Palestinians and Arabs generally. Examples of the ignorance of some basic facts that foster such prejudice and misunderstanding are provided in Gopin's candid self-examination, as when he admits to being astonished that Arabic-speaking Jews had for centuries used the phrase *Allāhu akbar* (God is most great) in their own devotions. "This shocked me, because I was familiar with that phrase, until I studied and taught world religions professionally, as the words suicide terrorists would shout before they killed Jews. This is the only resonance that the phrase has for European Jews and most Westerners" (p. 156).

Second, Gopin suggests the sharing of myth, ritual, and ceremony. These include mourning and commemoration of the victims of violence on both sides. Interfaith dialogue might expand to include joint prayers. Other "pro-social" acts would include acts of repentance and forgiveness, including, "when the time is ripe," a truth and reconciliation commission that, through its public airing of grievances, might provide some restitution for those Palestinian refugees from Israel who will probably never enjoy a "right of return" (p. 214).

A third recommendation is that Israelis and Palestinians engage in a series of multiple, low-level, and incremental confidence-building measures. These could take the form of what Gopin calls "treaties," "covenants," and "contracts" (p. 222). But unlike the official diplomacy of the past, which yielded numerous disengagement agreements and promises of further negotiations among elites, these treaties would be negotiated and concluded by the people themselves. Thus, Jewish and non-Jewish workers could arrive at a shared agreement on the values that link them to one another. Likewise, for mothers on both sides, teenagers, doctors, rabbis and shaykhs, and so on. Gopin does not propose to replace official, "track one" diplomacy with this type of unofficial, "track two" diplomacy. "No one wants to suggest the hijacking of official diplomacy by demagogic religious or cultural leaders who happen to be on top" (p. 226). But grass-roots efforts can and must supplement the work of official negotiators or jump start peace talks when the officials themselves are part of the reason they are stalled.

None of Gopin's suggestions are unreasonable, and we may reasonably conclude that many of his recommendations will have to be part of any lasting solution to this conflict. Indeed, as of this writing, his argument that track-two diplomacy is a vital adjunct to official negotiations is being dramatically echoed by the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators of the Geneva Accord and their supporters around the world. The declaration of the Geneva Accord has also been roundly condemned by many who see it as a nefarious attempt to bypass democratically elected leaders. Gopin's call for popular peace-building efforts will also undoubtedly be met with the same criticisms and charges of dangerous naivete.

The main problem with Gopin's recommendations, however, is that there are extremists on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian divide who find nothing reasonable in accommodating the other side. As anyone who has ever participated in interfaith dialogue knows, the interlocutors are usually those predisposed to the aims of dialogue; those who most need to be at the table are rarely there. Gopin is aware of this problem and insists on the need to include so-called fundamentalists in the conversation. But he offers only vague suggestions on how to draw them in, placing most of the burden on the "intervenor," who must "develop multiple, finely tuned methods of intervention for the various constituencies of a religious community, including the most extreme elements of that community" (p. 133).

Ultimately, it seems, his approach assumes that the only way to deal effectively with the most violent religious elements is to marginalize them through a groundswell of religious-based peace work. When grass-roots conflict resolution proceeds along all the constructive tracks he recommends, the conflict-prone religious groups will be progressively squeezed into

such a narrow space that they will have little room in which to operate. Tragically, however, the recent round of suicide bombings and Israeli reprisals demonstrates that religious extremists do have the power to create groundswells of popular support in directions other than forgiveness and reconciliation. Breaking this cycle of tit-for-tat violence will require more vision, sagacity, and moral courage from the leaders and the masses on both sides than has been demonstrated so far—or, perhaps, might be reasonably expected from any people.

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GILLES KEPPEL, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002). Pp. 454. \$33.95 cloth, \$15.95 paper.

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In the wake of 11 September 2001, the study of political Islam became a vastly more complicated enterprise. No other event in recent history demonstrated with such literal force how interconnected the phenomenon of Islamic activism—in all its forms—had become. Those scholars who had studied the Arab world suddenly had to pay attention to Iran and Turkey, and to such remote places as Pakistan and Afghanistan. Scholars of South and Southeast Asia had to consider how Indonesian and Malaysian Islam intersected with Khomeinism and Saudi Wahhabism. Thus, like it or not, 11 September set the stage for a rebirth of Islamic studies. Gilles Kepel's *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* marks this coming of age by providing a comprehensive account of the evolution of political Islam as a national, regional, and global phenomenon. No other work offers such a careful and well-written balance of analytical parsimony and empirical reach. For this reason alone, the book will be a classic for years to come.

Kepel does not wear his theory on his sleeve. Rather than draw the reader into a long conceptual prologue, he links two venerable forms of analysis to construct a flexible analytical framework whose unassuming if ubiquitous presence clarifies rather than weighs down his story. Deploying traditional Marxism, he argues that the effort of radical Islamists to impose their agenda on the state hinges on their capacity to forge an alliance between “young urban class” and the “devout middle class.” The former has been the standard-bearer of radical social and ideological (if not utopian) agendas, while the latter has often aligned itself with these revolutionary projects only to relinquish them in favor of an accommodationist pragmatism that protects its economic interests. This deeply structuralist perspective, which has a Barrington Moorish feeling to it, leads Kepel to an eloquent if familiar proposition: no enduring alliance, no power. But how do we explain the success or failure of alliances that in retrospect are almost always tenuous? Using a variant of Weberian sociology, Kepel argues that politically active intellectuals promote such alliances by disseminating ideologies that fire the imaginations of different social groups precisely because the moral impulses that animate these ideologies *transcend* economic and social interests. Highlighting the writings of Sayyid Qutb, Mawlana Mawdudi, and Ayatollah Khomeini, he shows how their ideas helped rationalize alliances between the urban poor and the pious middle class, thus producing what *appeared* during the early 1990s to be a rising tide of radical Islam in Egypt, Malaysia, Pakistan, Palestine, Afghanistan, Iran, and Western Europe. This tide was fed by rapid modernization (which expanded the size of the urban poor population, from Jakarta to Cairo) and by the globalization of Islamist ideology, set in motion by Saudi petrodollars and then greatly accelerated by the Saudi-funded, and American-armed, jihad in Afghanistan.

Yet if money and geo-strategic interests propelled radical Islam, its fortunes were limited by a paucity of leadership skills within the ranks of the radical Islamists themselves. Few of the intellectual activists who produced or reinterpreted the Islamic ideologies of the 1980s and '90s had the symbolic and political skills to forge durable class alliances. Indeed, no one could rival "Khomeini's extraordinary ability to unify the various components . . . of a movement whose single point of departure was hatred of the shah" (p. 112). Personal charisma, combined with the hierarchical nature of Shi'ism itself, produced an outcome in Iran that was nearly impossible to replicate in the Sunni world.

As Kepel's story unfolds, the role of leadership looms even larger than his eclectic analytical framework would initially suggest. Quite apart from symbolic skills or personal charisma, the *alliance strategies* of radical Islamists play a decisive role in determining the fate of their project. While rational-choice aficionados would surely prefer a deductive analysis of such strategies, Kepel's more inductive approach nevertheless echoes the "democracy without democrats" and its rationalist underpinnings. As his narrative suggests, the only effective long-term strategy that radical Islamists can use to dilute the edifice of autocracy, the shrewd strategies of well-entrenched autocrats, and the fears of the pious bourgeoisie is a policy of capitulation that accepts the political and social status quo. Blinded by the light of their victory in Afghanistan, they constantly misjudged both the strength of the state and the economic interests of their tacit allies with the bourgeoisie. As Kepel's chapters on Egypt and Algeria demonstrate, the radicals' resort to violence eventually pushed the latter into the hands of the former.

The painful ten-year defection of the Islamic bourgeoisie from the Islamist opposition began in 1990 when, in the Iraqis' invasion of Kuwait, the Saudis discovered that their bid to fund and control an alliance of radical and mainstream Islamists had emboldened the radicals to betray their paymasters. But by then the genie was out of the bottle. With the worldwide dispersion from Afghanistan of unemployed jihadist-salafists (who gladly lent a hand to whoever would hire them), Islamist radicals everywhere concluded that the time had come to confront Arab rulers and their allies in Paris and Washington. But if it took successive administrations time to grasp the bitter legacy that American policy in Afghanistan had bequeathed (as Kepel's account of Washington's insidious relationship with Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman illustrates), the fact is that well before the tragedy of 11 September, the resort to violence by the radicals had all but sealed their fate as a political movement.

This point merits emphasis. *Jihad* came out one year after its original French version (*Jihad Expansion et Déclin de l'Islamisme*) was published and thus includes a discussion of the impact of 11 September on Islamic radicalism. While some reviewers have argued that the attacks in New York and Washington disprove Kepel's argument about the declining capacity of radical Islam to win political power, this assertion misses a central point of his book—namely, that the use of terrorism is the last straw that breaks the back of the urban-poor-pious-middle-class alliance. Even if you only read the French version (most of which I slugged through), you cannot but predict that the rise of Al-Qa'eda would strengthen the resolve of Middle Eastern governments, their tacit allies in the Islamic bourgeoisie, and their increasingly taciturn supporters in the West to prevent Sunni Islamist radicals from repeating the victory of their Shi'i counterparts in Iran.

That said, is the failure of radical Islamists to take power synonymous with the overall decline of Islam as a political force? Moreover, does this failure presage a new era in which, as Kepel puts it, "Islamists defending the rights of the individual stand shoulder to shoulder with secular democrats in confronting . . . authoritarian governments" (p. 368)? Kepel offers an equivocal answer to the first question and a resounding yes to the second. The limits of radical Islam, he argues, have spawned a "post-Islamist" movement, most dramatically in Iran and to a lesser or greater degree in Sudan, Egypt, Bosnia, and Turkey. But to the extent that this movement promotes a revision rather than an abandonment of Islamic thought and

action, Kepel's book signals the continued vibrancy of a certain version of Islamist politics. Moreover, on the very last page of the French version of his book he alludes to the possible return of Islamic radicalism itself when he warns that, unless Muslim governments address the social and political needs of their urban poor, "the Muslim world will soon be confronted with new explosions."

As to his second claim, how one evaluates it depends not only on a reading of the facts, but also on the conceptual prism through which these facts are read. Although Kepel's book brings together Marxist and Weberian analysis, ultimately it rests on a Hegelian vision of historical dialects that points forward to a democratic future. Put differently, Kepel believes that at the end of the day the devout bourgeoisie will be more bourgeois than devout. But Islamic ideology—even in its most bourgeois form—is as much, if not more, about identity as economics. And it is precisely this fact that has hindered collaboration between secular professionals and the leaders of the devout middle class in Kuwait, Algeria, Morocco, Palestine, and Jordan. Kepel is right: the decline of radical Islamism has opened the door to a process of state-controlled political liberalization that has facilitated the co-existence of both groups. Moreover, in the long run, their peaceful coexistence might promote the kinds of lasting political learning that he already sees on horizon. But for now, their coexistence owes more to institutional constraints than any fundamental process of ideological transformation. As Kepel's chapter on Turkey shows, one of these constraints is the existence of secular political parties. Although their influence has contributed to what he calls the "forced secularization" of Turkey's mainstream Islamists, given the paucity of credible secular opposition parties in the Arab world, and the presence of an Islamist bourgeoisie that is committed to a cultural agenda that the impious bourgeoisie and its allies in the ruling establishment reject, a transition from liberalized autocracy to competitive democracy may take a little longer than Kepel's superb book suggests.

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BRUCE LINCOLN, *Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). Pp. 153. \$25.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY MICHAEL BARKUN, Department of Political Science, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y.; e-mail: mbarkun@maxwell.syr.edu

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks spawned a cottage industry of instant analysis. The result has been an avalanche of books that purport to explain terrorism, Islam, and the relationship between religion and violence. Most of the books written in the shadow of these events are superficial efforts unlikely to be remembered a few years hence. Bruce Lincoln's is a rare and distinguished exception. It is sure to outlast its competitors both in providing an understanding of 11 September and in offering broader frameworks for analyzing the linkages between religion and political change.

Holy Terrors consists of six essays on religion, violence, and social change, half written before and half written after the 2001 attacks. The post-11 September chapters offer close analyses of four relevant texts: the final instructions given to the hijackers found in Mohamed Atta's luggage; George W. Bush's address to the nation on 7 October; a videotaped address by Osama bin Laden on the same date; and a televised interview with Jerry Falwell by Pat Robertson two days after the attacks. The full texts of all four appear in appendixes. The pre-11 September chapters examine religion in terms of its relationships to culture, post-colonial states, and revolts, although two of the three were revised after 11 September.

Inevitably, collected essays face problems of cohesion. Although this volume is far more cohesive than most, it might have appeared more unified had Lincoln structured it somewhat differently. He chose to arrange the material in what may appear to be a counter-intuitive sequence. The first three chapters are those that address 11 September texts, followed by the more general chapters, originally written between 1981 and 1997. While this results in movement from the specific to the general, reversing the order might have made more apparent the application of general ideas to a limited set of cases. More significantly, the broader early essays do not appear to have decisively shaped the later ones, in part because the post-11 September chapters are far more narrowly focused and, perhaps, because the author's views have altered over the more than twenty years that separate the earliest from the latest contributions. Although each chapter has a lapidary brilliance of its own, the overall impression remains one of superbly constructed individual arguments rather than of a single, cohesive work.

That said, the book is immensely valuable, both for the light it sheds on the events of 2001 and for the author's willingness to confront the question, "What do we mean by 'religion?'" Lincoln advances conceptualization by eschewing an essentialist definition and instead works within a framework of four categories: discourse, practice, institution, and community. This typology both encompasses religious manifestations and provides a basis for comparison among them. It does not seek to somehow capture the essence of religion in a single sentence. Instead, by identifying domains of belief and behavior, Lincoln provides a basis for analyzing the religious elements that might be relevant to the commission of violent acts.

The value of this lies not only in its facilitation of comparative analysis, but also in its ability to break free of the notion that there are inherently "dangerous religions." This concept has a double existence, present in both discussions of so-called fundamentalist religions and New Religious Movements (or "cults"). Lincoln wisely avoids "fundamentalist" as "a term that has inflammatory connotations and fails to capture what is truly crucial: that is, the conviction that religion ought to penetrate all aspects of social, indeed of human existence" (p. 5). His preferred term—"maximalist"—manages to avoid the incendiary associations of "fundamentalist" while capturing the tendency of religious militants to extend religion into every sphere of life.

The capacity of religion to permeate other spheres also explains Lincoln's preoccupation with the elasticity of boundaries that conventionally appear to separate religion, on the one hand, from culture and politics, on the other. The concept of a religious sphere distinct from the political was, as Lincoln suggests, the consequence of a specifically Western history of religiously driven warfare against which the modern nation-state was erected as a bulwark. Belief in the universality of this pattern assumes, erroneously, that the same history will necessarily be replicated elsewhere. When religion extends beyond the constraints regarded as customary in the West, the response is either incomprehension or the sense that some natural law has been violated. As the author demonstrates, the placement of boundaries is a dynamic process. Not only do societies differ in this respect; the same society may over time experience the expansion or contraction of the religious domain. Lincoln provides a useful set of models embodying such boundary shifts in situations characterized by varying degrees of secularism and religious diversity.

This is, in short, a work filled with insights, blending theory and analysis. It is destined to be read and cited long after the tragic events of 11 September have passed into history.

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AYŞE SAKTANBER, *Living Islam: Women, Religion and the Politicization of Culture in Turkey* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002). Pp. 309. \$59.50 cloth.

REVIEWED BY CIHAN TUĞAL, Department of Sociology, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.; e-mail: c-tugal@northwestern.edu

The Islamist movement in Turkey has gained more global relevance since a center-rightist offshoot of the conventional Islamist Milli Görüş came to power in 2002 and expressed willingness to cooperate with the United States for the occupation of Iraq. *Living Islam* is a timely contribution at a conjuncture when both scholars and the English-speaking public want to know more about the ideological, social, and political background of the movement. Ayşe Saktanber introduces the book with a relevant conceptual intervention in the field of Islamist studies. Arguing that the now fashionable “cultural Islam versus political Islam” dichotomy is not very useful, she posits “living Islam,” which she defines as the strategy by which the cultural is channeled into the political, as an alternative concept. Saktanber contends that differentiating between “the political” and “the cultural” by attributing danger to the former and naïveté to the latter ultimately leads to “forgetting” the significance of Islam and Islamization in recent Turkish history.

In conjunction with this intervention, the main argument of the book is that Islamism is a type of “life politics” that produces an alternative intelligentsia and an alternative middle-class countering those of the secularist Turkish republic, thereby inducing a moral transformation and a thorough change in everyday life. According to the author, these changes in the meaning of the “political” have coincided with the blurring of the boundaries between “the public” and “the private” in the new global society to render the role of women exceptionally central. Consequently, religious Muslim women have gained power to construct themselves and the movement, thus belying their Orientalist perception as passive and obedient recipients. *Living Islam* is in part a study of the implications of this new configuration of gender relations within the Islamist movement.

Saktanber extends these arguments through the ethnographic analysis of a residential complex in Ankara (the capital city of Turkey) built and exclusively inhabited by Islamists. The place is more particularly dominated by followers of the Milli Görüş (the main Islamist current in Turkey, represented by the banned Welfare and Virtue parties), some of whom are members of two separate communities of the Nakshbendi religious order. The author’s observations of the site cover the time frame from 1989 to 1993. Her story of entering the field (chap. 2) and building trust among the inhabitants is both engaging and informative. Saktanber has tactfully interwoven analysis and narrative in this chapter. While relating the obstacles and restrictions she has faced, she also gives a complicated analysis of the meaning of “seclusion” for this community. Since this story also gives an idea about Turkish culture, the place of Islamists in Turkey, and their political rationale for seclusion in an entertaining way, it could serve as introductory reading for the uninitiated who would like to have some sense of the Islamist experience in Turkey.

Chapters 5 and 6 constitute the core of this book, where Saktanber develops her analysis of the religious residential complex. In Chapter 5, the author argues that Islamists in Turkey express what Richard Sennett calls “ressentiment” in face of secular domination: they protest against the perceived impersonality and lack of warmth of the urban, where they feel themselves to be unjustly excluded. As Sennett points out, the politics of resentment does not aim at transforming inegalitarian structures; it is based on the hope that the excluded and dominated party will somehow replace the old elite and come to occupy a central

role. Communal ties of the Nakshbendi order provide the residents of the complex with the warmth and intimacy they feel are lacking in modern Turkey. The model of the prophet and the golden age of Islam supply them in turn with the moral order that they imagine will replace the secular and immoral order of the country.

In Chapter 6, the author analyzes how the Muslim residents attempt to build an Islamic way of life in face of modern pressures. Their hesitance regarding sending their daughters to school, watching television, and participating in the social life of non-Muslim environments all exemplify the difficulties of “living Islam” in a society where the secular way of life is accepted as normalcy. This chapter gives a good idea about popular Turkish customs and how religious customs differ from them, while the footnotes make the analyses much richer and fill in some gaps for the less well initiated reader.

The insights developed in this book are very valuable for both those trying to develop a preliminary understanding of Turkish society and those interested in the functioning of religious activism in contemporary Turkey at a deeper level. However, the sequencing of the arguments does not always lead to a well-structured narrative: the chapters do not flow logically, and there is often a disconnect between parts of the book. The most problematic parts are the extended literature reviews, which are thorough and satisfactory but not always well integrated with the theme of the book. Although there are exceptions to this (pp. 30–36, 48–52), the author often does not go beyond paraphrasing what other scholars have said on a particular issue (pp. 3–6, 44–48), without linking these to her main argument or to her analyses.

Even though the book makes important conceptual revisions in a field where many commonplaces are repeated without reflection, it cannot escape reproducing one dimension of the new scholarly common sense regarding the Islamist movement in Turkey. For the past fifteen years, scholars have over-reacted to the dominant Kemalist paradigm, which pictured proponents of Islamism as poor, rural, and thus ignorant, and have alternatively portrayed them as middle class, upwardly mobile, and “conscious.” Although this reaction was partially justified, it missed the creative (not simply “rural” and “ignorant”) input of non-middle-class sectors in the movement. *Living Islam* reproduces this new academic common sense to the extent that it treats Islamism as a new “middle-class ethos,” without reflecting in-depth on the fact that this study is conducted within the confines of a place that is exclusively and intentionally middle class.

The nature of the field site also restricts the ethnographer’s capacity to observe differences within Islamism and how these are negotiated. (The only exception to this consists of a few brief notes about the differences between the members of religious orders and those who do not subscribe to a particular shaykh.) Moreover, observations of this residential complex inhabited exclusively by religious people do not provide any firsthand information about how Islamists interact with non-Islamists (secularists as well as non-Islamist religious people). This prevents the author from analyzing Islamism in the midst of a variety of interactions. As a result, the position of Islamists in the wider society and their relations to their “others” are filtered through the narratives of the Islamists themselves. Hence, what we end up with is a description and analysis of how Islamists would like to see themselves (“conscious,” “moral,” and “modest”) instead of a rich depiction situating the voices of Islamists amid the “noise” of Turkish social and political life.

Despite these restrictions, *Living Islam* is a thorough analysis of the quotidian of middle-class Islamism in Turkey. It will be an important source for students, scholars, and the interested public who want to explore the middle-class dimension of Turkish Islamism.

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AZZAM S. TAMIMI, *Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat Within Islamism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). Pp. 276. \$49.95 cloth.

REVIEWED BY I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C.; e-mail: zartman@jhu.edu

The compatibility of political Islam with democracy is an enormously debated but slippery topic, often losing its balance over the definitions of the two elements. There are (at least) two ways to approach the topic—from the outside and from the inside. The usual approach is to stake out a definition of the two elements and then see whether they permit enough overlap to be compatible with each other. Variations are huge. If political Islam means consultation of the believers, and democracy is regular consultation of the governed, then they are compatible—at least, in a polity populated by Muslims. If political Islam means validation of rulers and their policies by *vox Dei*, and democracy means validation by *vox populi*, then they are not. In between are many variations.

The approach from the inside would be to choose a person who claims to incarnate both virtues and see how he does it. This is the approach adopted by the London-based historian Azzam Tamimi in his exegetical biography of the Tunisian Islamicist and (would-be) politician Rachid Ghannouchi (b. 1941). The result is an intelligent portrayal and analysis by a historian who is both admiring and honest about his subject. It is a doubly inside study—inside from the point of view of the subject but also in regard to the author, who is writing as a Muslim scholar who shares his subject's approach, even if not all his positions, and who analyses using the terms of Islamic discourse as his parameters. In so doing, he educates his Western audience (Oxford University Press's readers) in both Islamicist ideas and in Islamicist analysis of those ideas.

Ghannouchi is not only a complex and intelligent thinker but also an interesting social phenomenon. Born and raised in a traditional and believing family in a rural town near Gabes in southern Tunisia, he attended al-Zeitouna college but was alienated by both the irrelevant religion taught inside and the offensive secularism practiced in Bourguiba's Tunisia. He became a Nasserist and went to Cairo University and then to Damascus University, searching for an anchor and an identity. He found it in the "original, revealed Islam," and when he next went to the Sorbonne it was as an Islamicist surrounded by a hostile alien society. He traveled to Algeria, where he met Malik Bennabi, who had a major influence on his thinking. He returned to Tunisia in 1970, joined a *tabligh* group there as he had in his various other locations, and in 1981 founded Harakat al-Ittihad al-Islami, commonly known by its French initials MTI although better translated as the Movement of the Islamic Way (not Tendency). Thereupon he was put in prison for three years and then went into exile in London. The MTI was outlawed, and even after the fall of Bourguiba it was never allowed to take part in elections in Tunisia's pseudo-democracy.

This cursus not only tells a typical tale of a man adrift between tradition and modernity. It also explains something about its bearer's belief systems. Ghannouchi was continually reacting against his surroundings, be it the sterility of the religion as taught, the materialism of the secular world as lived, the invasiveness of French culture, or the imposition of American imperialism, especially in regard to the Palestinian question, as he saw it. In this context of negative socialization where he knew what he was against, he was searching for what he was for. It has been a torturous path, full of evolution and contradiction, assertions and ambiguities, standard stands and thoughtful attempts to work things out in his mind. In it all, pillars and concepts from orthodox Islam provide comfortable and accepted foundations and

markers to lean on, ranging from *‘aqīda* (creed) to *mazhar* (appearance), down to the proper shape of the beard and length of the robe (p. 33).

The result is an interesting mixture of details and lacunae, often more satisfying to a religious thinker than to a political activist. The territorial state and the international order are obstacles to Ghannouchi’s democracy. “Liberal, Western democracy” is undesirable but will produce Islamic democracy. Islam is “a comprehensive way of life and God is the Lord both in the mosque and the market;” however, some areas have been filled by divine commandments but others were intentionally left vacant to be filled “through *ijtihād* but within the framework of *‘aqīda*” (p. 197). Yet there is no suggestion of how the community “may choose among various *ijtihādāt* or how a chosen *ijtihād* may become law” (p. 139). Presumably, this would take place “by an elected parliament in coordination with a council of legal experts,” a system that sounds very Iranian, yet Ghannouchi also rejects the Iranian system. So the content of the Islamic democratic system rests entirely on faith, the belief that somehow the community will be moved by righteousness to choose good leaders and good policies.

Yet that is all that “liberal Western democracy” relies on, too—faith that in the medium run (no guarantees in the short run), enlightened self-interest and right reason will move the governed to choose good leaders and good policies. The major difference is that Ghannouchi takes his faith on faith, having no empirical data to back up his belief (and much historical data to show the weakness of belief in philosopher kings), whereas those who believe in democracy have plenty of evidence, much of it highly ambiguous. His defense of Islamic democracy is on the conceptual level and his attacks on democracy as practiced on the empirical level.

Tamimi’s work is an honest if sympathetic portrayal of these ideas. There is a fine chapter on Ghannouchi’s views of civil society, another on the territorial state and the international system, and a balanced analysis of Ghannouchi’s critics and his response to them. The book suffers from some stiff and repetitive writing and poor editing by Oxford. (Bernard Lewis comes across as a Spaniard [Luis; p. 174] and a Frenchman [Louis; p. 264] on occasion). This is a book well worth reading. It will not settle the debate, but it will move it to a higher, informed level. It will probably convince many readers that Ghannouchi was not as dangerous as Bourguiba imagined, because at the hustings his arguments were too philosophical and based on the righteousness of his audience. But you never know.

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ABDULKADER TAYOB, *Islam in South Africa: Mosques, Imams and Sermons*, Religions of Africa (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999). Pp. 187. \$55.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY ASHRAF DOCKRAT, Department of Semitic Languages, Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg, South Africa; e-mail: molvi@mandla.co.za

Tayob’s study of the sermon is unique. This is so because, as he suggests, a unique approach grounded in the discursive traditions of Muslims themselves is called for when studying a religious symbol. That this symbol’s religious and metaphysical dimension has not been sufficiently explored is the justification for this contribution on the sermon in Muslim societies. More than a ritual and disciplinary practice, Tayob’s Friday sermon holds out many possibilities, and his privileged position as a Muslim, he reminds us, means that he is able to unpack the layers of the sermon from the inside out. The results of such an approach, we are

promised, are far-reaching. It affords an opportunity to look at the position of the “mosque and imam traditions” within Islam, which he maintains is the missing link to explain the matter sufficiently well. It also serves the purpose of rethinking Qur’anic revelation. This is so because the Friday sermon as the most significant occasion on which the Qur’an is “re-cited” will now be recognized for performing the cosmological function of the original text of Islam. Eventually in this approach there is even salvation for the Qur’an from being a “bounded” book.

Mosque and imam traditions, as the author suggests, have to be studied in relation to the historical context and the discursive traditions employed. With the sermon as a prism for both the history that such a study unearths and the discursive tradition, a range of relationships that reveal some basic contradictions of authority and status within the discourse will be revealed. To understand the discourse we are called to look beyond the speech and written word and at the gestures of those involved. The leader is one who conforms to the pattern or the established discourse, and the history recovered is a genuine “people’s history,” which recognizes the place of Muslim communities in shaping their own history.

For the purpose of this study, two mosques are chosen. After an introductory chapter, the reader encounters two chapters—one devoted to the discourse governing mosques in the Cape, and the other to the Claremont Main Road Mosque. Similarly, the next two chapters determine the “Transvaal mosque tradition,” with the Brits Mosque the specific focus. This is followed by two chapters that focus on the sermon in general and analyze the representative samples chosen for this study. A concluding chapter reinforces the central argument, and an argument for the efficacy of this method for understanding Muslim communities and *all* of Muslim understanding is made here. The clear and logical arrangement makes for easy reading and understanding of these arguments. The reader encounters a range of the familiar and predictable categories and terminologies of symbol, metaphor, sacred space, religious discourse, ritual, gender, tradition, orthodoxy, theology, and ideology, to name a few. Importantly, the scholarship is a representation of some of the academic scholarship in the period of South Africa’s transition to independence and the (self) representations consistently negotiated in Tayob’s work can be considered an example or measure of social identity formations experienced in South Africa. The style is lucid and wonderfully reflects the passion that the author has for what he terms the progressive Islam so close to his heart. Ideology in the sermon at Claremont is accepted or rejected by the congregation while the theology of Brits is dissimulated. In this regard, one may argue that what is absent in this discourse analysis is a discussion on *nifāq* undertaken with the same dexterity and thoroughness that the author examines *bid’a* (religious innovation) and *‘ilm*.

Similarly, the author does not deliver sufficiently on his promise that he will relate his findings to the place of South African Muslim institutions in the new dispensation. Perhaps this is excusable since this work was published within the first five years of independence, and the most recent sermon analyzed dates to 1994. As South Africans, we celebrate ten years of liberation this year, and some Muslims may argue that today it is often the ideology that is dissimulated and the theology that is either accepted or rejected. In the face of a continuous and contingent demand on the Muslim community, neither the theoretical consistency of the mosque sermons that are theologically fused nor the concern with the relation of faith to dimensions such as class, gender, sexuality, and ethnicity in the ideological mosque sermons has prevented South African Muslims from appreciating their responsibility. The prism of the sermons continue to refract the full range of the spectrum, where for some *kufr* remains the greatest *zulm* and for others ecumenical pluralism is a preferred way of being for a Muslim in a civil society. They do so, however, in a second moment of an increasing awareness of

the practice and action that has to follow the sermon in face of the challenges faced locally and on the African continent generally.

The book is a welcome addition to the study of Islam in South Africa. It is invaluable for scholars of, and readers with a passing interest in, the impact of the apartheid system on the different Muslim communities in South Africa.

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NOZAR ALAOLMOLKI, *Life after the Soviet Union: The Newly Independent Republics of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia*, SUNY Series in Global Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001). Pp. 196. \$18.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY PEZHMANN DAILAMI, independent scholar, Schwerin, Germany; e-mail: pdailami@hotmail.com

The subject of this book is the recent political and economic history of the Central Asian republics as well as the state of Azerbaijan in the Caucasus since the end of the Soviet era and their subsequent independence. In addition, the author examines the present-day conditions of these republics up to the year 2000.

In the Foreword, written by John E. Wood, we are promised a fresh look at the vicissitudes of the republics. There it is asserted that scholarship on these nationalities has always been conditioned by their long-standing positions in the Soviet Union and their relations with Russia that preceded that. That seems a perfectly natural thing. However, the historical, linguistic, religious, and cultural ties of these states with their other neighbors, far and near, are said to be more important. In this book, Alaolmolki sets out to examine the newly independent republics' recent problems by relying entirely on products of the Western media, especially American and British ones. He tries to do exactly what is promised in the Foreword and informs those with raised eyebrows that the U.S. administration and especially American business now have their eyes on the natural resources of these nations and seek both economic and political influence in the region.

In his Introduction, the author informs the reader of political instability in the northern Caucasus; inter-ethnic and religious conflict in Central Asia, and the threat of the then extremist Muslims of Afghanistan, the Taliban, to Central Asian peace and security. While throughout a semblance of scholarly objectivity can be traced, when it comes to explaining U.S. policy in the region, the objectives are merely quoted. Taken at face value, U.S. policy until recently consisted of four main points: formation of democratic political institutions; promotion of market economic reform; integration of the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan into the "international communities"; and arms control, "anti-terrorism," and measures against drug trafficking (?). This time, eyebrows do not have to be raised for long, as the reader soon finds out that it is all good for business—or, at least, most of it. And in that direction, the United States has long encountered these states in the manner of an arrogant imperialist.

The first chapter contains a short history of the republics, mainly during Russian and Soviet rules, in which the author describes what is generally thought of as the oppression of the nationalities—nationalities with a virtually total lack of national consciousness and a religious doctrine that still allows for the burning of women. Perhaps Alaolmolki dreams of a khanate of Bukhara, for instance, entirely populated by mullahs and the amir's little male toy boys that would in turn be friendly with America. The British interventionists in the Russian civil war envisaged something similar, but in this day and age the U.S. State

Department ought to be more careful. Alaolmolki calls the end of state capitalism in the Soviet Union “Russia’s freedom,” although he repeatedly admits and agrees that since then, political rule in the Central Asian republics, as well as in Azerbaijan, has been more arbitrary, and the condition of their economies can only be described as devastated. He nevertheless attempts to play havoc with the sentiments of freedom-loving readers: “[t]he former Soviet republics suffered extraordinarily under Russian and Soviet rule. Forced russification in the late nineteenth century and the exploitation of the former Soviet republics’ natural resources by Tsarist Russia for its own use only harmed the people in the former Soviet republics” (p. 22). History is not Alaolmolki’s strong point.

In the chapter on economic conditions of Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states, where the author describes U.S. (and others’) efforts to fully exploit these nations’ natural resources, he comes up with his main criticism of U.S. government policy. Although a number of routes are available for oil and gas pipelines to go through, a route through Iran is more desirable because it is cheaper and more secure. That is what American business wants, and that is why it is at odds with the administration. This argument is pursued further in the book.

Another criticism of U.S. policy is (or, rather, was) its support for the CIA creatures Osama bin Laden and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Alaolmolki argues that a pipeline route through Afghanistan and Pakistan would also have been desirable had there not been so much political turmoil. When the book was being written, a stable Afghanistan must have seemed like a far-fetched imperial dream—but, of course, it is all virtually a reality now.

Throughout the book there appears to be something inherently bad about the republics’ relations with Russia and something intrinsically good about the growing American influence in the region. In the last chapter, Alaolmolki prophesizes on the bleak future of dependence of these states, both economic and political, on the Russian Federation. On this point, political reality has proved him wrong. After the imperialist invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (and especially the former) we have witnessed an increasing U.S. military presence in the region, and if economic domination has not come in full force yet, it will.

This is a book that by its nature goes out of date rather quickly. The next updated edition would benefit from more careful editing, as a number of sentences are incomprehensible, and there are paragraphs that are hard to understand. Some parts also ought to be rearranged to make comprehension of the story easier. The Tajik civil war could be explained more clearly and all in one place. Discussions of Russian and Chinese efforts to gain influence could be included in Chapter 9 (“Neighbouring Influences”), and in the same place the author ought to discuss Indian and Pakistani competition in Central Asia, too.

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HENNER FÜRTIG, *Iran’s Rivalry with Saudi Arabia Between the Gulf Wars*, Durham Middle East Monograph Series (Reading, U.K.: Ithaca Press, 2002). Pp. 306. \$49.50 cloth.

REVIEWED BY F. GREGORY GAUSE III, Department of Political Science, University of Vermont, Burlington; e-mail: gregory.gause@uvm.edu

The author, a former German diplomat now affiliated with the Center for Modern Oriental Studies in Berlin, presents a detailed and readable account of bilateral relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia from the Iranian Revolution through the mid-1990s. The work is based largely on English-and German-language secondary sources, with some reference to the secondary literature in Persian and to newspaper accounts in Arabic and Persian. The

first section of the book is a chronological account of the relationship, with chapters on the immediate post-revolutionary period, on the Iran–Iraq War, and on the first Gulf War and its aftermath. The second section of the book focuses on main areas of rivalry, both geographic and issue-oriented. It includes chapters on Saudi–Iranian competition in the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia, and for “religious and economic leadership.” The latter chapter focuses on the Iranian revolutionary challenge to Saudi claims of leadership in the Muslim world and on conflict within OPEC over oil policy.

Fürtig’s thesis is straightforward: relations between the two states in this period were particularly hostile because each put itself forward as the political leader and model for the Muslim world. Iran, by rejecting the Islamic legitimacy of monarchy in general, “challenged the very roots of the identity of the Saudi Arabian state and its ruling family” (p. xiv). Therefore, the possibility of more normal or even cooperative relations between the two states depends on how the debate in Iran over the role of Islamic revolutionary principles in Iranian politics and foreign policy works itself out.

This thesis might be considered unexceptionable, even obvious, were it not for a persistent strand in the literature on the international politics of the Persian Gulf that emphasizes the deep geo-political roots of competition among the major regional states. This school of thought stresses the continuities in Iran’s foreign-policy behavior from the Shah’s regime to the Islamic Republic; points to persistent border issues among the regional states; and generally makes a systemic-level argument about the inevitable rivalry for dominance in a tripolar regional system. I find Fürtig’s argument more persuasive than that of the “geo-political” school. While there are plenty of reasons for Saudi Arabia and Iran to oppose each other, the intensity of their mutual antipathy in the period under study had important policy consequences that were not characteristic of previous periods: active Iranian efforts to destabilize the Saudi regime domestically; an open Saudi alliance with Iraq against Iran during the Iran–Iraq War; the Saudis’ ability to institutionalize their dominance over the Arab littoral of the Gulf in the Gulf Cooperation Council, with fear of Iranian meddling in their domestic politics driving the smaller Arab monarchies into Riyadh’s arms.

Fürtig could have developed his thesis at greater length had he extended his analysis past the mid-1990s. It is disappointing in a book published in 2002 that the substantive analysis stops many years before. The late 1990s are an excellent confirming test of Fürtig’s thesis. As the “revolutionary” element of Iranian foreign policy fades in significance (though it does not disappear), relations between Riyadh and Tehran improve. Extension of the analysis for just a few more years would also have called into question Fürtig’s conclusions about Saudi–Iranian relations on oil questions. He argues that the two states’ interests in oil production and pricing issues are largely incompatible. However, in the context of the lessening of ideological tensions, the collapse of oil prices in 1997–98 brought Tehran and Riyadh together in a cooperative effort to cut OPEC quotas and push prices up. By stopping in the mid-1990s, Fürtig also misses the chance to assess the effects of the post–Gulf War increase in the seemingly permanent American military presence in the area on the relationship.

This is a fine synthetic work, based on solid secondary sources. It provides more than sufficient detail on the various aspects of the bilateral relationship. While not grounded in larger theoretical literatures, it successfully argues a clear thesis about what drove Saudi–Iranian tensions in the period. It will be of interest to the specialized audience of readers concerned with the international relations of the Persian Gulf and of transnational Muslim politics.

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DALIA DASSA KAYE, *Beyond the Handshake: Multilateral Cooperation in the Arab–Israeli Peace Process, 1991–1996* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). Pp. 341. \$60.00 cloth, \$21.50 paper.

REVIEWED BY ANTHONY F. LANG, JR., University of St. Andrews; e-mail: alang@alb.edu

Following the end of the 1991 Gulf War, the Bush administration sought to reinvigorate the peace process. Rather than begin a new round of bilateral talks, however, the administration undertook a radically different approach in opening the Madrid Conference. Based on a pragmatic, functionalist approach to the conflict, officials such as Dennis Ross, Martin Indyk, Daniel Kurtzner, and Edward Djerejian convinced the president and Secretary of State James Baker to initiate a series of multilateral negotiations centered on three issue areas: arms control, economic cooperation, and the environment (including water issues). These talks, which became known as the multilaterals, lasted from 1991 through 1996 and included Israel, Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf Cooperation Council states, and the Palestinians.

Some have dismissed the talks because they did not lead to major breakthroughs in any single relationship and were soon overshadowed by the “handshake” that followed the Oslo Accords in September 1993. Dalia Dassa Kaye argues that to point toward specific outcomes as the way to judge the success or failure of these talks ignores their more important contribution to the peace process. Kaye resists defining cooperation in terms of outcomes but, rather, argues that it is “a process of interactions, interactions which may themselves be quite conflictual. But these interactions can also lead to new understandings which may prove as important to explaining regional developments as more tangible outcomes” (p. 185). Her idea of cooperation as a “process of working together to achieve common understandings” (p. 7) captures the essence of the multilateral idea. The meetings of the three working groups created new vocabularies and, in so doing, shaped the interests of the participants in new ways. This process, described by Kaye in four substantive narratives, demonstrates the relevance of recent constructivist theories of international affairs. Rather than assuming that states come to negotiations with interests set in stone, a constructivist account explores how interests might be shaped by the process of negotiation, leading to more peaceful outcomes.

Kaye’s theoretical chapters introduce the reader to recent debates in international relations and conflict-resolution theory. Although it retains the flavor of a dissertation at times, the review does place her argument in a larger theoretical debate. It also serves the more important purpose of demonstrating the non-intuitive nature of her argument—that is, why would a process that did not lead to a new policy outcome be seen as a good thing? By demonstrating how cooperation can be better understood as an ongoing process that shapes interests, Kaye has made a valuable contribution to how we should evaluate such negotiations.

Her substantive narratives of the different tracks will be of great interest to those interested in the Arab–Israeli conflict and especially the U.S. role. The descriptions of the three working groups seamlessly weave together her theoretical and empirical material. The research for the working groups is based largely on interviews with participants in the talks. One concern is that looking through the footnotes, it appears that her subjects were mainly Israeli and American diplomats, which raises the question of how much access she had to Arab state delegations. The work does not seem skewed toward an Israeli perspective, however, which suggests she did have access to a wide array of participants.

The book is perhaps most useful for understanding the American perception of how to resolve the conflict, especially the beliefs of those involved in the last two presidential

administrations. The team of Ross, Indyk, Kurtzner, and Djerejian was influential in shaping the first Bush and the Clinton administrations' approaches to the conflict. Their focus on integrating Israel into the region by focusing on pragmatics rather than difficult political decisions has been a hallmark of the past fifteen years of U.S. policy. As Kaye points out, this approach was nurtured in Washington-area think tanks, such as the Washington Institute for Near East Affairs, which Indyk created and Ross currently directs. While some of these individuals and institutes continue to have an influence in the current Bush administration, they have largely been eclipsed by the approach of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, which seeks to create democracy by force and hopes that other Arab states will follow suit.

The refusal of Syria and Lebanon (and Iraq) to participate in the multilaterals is noted but not explored at any length. This might have been useful to examine as an alternative case, one that demonstrates how interests sometimes do *not* change as a result of negotiations. Especially since Syria and Israel undertook a six-year process of negotiations during the same time period—one that led to very little in the way of changed interests—a chapter on what happened here might have been a useful comparison.

Despite these suggestions, this is an excellent book. It makes an important theoretical contribution by demonstrating the relevance of the constructivist thesis for negotiation and conflict resolution. It also provides important historical details on the course of the multilateral negotiations. The book would be an excellent addition to an undergraduate course on the Arab–Israeli conflict and graduate-level courses in conflict-resolution and international-relations theory. One can only hope for more work from this author and others in this important area.

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SAMIR KHALAF, *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). Pp. 387. \$34.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY AKRAM FOUAD KHATER, Department of History, North Carolina State University, Raleigh; e-mail: akram_khater@ncsu.edu

Samir Khalaf's *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon* is a study in the sociology and history of communal violence and how political conflicts in Lebanon have deteriorated into protracted and visceral violence. However, on another equally profound level, this is a book that seeks to imagine and narrate a Lebanon that goes beyond the contradictory clichés of its past as either Switzerland of the Middle East, or a failed and inherently dysfunctional nation. On both levels, Khalaf succeeds in crafting a narrative that is engaging, scholarly—and, perhaps most refreshing—hopeful.

As an eminent Lebanese sociologist, Khalaf seeks to answer a question that has puzzled many observers of Lebanon—namely, why does Lebanon appear as the Janus of nations, a seemingly prosperous and peaceful multicultural society that suddenly and collectively descends into long episodes of wanton killing, leaving behind a trail of woe and destruction? Most previous observers have tended to emphasize one of two answers. Some have argued that Lebanon as a polity and social entity is untenable because it is built on deeply divisive socio-economic inequalities and cultural chasms. Others contend that external factors (Ottoman–European rivalry, the Cold War, the Arab–Israeli conflicts, etc.) rather than internal structural problems are to blame for each and every one of the three major episodes of communal violence.

Khalaf sees the answer as a combination of both factors. In the first two chapters of the book, he explores these themes in detail. He argues that in the past 150 years, communal identities in Lebanon have remained a critical part of the socio-cultural map of the country. At historical moments when sectarian lines were beginning to fade in the face of emerging socio-economic solidarities, traditional leaders (fearing loss of their power) and regional powers (seeking greater power in the Mountain) would intervene to subvert such developments and to divert political tensions into communal conflict. To illustrate this point, Khalaf examines—in Chapters 4–7—the civil war of 1860, the conflict in 1858, and the most destructive of all episodes of communal violence, the civil war of 1975–90. In each of these instances we find that the confluence of external rivalries with internal tensions unleashes inter-communal conflict.

In 1860, for example, the external factor was the contention between the Ottoman Empire and various European powers (most notably, the French and the British) over who would control the Eastern Mediterranean. Internally, the Maronite church sought to exercise greater influence over the affairs of Maronite peasants, and a new mercantile class sought to extend its economic control from the coastal cities to the mountain villages. Both trends clashed with the entrenched interests of existing Maronite and Druze overlords, who sought to safeguard their political, social, and economic power. The socio-economic discontent of the peasantry (particularly in the Maronite region of Lebanon) was encouraged by church and merchants, which gave it a sectarian ideological bent. The lords of the mountain sought to undermine the claims of the peasantry by focusing on the sectarian aspects of the revolt of 1860 and by presenting themselves as the champions of a counter-sectarian claim. Ottoman and European officials only exacerbated the conflict by providing weapons and support for one side or the other in the conflict and by emphasizing the “primordial” sectarian identities. In this manner, what started as a legitimate socio-economic grievance that could have created a new multi-religious social movement was diverted into senseless violence that only intensified sectarian divisions. The same story was repeated, with variations in historical actors and intensities, in 1958 and 1975.

But Khalaf extends his explanation beyond this thesis (which others, most notably Ussama Makdisi in his highly original study of the 1860 conflict, have articulated before) to argue that a third factor accounts for the viciousness of communal violence. In a very insightful chapter (chap. 3), he argues that violence creates its own momentum. It is not only that killing engenders the desire for revenge, or that the availability of lethal weapons makes internecine wars all the more destructive. Rather, and but for the most pathological of individuals, killing requires a “legitimate” reason that exonerates the killer and the act itself. In Lebanon, religious and communal ideology played a critical role in legitimizing the violence and thus in perpetuating it. Combatants were told that the massacres they committed were acceptable either because God was on their side or because the other side was “fascist” or “foreign.” In all of these cases, the history of communal tensions and suspicions helped create an insular and circular logic in which such stereotypes acquired coherence and meaning. This legitimating language de-humanized the “other” in the conflict and quickly turned neighbor, co-worker, relative, or simply fellow citizen into an alien whose very existence threatened one’s own existence. Thus, violence descended from “just war” into wanton killing.

Khalaf concludes this insightful book by leaving behind the past to cast a hopeful personal and scholarly look at the future of Lebanon. He argues that today in Lebanon there are three competing reactions to the post-war traumas, reconstruction, and embroilment in globalization. The first reaction is one perfected during the 1975–90 civil war, which entails a numbness that deadens any reaction to the flurry of problems or conflicts swirling around the country. This cultural and social inertia allows people to retreat from what they perceive as

overwhelming and seemingly chronic problems. The second response has been a “flight” into hyper-commercialized existence, where the woes of the present and uncertainties of the future are drowned out in a kitsch reproduction that romanticizes bygone eras without engaging that history in a meaningful and honest dialogue. The last and most promising reaction has been new forms of collective action that range from new urban planning and environmental politics to the establishment of artistic neighborhoods. These seemingly innocuous movements in fact have the capacity to transcend painfully divisive memories by creating new spaces for inter-communal action and existence at the same time that they draw on elements of the past. By focusing, for example, on the fact that quarries are devastating the Lebanese (and not Christian or Muslim, rich or poor) environment, “green” organizations create structures and mechanisms for the creation of a civil society in Lebanon and for mobilizing citizens to act outside the rubric of the “state” and the violent “street.” Ultimately, Khalaf argues that it is this new type of civil society that holds the potential to create a new Lebanon that draws on the richness of multi-cultural society even as it transcends parochial communal boundaries. In that sense, Lebanon would stand in clear juxtaposition to a Middle East descending in its totality into the morass of tribalism.

This whirlwind of a book gathers between its pages a most cogent discussion of the pitfalls and promises of Lebanon as a metaphor for new civil society. Its reliance on some older sources and its reintroduction of some ideas discussed elsewhere does not in the least detract from its breadth and depth. For that reason, this book should be read by those seeking to learn more not only about Lebanon but also about the Middle East and communal violence in general.

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HILAL KHASHAN, *Arabs at the Crossroads: Political Identity and Nationalism* (Tampa: University Press of Florida, 2000). Pp. 200. \$59.95 cloth.

REVIEWED BY BASSEL F. SALLOUKH, Department of Arab and International Studies, American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates; e-mail: bsalloukh@aus.ac.ae

Hilal Khashan’s book is a sweeping indictment of the myriad Arab failures since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the modern Arab state system. It is a story of overwhelming Arab failures at all levels: political, military, developmental, intellectual, cultural, and social. Common to these failures, however, is a basic foundational dislocation—one that has doomed everything Arab. It is the crisis of identity and legitimacy bedeviling Arab society and politics. This crisis is not without cause, however. It is rooted in the decline of traditional forms of political legitimacy and the concomitant failure to replace them with modern ideas, attitudes, and institutions. Consequently, Khashan contends, “Arabs” suffer from “a severe identity crisis” (p. 1), and the “Arab mind” is utterly confused. Moreover, it is this crisis of identity, and its socio-political ramifications, that explain the failure of the “Arabs” in the aforementioned spheres. In fact, and on Khashan’s reading, everything that transpires in the Arab world is either caused by the “Arab mind” or has a direct impact on it, but only to confuse it even more.

Khashan is not alone in deploying political culture to analyze Arab politics. Nor is he the first to make a connection between the collapse of traditional structures of political authority and the crisis of political identity. However, he employs a rather essentialist and reductionist variant of this analysis, tracing all failures to a common crisis of identity and a dislocated “Arab mind.” Under Khashan’s scrutiny, “Arabs” emerge as a monolithic herd, unable to make

sense of their place in the modern world or transcend their tribal, sectarian, clannish, and regional loyalties. For example, the poor performance of Arab armies is related to the tribal nature of Arab social and political organization (p. 49). And the lack of enthusiasm by Arab regimes to go to war in defense of Palestine should not surprise us, because whereas Mecca is a locus of attention for all Muslim Arabs, Palestine concerns only its local Arab inhabitants (p. 50). This dissonance in personal and regional loyalties explains the loss of Palestine to Zionists, as well as the inability of most Arabs to offer anything more than solidarity to the Palestinian cause. Absent from this unconvincing political-culture explanation is a secular analysis of the dynamics of inter-Arab rivalry, of the disparity in military preparedness between the two sides, and, more important, the impact of British policies on the Palestinian political leadership during the inter-war period. Moreover, Khashan's thesis fails to account for the role played by the Palestinian cause in shaping an Arab state system permeable to trans-regional political and ideological currents, especially in the 1950s and 1960s.

The crisis of identity and the "Arab mind" is also responsible for the failure of post-war developmental projects in the Arab world. After all, the "restless Arab character" (p. 83) is unprepared to deal with the exigencies of economic development, and the lack of a vibrant civil society is in part blamed on the lack of discipline among Arabs and their inability to understand laws and respect them (p. 84). The list does not end here, however. Khashan contends that radical Islamists can successfully recruit members into their brand of militant Islam because the "Arab-Islamic mind" is a "unionist" one (p. 118) and hence easily tapped into by these groups. But is it not more convincing to explain these dynamics in terms of political-economic and sociological variables than by using the reductionist variables of identity and the "Arab mind"? Similarly, though in a different context, does the personal animosity between Hafiz al-Asad and Saddam Hussein best explain Syria's alliance with Iran from 1980 until 1988 (p. 96)? Why invoke idiosyncratic variables when defensive realism provides a more coherent geo-political explanation of this alliance choice?

I do not want to suggest that Khashan fails to offer a good analysis of many of the problems and challenges facing contemporary Arab societies. This he does, and much of his book reads like a straightforward modern political history of the Arab region. But the methodological choices he has made are unconvincing and misleading. The problem with this kind of residual analysis is that it tends to privilege political culture as an explanatory variable over much more convincing, and consistent, explanatory variables, such as the process of state formation, neo-patrimonial regime survival and state building strategies, neo-colonialism, and the dynamics of late and penetrated capitalist development. Moreover, Khashan does not engage in a cross-regional comparative analysis of the many failures he catalogues to ascertain whether these are strictly *Arab* failures or the socio-economic and political consequences of state formation under the pressures of late development and neo-colonialism common to many parts of the so-called developing world.

No region requires a more urgent and critical examination of its past failures and present challenges than the Arab world. But to reduce the causes of these failures and challenges to a crisis of identity and to a "disoriented and politically indecisive" (p. 1) "Arab mind" offers very little insight, both methodologically and empirically, into their true origins and the means to negotiate their peaceful resolution. A genealogy of past failures and present challenges plaguing Arab societies deserves greater methodological self-consciousness and rigor than that exercised in *Arabs at the Crossroads*.

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MEHDI MOSLEM, *Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2002). Pp. 378. \$29.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY ARANG KESHAVARZIAN, Department of Political Science, Concordia University, Montreal; e-mail: akeshava@alcor.concordia.ca

There have been three waves of studies on Iran after the Islamic Revolution. The initial series of studies debates the causes of the revolution. A second collection investigates the ideological and theological underpinnings of the Islamic Republic. Most recently, a set of monographs has begun to probe the praxis of the regime and the dynamics of post-revolutionary politics. Mehdi Moslem's *Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran* is an insightful and thought-provoking contribution to this newer research agenda.

Moslem asks three questions: what are the roots of the ideological disputes among the Islamic Republics' elite; how do factions express, impose, and translate their views into policies; and how has this factionalism influenced the political development of the regime? His meticulously researched and clearly written narrative shows that ideological plurality emerges out of the three founding components of the Islamic Republic: the populist, religious, and revolutionary dimensions. Consequently, political cleavages and factional discord are based on the relative weight given to these essential principles, with "the left" initially stressing the populist and revolutionary dimensions and "the right" favoring an elitist and religious interpretation of Islamic government. Moslem, building on Behzad Nabavi's typology, carefully illustrates that this initial inter-elite division evolved into four ideological groupings—specifically, the "conservative right," "modern right," "reformist left," and "neo-fundamentalist" populist left. Given the specific junctures and depending on issue areas such as economic, foreign, and cultural policy, these factions have clashed or cooperated with one another. Ostensibly writing an analysis of the ideological development and public discourse of the political elite in the Islamic Republic, Moslem is at his best when he delves into an extensive array of newspaper archives and the parliamentary record to present and juxtapose the factional conflicts and trajectories of these groupings. For instance, he demonstrates that because factional debates are framed in terms of the different interpretations and synergies of the religious, populist, and revolutionary dimensions, all factions since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini have resorted to methods of co-opting the legacy of the founder of the Islamic Republic and the interpretation of its principles.

Second, these ideological differences and conflicts, argues Moslem, have increasingly been channeled by the plethora of state institutions and bodies of the state. The diffused institutional configuration, which was enshrined in the Iranian Constitution and entrenched by Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani's "rationalization of the regime" (chap. 4), is the linchpin reinforcing and shaping the factional conflict and competition. Moslem provides ample examples of how factional clashes revolve around elections, laws defining the powers and responsibilities of particular government bodies, and five-year development plans and budgets. Moreover, Moslem takes the institutional argument further by arguing that once factions control particular state institutions (e.g., the parliament or the judiciary), they transform them into instruments and forums to challenge and subvert their opponents. Thus, institutions result in "patterned and predictable" factional politics. A plausible and complementary line of argument not followed by Moslem would be that once factions begin to coincide with a particular institution, factional conflicts will become even more intransigent, because ideological distinctions will be buttressed by institutional interests. Given the narrative's emphasis on the ideological dynamism of these factions, more weight should be given to the power of institutionally generated interests and contestation than Moslem's treatment is ready to bear.

The third question, the effect of factionalism on the political development, receives far less treatment than the first two questions. This is unfortunate in that, without an argument about the consequences of ideological pluralism and conflict, it is difficult to appraise the importance of the study as a whole. It is suggested that factionalism has undermined long-term planning and stable policies, but factors such as fluctuations in oil revenue or class conflict may have been equally important. In the Conclusion, Moslem raises the issue of “unintended consequences” but does not enumerate these consequences or how they relate to factionalism. He alludes to potentially intriguing outcomes such as “cracks in the historical alliance of the clergy and the bazaar” (p. 270), yet we are not told what these cracks entail, why they have occurred, and what their relationship is to factional politics.

This limitation points to a more fundamental shortcoming of the study—namely, the lack of attention paid to how disputes among the Islamic Republic’s elite seep down and resonate at the level of the bureaucracy, civil society, and social groups, and if they do not, why not? Does this political factionalism reflect and perpetuate social and economic cleavages within Iranian society? Are these factions able to mobilize popular support for their positions, and to what extent does this vary across groups and over time? Non-elites are absent from Moslem’s account. It is not until the last few pages that we read such statements as “the 1997 presidential election should be an alarm for all factions in power that the society will no longer accept oppressive measures” (p. 272), or that “the society sets agendas” (p. 273). However, since factional politics are not mapped onto society or civil society, and factional competition is never linked to electoral politics and the mobilization of the electorate, it is difficult to access these statements or comprehend “the epic of the second of Khordad.”

Finally, and related to the analysis’s disconnect between ideological cleavages and social forces, Moslem does not address a question that seems to hover over his study: is there a possibility for a form of politics in the Islamic Republic other than factional politics? Is there a possibility that factional conflict can be transformed into party competition? Or are these ideologies and diffused institutions incommensurable with a party system that represents the interests of social groups? The impact of Moslem’s carefully researched and rich narrative would have been far greater if he had paused to contemplate the society, economy, and history that accommodates, if not produces, the ideologies and institutions that he treats so systematically and judiciously. Even though I wish Moslem had broadened his scope analytically, I firmly believe that this monograph will be a useful source for students of Iranian politics for many years.

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EQBAL AHMAD, *Terrorism: Theirs and Ours* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2001). Pp. 59. \$6.95 paper.

RAHUL MAHAJAN, *The New Crusade* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2002). Pp. 160. \$17.95 paper.

HOWARD ZINN, *Terrorism and War* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002). Pp. 159. \$9.95 paper.

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The term “terrorism” is normally applied to activities of small and scattered groups who pursue their goals with fanaticism and press their political and religious agenda by the force

of fear and insecurity. There are also states that sponsor terrorism. However, whether a major country such as the United States can be labeled a terrorist country is not often addressed. A few writers on the left have explored that notion. They claim that the United States' militarism abroad is similar to what terrorist groups do. Moreover, most terrorists, from the Islamic fundamentalists of the Middle East to the right-wing assassins of Latin America, are products of U.S. imperial policies. Osama bin Laden was groomed by the CIA, as were Manuel Noriega of Panama and Roberto D'Aubuisson of El Salvador.

The United States itself is the product of war and aggression, created by grabbing land from Native Americans and Mexicans. It is an empire "as brutal as any other," as Rahul Mahajan asserts (p. 104), constantly seeking alibis to invade other nations. What is the hidden agenda behind these invasions? To gain economic advantage, to install military bases, and to gain world supremacy, he responds. For example, the engagement in Afghanistan was due to concern for UNOCAL pipelines. Mahajan goes as far as saying that even intervention on behalf of the Kosovars was meant to "turn Kosovo into an economic protectorate of the United States and establish a military beachhead in the Balkans" (pp. 112–13).

Explaining the logic of attacking Afghanistan, he writes, "Americans argue that if a maniac breaks into your house and has already killed a family member, then you have no need to negotiate before attacking him back" (p. 21). But, Mahajan argues, the analogy is wrong—instead, it is a case in which a maniac attacks your house, and you level his entire neighborhood in revenge. The author, an Indian-born American lawyer, has collected enough evidence to indict America in any court of law. He leaves no stone unturned, although most of the information he presents is already part of the common repertoire that is rehashed over and over in the media. But in his attempt to convict America, he claims that the Taliban were better than the Northern Alliance and that Saddam Hussein was more or less a reasonable leader trying to comply, albeit lethargically, with U.N. resolutions. He writes, "The Taliban's only virtue, and the reason they had some popular support, was that they brought order to the region they governed. The so-called Northern Alliance, by contrast, is a group of warlords" (p. 41). Mahajan is not short of words or evidence. His advocacy is sharp and condemning. By the same token, however, one may argue that his predilection for advocacy stands in the way of more objective analysis. For example, while details of American misdeeds abroad are enumerated, the abject human-rights transgressions of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein find no coverage in Mahajan's book. Mahajan, in denouncing the United States, calls it just another brutal empire without discussing whether there is any qualitative difference between this "empire" and the former Soviet Union, or the nascent empire of the fascists in the first half of the 20th century.

Howard Zinn, who, according to his biography, "grew up in the immigrant slums of Brooklyn," also finds America lost in the path of wickedness. Considering terrorism, Zinn, like Mahajan, argues that the U.S. government is the largest supporter of terrorism. The School of Americas, now renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, has been the military nursery for dictators and specialists in the violation of human rights. Zinn devotes a good part of his book (which is in interview form) to the stifling of dissent in America. He writes, "We have a long tradition in this country of stifling dissent exactly at those moments when dissent is badly needed" (p. 61). Zinn, a retired professor of political science at Boston University, has no difficulty quoting various news anchors, congressmen, and other authorities who kowtow to President Bush's war-mongering.

Zinn maintains that what is being done in the name of security for America across the world prompts more terrorism. "You might say that there is a reservoir of possible terrorists among all those people in the world who have suffered as a result of U.S. foreign policy" (p. 17). What should the United States do in the face of growing international terrorism?

Zinn would not settle for less than a complete overhaul of the American political system. "If we want real security, we will have to change our posture in the world—to stop being an intervening military power and to stop dominating the economies of other countries" (p. 9). According to Zinn, the cause of all that evil is capitalism. The U.S. government could feed millions of people in the world if it stopped its war machine and spent the budget instead on the welfare of the people. However, that will not happen, because the country is driven by capitalist greed, which in turn billows out war and violence. Reflecting on history, Zinn shows how a good part of the United States was appropriated from Mexico during the Spanish War, a war that was begun based on trumped-up charges. Zinn does not take the time to discuss how a war-mongering capitalist country whose territorial integrity is based on war and conquest can change its "posture" in the world.

In *Terrorism: Theirs and Ours*, which also uses an interview format, the late Eqbal Ahmad, the Indian-born activist and scholar once accused of plotting to kidnap Henry Kissinger, identifies five different types of terrorism. Of those five, he considers state terrorism such as that committed by U.S. allies throughout the Cold War, the most dangerous, callous, and calculated. "Of the five types of terror, the official approach is to focus on only one form—political terrorism. . . . The form that exacts the highest loss of life is state terrorism" (p. 18). However, Ahmad considers political terrorism, as perpetrated by the likes of Yasir Arafat and Osama bin Laden, as simply an effort to be heard and recognized and to express anger against lasting injustices. Ahmad writes that, although former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir said in 1969 that "there are no Palestinians" (p. 19), decades of terrorism established an identity for them—so much so that even Israel recognizes an entity by that name. Ahmad also recognizes other motives for terrorism, such as "expression of anger and helplessness. . . tribal ethic of revenge. . . [and the reaction of] victims of violence" (pp. 18–19).

Analyzing the roots of modern political and religious terrorism, Ahmad maintains that the rise of religious terrorism and the jihadi movement was stirred by America. Jihad in Islam had been forgotten for 400 years before America kicked it off in the war against the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan. However, the rise of terror as a means of political action could be directly related to the decline of revolutionary (Marxist) ideology (for which America was most likely responsible) and indirectly to globalization (which is encouraged by the capitalists). Ahmad describes the debate between Marxist revolutionaries and the anarchists of the late 19th century, when the former denounced personal assassination—"terrorism," in modern parlance—as a means of revolutionary action. "The revolutionary ideology receded, giving in to globalized individuals" (p. 21).

The U.S. government, according to Ahmad, conveniently ignores the truly egregious acts of terrorism perpetrated by its own allies while incessantly threatening non-allies with retaliation. He writes: "the ratio of people killed by the state terror of Zia ul-Hagh, Pinochet, Argentineans, Brazilians, Indonesian type, versus the killing of the PLO and other organizations is literally [*sic*], conservatively, 1000 to 1" (p. 16).

Ahmad, like the two other authors, seeks political solutions for terrorism, not military ones, because political terrorism in essence is political and requires political solutions. Military reactions would only exacerbate political terrorism and put more wind in the sails of the religious terrorists. While Ahmad's observation is compelling, one cannot surmise from his blanket "political solution" a practical method of dealing with modern terrorism.

Whether the receding of revolutionary ideology has led to the rise of individualized terror, as Ahmad claims, is also questionable. Marxist revolutionaries were not averse to terrorism. The late 20th century witnessed the rise of "urban guerrillas" who were both Marxist and well disposed toward the use of terrorism and personal assassination.

The ideas of the three authors discussed here, all of whom were raised in the margins of American society, are refreshing. However, they seem to be more concerned with the rule of

justice in the world than the realities of international relations. Modern terrorism has created a need for debate, especially in the area of international law, where no provision is made for acts of small groups of terrorists against nations. Nevertheless, "terrorism" is a term used in the parlance of political science to denote violent actions of small groups to force their political or religious agenda on others. Using the same term to implicate a superpower is questionable, at best.